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Abstract
This thesis investigates theoretically how information and credit frictions affect
the functioning of financial markets. I suggest that asymmetry of information about
opaque assets may cause instability. The widespread use of these assets as collateral
contributed to a severe credit contraction during the recent crisis. In this context, I
propose a theory of collateral re-use, a technique designed to overcome shortages of
high quality assets to secure credit.
The first chapter shows that information frictions generate liquidity fluctuations
whereby asset prices move endogenously. In the model, buyers meet sellers in a de-
centralized market and do not know their asset quality. Prices and volume increase
with the average quality of sellers since buyers are more willing to trade. However,
high trading volume depletes the pool of future high quality sellers. Cyclical equilib-
ria in price and volume are thus sustained endogenously. Temporary asset purchase
programs can revive the market and smooth out fluctuations. Finally, I show that
increasing market centralization may harm liquidity provision and reduce welfare.
The second chapter introduces collateral re-use in an economy where agents face
limited commitment and must pledge a durable asset to borrow. Lenders may then
re-sell a pledged asset or re-pledge it to secure further borrowing. Since lenders may
now default and fail to return the collateral, net gains from collateral circulation are
ambiguous. I show that benefits are larger in decentralized markets when agents
trade trough intermediaries. The third chapter, joint with Piero Gottardi and Cyril
Monnet, complements this analysis, focusing on repurchase agreements. In a repo,
the borrower sells an asset to raise income and commits to a repurchase price to
limit exposure to future market risk. If defaulting borrowers incur a cost over and
above the loss of collateral, re-use is beneficial and increases leverage. We show that
intermediation now arises endogenously: trustworthy agents - those with high cost
of default - re-use collateral to borrow on behalf of riskier counterparties.
i
The beginning and end of a matter
are not always seen at once.
Herodotus, The Histories, VII, 51
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Chapter 1
Liquidity Fluctuations in Over the
Counter Markets
1.1 Introduction
The recent 2007 crisis started with a widespread shortage of liquidity in the fi-
nancial system after a prolonged boom. Difficulties to sell or finance securities on
secondary markets triggered a collapse in the issuance of many assets, impacting
credit and ultimately the real economy. The severity of the bust prompted a two
stage response from policy-makers acting both as market participants and market
designers. During the crisis, the US Fed provided credit lines and purchased assets
such as Mortgage Backed Securities to prop up trading and liquidity. In Europe,
fears of government losses or uncertainty regarding their optimal design sometimes
delayed the implementation of these programs1. In a second ongoing phase, regu-
lators have started to overhaul various segments of financial markets. For instance,
the Market in Financial Instruments Directive2 requires “all standardized derivatives
to be traded on organized and transparent venues”. For many assets, transactions
indeed take place Over The Counter (OTC) where trading frictions and opacity
may cause illiquidity and instability3. Increased transparency and competition are
generally seen as desirable features of centralized platforms.
In this paper, I propose a theory based on asymmetry of information to explain
why liquid OTC markets can become illiquid. Endogenous variations in the supply
of high quality assets generate price and volume swings. I use the model to study an
asset purchase program designed to revive market liquidity in bad times. I show that
1“Too little, too late” was the financial press widespread reception to the ECB 60 billion-a-month
bond buying plan announced in January 2015.
2MIFID II, Regulation 600/2014 of the European Parliament. In the US, Title VII of the Dodd
Frank in the US contains similar provisions.
3On its website, the IMF referring to OTC markets explains that “some types of market ar-
rangements can very quickly become disorderly, dysfunctional, or otherwise unstable”
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large interventions might be too costly and that tight government budget constraints
dampen the effect of the policy. Finally, I argue that in the presence of asymmetry
of information, a decentralized market might perform better in providing liquidity.
The introduction of a more transparent trading platform, in line with the target of
current reforms, can thus decrease welfare.
In the model, agents have different valuations for a long-term asset and thus
gain from trade. Preferences switch over time so that buyers may ultimately need
to resell an asset previously acquired. In the OTC market, agents match bilaterally
and the buyer makes a Take It Or Leave It offer. There are two qualities of the
asset which either pays a high or a low dividend. The key friction is that only the
seller knows the quality of the asset he holds as well as his own valuation. Hence,
trade may fail to occur because of adverse selection as in Akerlof (1970). A pooling
price offer to attract high quality sellers entails losses on low quality assets. When
the share of high quality sellers is too low, a buyer thus reduces his bid to trade
only with low quality sellers. We call market liquidity the ease to sell a good quality
asset. Liquidity can fluctuate because both the value of a lemon to a buyer and the
composition of the pool of sellers are endogenous. First, high future prices raise the
resale value of a lemon. This increases buyers’ willingness to pay today for an asset
of unknown quality. Hence high future liquidity begets present liquidity since then,
buyers are more likely to offer a price at which high quality assets trade. Dynamics
can be more intricate, however, since the composition of the pool of sellers responds
negatively to market liquidity. If the market was liquid in the past, high quality
assets are in the hands of high valuation agents who do not wish to sell. Buyers
thus mostly meet low quality sellers who want to flip their lemon, regardless of their
private valuation. A low price offer becomes more profitable, so that liquidity can
generate illiquidity. This composition effect also leaves room for recovery. If the
market is illiquid, selling pressure from high quality asset owners accumulates over
time as high valuation agents switch to low valuation. Buyers meet increasingly
more good quality sellers and, after some time, may offer a pooling price.
When the discount factor and the probability of switching type are low, the com-
position effect is strong and equilibrium cycles exist in the absence of any aggregate
shock. For T ≥ 2, a T period cycle consists of T − 1 trough periods where only
2
Chapter 1. Liquidity Fluctuations in Over the Counter Markets
lemons trade and 1 peak period where both qualities trade. The market price for the
low quality asset increases during the trough to reflect high offers at the next peak.
Indeed, traders know that the accumulation of selling pressure for high quality assets
will lead future buyers to offer a pooling price. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the first to characterize cycles in this environment. Foucault et al. (2013)
describes “‘make-take” liquidity cycles in electronic markets which share many fea-
tures with the dynamics in my model4. The model also sheds light on boom and
bust episodes commonly associated to financial crises. During the trough of the cy-
cle, investors exhibit speculative behavior in the words of Harrison and Kreps (1978)
as they know they buy a lemon but pay an increasing premium that captures future
resale gains. The low quality asset appears like a hot potato that agents pass to
the next investor in line. Since the pool quality may take time to reach the peak
whereas a pooling offer immediately clears the market, the model can rationalize
slow build-ups followed by fast crashes.
Cycles emerge for an intermediate share of high quality assets in the economy.
In that region, there also exists a steady state equilibrium in mixed strategy where
buyers randomize between the pooling and the separating price. Intuitively, funda-
mentals are neither favorable enough for the market to be fully liquid nor so bad
that good quality assets never trade. Partial illiquidity materializes either through
buyers’ randomization in a steady state or through cyclical dynamics. I show that
fluctuations in a cycle typically entail a surplus loss with respect to the steady state.
There is too much trade at the peak of the cycle and too little at the bottom. Sur-
plus would improve by propping up (resp. taming) liquidity in the trough (resp. at
the peak).
Illiquid and unstable markets call for policy interventions. I study an asset
purchase program by a benevolent government who is bound to resell the assets
purchased. The combination of an asset purchase program together with a resale
constraint fits the description of many policies implemented during the financial
4The sharp fall and progressive build-up of liquidity after a period with high volume and high
price also evokes Duffie (2010)’s account of price movements after good news. In my model, at the
peak of a cycle, there is “good news” about the quality of assets for sale as the pool contains many
high quality assets. Liquidity then falls because of the composition effect.
3
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crisis5. In my model, the resale constraint proceeds from a natural assumption that
the government values assets less than private agents6. In addition, a revertible
intervention does not affect the fundamentals of the economy in the long run. I
show that this asset purchase program can still increase surplus when the economy
is in a cycle. Buying lemons jump-starts the OTC market as it improves the aver-
age asset quality private buyers face in the trough. Reselling lemons at the peak
may then reduce prices and trading volume in line with steady state levels. When
the objective is to maximize aggregate surplus, the government weighs the benefits
from jump-starting and then stabilizing the market with the asset holdings costs.
My numerical analysis shows that achieving the first objective sometimes requires
buying too many assets and the intervention becomes undesirable.
I show that the program is not self-financing. Although he eventually resells as-
sets, the government runs a loss. Indeed, he enjoys a lower utility for the dividends
of the asset but also pays a premium to induce participation in the program. As we
observed, buying lemons increases liquidity. However, better conditions in the OTC
market raise the outside (market) option of lemon holders and in turn the price
the government must pay. To finance the shortfall, I allow the government to tax
transactions in the resale period. Then, I show numerically that Pareto improve-
ments are possible but budget-neutral interventions need be smaller. Indeed, while
flattening fluctuations raises surplus, riding the liquidity cycle relaxes the govern-
ment budget constraint in two ways. First, maintaining high liquidity in the resale
period reduces the capital loss of the government who can quote a high resale price.
Second, it increases the tax base to make up for this loss.
Finally, Section 1.5 introduces a more transparent trading infrastructure called
Exchange. Buyers now post and commit to terms of trade prior to meeting a coun-
terparty. Sellers thus observe prices posted by all buyers. With bilateral matching,
they may face a different level of rationing for each price. I show that the resulting
5After its first intervention in the Mortgage Backed Security Market in 2008, the Federal Reserve
was eager to sell back the assets it had purchased. Since then, it has adopted a buy and hold
strategy.
6Intuitively, a public entity does not value the potential services (borrowing, hedging..) attached
to holding assets. Asset purchase programs would then generate some misallocation. To quote
Singh (2013), “some central banks purchases of good collateral have contributed to shrinkage in the
pledged collateral market”
4
Chapter 1. Liquidity Fluctuations in Over the Counter Markets
increase in competition in the Exchange lowers liquidity and may decrease welfare.
On the upside, price posting economizes on search costs. Indeed buyers and sellers
can coordinate on a sub-market and price competition avoids spending on wasteful
search cost. However, the availability of multiple offers induces sellers to try and
signal their asset quality. High quality sellers should thus choose higher prices where
they face a lower probability of trading. I show that in equilibrium, high quality
assets do not trade at all. Both dimensions of private information - valuation and
asset quality - matter for this extreme result. The key ingredient is the presence of
high valuation lemon owners who have no gains from trade with buyers - a “no gap
at the middle condition”. These traders block transactions of high quality assets as
they would otherwise mimic high quality sellers. Hence, competition generated by
a transparent centralized market may harm liquidity provision. In the opaque OTC
market, local monopsony power protects buyers from competition, allowing for a
pooling outcome.
Aggregate surplus is higher in the OTC market than in the Exchange when the
share of high quality assets is sufficiently large. In that region, the realized gains
from trade on high quality assets overcome the inefficiencies attached to random
search and bargaining. This comparison suggests that, to some extent, opaqueness
of the asset traded and the trading structure are complement. In the presence of
asymmetry of information about the asset value, a transparent and competitive ex-
change is not necessarily desirable.
Relation to the literature
A strand of literature has identified self-fulfilling expectations as a mechanism
for cycles and chaotic dynamics in the absence of aggregate shocks. Boldrin and
Woodford (1990) provides a survey of early endogenous business cycle models. More
recently, a series of works including Gu et al. (2013) or Rocheteau and Wright (2013)
highlighted the contribution of credit constraints in generating such dynamics. In
my model, cycles rather hinge on variations in the composition of the pool of sellers
- a backward-looking variable -, and equilibrium multiplicity is not as severe.
This paper relates more closely to the growing literature on dynamic markets
with asymmetric information. My contribution is to show that this environment
5
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is prone to liquidity fluctuations. Recent works (e.g. Deneckere and Liang, 2006,
Camargo and Lester, 2014, Moreno and Wooders, 2013) have emphasized that, as a
screening device, trading delay is tantamount to rationing in a static environment.
Bad assets trade first while high quality sellers are willing to wait. Frozen lemon
markets thus eventually thaw over time endogenously or thanks to the arrival of
news as in Daley and Green (2012). This force leading to separation of sellers is
absent with re-trade. My paper is thus closer to Chiu and Koeppl (2014) since
there also, the lemon problem does not vanish over time7. Monopsonist buyers also
offer terms of trade after matching and may pool sellers if chances to obtain a good
quality asset are high. However, their model does not disentangle the preference
switching process from the trading process. This natural feature is an important
element to identify cycles. In addition, as I discuss later, my revertible policy differs
from their permanent asset purchase program. Finally, their paper does not discuss
the role of the market structure or transparency.
I compare indeed the OTC equilibrium to that of an directed search environ-
ment (called Exchange) where buyers post and commit to terms of trade before
meeting. There, as in Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) and Chang (2014), building on
Guerrieri et al. (2010) and the pioneering work of Gale (1996), separation obtains
through rationing at different prices8. As a difference with these works, I show that
the possibility to resell assets with two dimensions of private information exacer-
bates market illiquidity. High valuation owners who try to flip their lemon form a
middle type with whom buyers do not gain from trade. Adverse selection is thus
more severe and high quality assets do not trade. As a consequence, liquidity is
lower than in the OTC market when the equilibrium is pooling in that market. In
a common value environment, Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009) and Fuchs and Skrzypacz
(2015) showed that pre-trade information may come at the expense of liquidity. If
buyers can observe the offers a seller rejected, the latter can use this information as
a signal. In my model of the Exchange, it is rather the possibility to observe current
7Hellwig and Zhang (2013) add endogenous information acquisition to this framework and show
that equilibria with different degree of adverse selection and liquidity can coexist. In my model,
liquidity varies over time in a given equilibrium
8Exclusivity for sellers is crucial to generate separation in this environment. Kurlat (2015)
relaxes this assumption and obtains a pooling outcome. See Wilson (1980) for a useful discussion
on this issue.
6
Chapter 1. Liquidity Fluctuations in Over the Counter Markets
terms of trade and not inconclusive past offers that leads to separation.
Although the Exchange improves trading efficiency for low quality assets, market
centralization and transparency can thus reduce aggregate surplus. In the seminal
search model of Duffie et al. (2005), trading takes place under symmetric informa-
tion and only the first effect is present. There, the centralized benchmark unam-
biguously dominates the market with frictions. My result complements the findings
of Malamud and Rostek (2014) who highlight the surprising role of market power
as a potential force against centralization. In their model, the market structure is
also exogenous. Michelacci and Suarez (2006) or Bolton et al. (2014) can endoge-
nize traders’ choice by imposing symmetric information in the OTC market, while
I maintain asymmetric information in both platforms.
Finally, the government purchase program for lemon markets I study, shares
many features with the policy experiment of Philippon and Skreta (2012) Tirole
(2012) or Chiu and Koeppl (2014). Unlike these papers and some mentioned above,
I impose a realistic constraint on the government to revert the policy, that is to resell
the assets purchased. Although the intervention may not change the fundamentals
of the economy in the long run, it can prop up and then stabilize liquidity in a
cycle. If implemented in steady state, this program would have at best no effect on
aggregate surplus. As in Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) or Faria-e-Castro et al. (2015)
with a different focus, I discuss the interaction between designing and funding the
policy. To generate a high taxing profit in the resale period, the government some-
what rides the liquidity cycle and the intervention does not flatten fluctuations as
much. The government then leans against the wind by buying low and selling high,
like the market-maker of Weill (2007).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model.
In Section 1.3, I describe the main dynamic effects and solve for stationary equilibria
including cycles. Section 1.4 discusses the welfare implications of liquidity fluctua-
tions and studies an asset purchase program aimed at restoring liquidity. Section
1.5 analyzes a market structure change by allowing agents to post prices before
meetings. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes. Proofs are in Appendix 1.7.2.
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1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and runs forever t = 0, 1, ..,∞. The economy is populated by a
large continuum of infinitely-lived agents with discount factor δ < 1. They consume
a non-storable numeraire good c and dividends d from assets. Agents can have
either low (i = 1) or high valuation (i = 2) for the dividends with the following
instantaneous preferences:
ui(c, d) = c+ τ id
where 1 = τ 1 < τ 2 = τ . Agents with a higher private valuation like the (dividends of
the) asset more. Valuation is persistent but may switch from one period to the next
with probability γ ∈ (0, 1/2). This Markov Process is identical and independently
distributed across agents. The valuation of an agent is private information9. Agents
are endowed with e units of the numeraire good every period. There is an infinitely
lived asset in fixed supply S with two varieties denoted H (High) and L (Low) with
share q and 1− q respectively. Variety L pays dividend dL > 0 in every period while
variety H pays dividend dH > dL. The variety or quality is private information to
the current holder of the asset. The asset is indivisible and agents may hold either
zero or one unit10.
Asset owners enter date t ≥ 1 carrying their holdings from date t − 1. At the
beginning of the period, valuations can switch and agents may wish to trade. Non
asset owners must pay a cost κ > 0 to enter a decentralized market where they
offer terms of trade to asset owners. Section 1.2.2 describes the market structure in
detail. The key friction is the asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers.
At the end of the period, dividends pay off and buyers discover the quality of the
asset purchased if any. The economy then moves on to period t+ 1.
With two valuations and three possible asset holding status, there are effectively
9Private valuation may capture different services attached to holding an asset (hedging, collat-
eral). Since their type switch agents with high valuations may need to resell an asset purchased as
it is usual in secondary markets.
10I make this assumption for tractability. The indivisibility comes without loss of generality as
buyers may offer contracts with probabilities of trade.
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six types of agents in the economy. Let thus (τ i, a) denote an agent with private
valuation τ i ∈ {τ 1, τ 2} and asset holding a ∈ {0, L,H} where by convention a = 0
means no asset. Importantly, there are two dimensions of private information for
an asset owner: valuation and asset quality. Let now µia(t) be the mass of of (τ
i, a)
agents in period t after the type switch but before the market opens. With this
notation, {µia(0)}i=1,2a=0,L,H is the initial distribution of asset holdings. These quantities
verify the following balance equations:µ
1
H(t) + µ
2
H(t) = Sq
µ1L(t) + µ
2
L(t) = S(1− q)
(1.1)
The total supply of each variety of the asset must match the total holdings of this
variety across the population in any period t. I now impose a series of assumptions
on the parameters of the model. The main restriction disciplines the degree of
adverse selection:
τdL < dH (LC)
I will refer to (LC) as the lemon condition. In a static environment, the value of
dividend dL to a type τ
2 agent lies below the value of dividend dH to a type τ
1
agent. This will imply that any price acceptable by a (τ 1, H) owner to sell his asset
is also acceptable for a type (τ 2, L) owner. The following assumptions are technical:
τdH
1− δ ≤ e (A1)
κ ≤ κ¯(γ, δ, τ, dL, dH), (A2)
Condition (A1) ensures that trade does not fail for lack of funds. Observe indeed
that the left hand side is the present discounted value of asset H when held in every
period by a high valuation agent. Condition (A2) guarantees that search costs are
small enough to preserve gains from trade and non-owners find it optimal to search.
The expression of κ¯(γ, δ, τ, dL, dH) is in Appendix 1.7.1. The important observation
is that κ¯ does not depend on the share of H assets q.
9
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1.2.2 The OTC market
Until Section 1.5 with price posting, I consider a market structure with random
search and ex-post offers, called Over The Counter or OTC. Trading is decentral-
ized. A non-owner must pay the search cost κ > 0 to match with at most one asset
owner. In a match, the non-owner makes a Take It Or Leave It (TIOLI) offer11
to the asset owner. I first describe the matching and bargaining stage in a given
period t ≥ 0 and then turn to the model dynamics. Definition 2 then introduces the
concept of the OTC equilibrium.
Matching
Asset owners with total mass S simply wait for a match. The mass of active non-
owners or buyers in period t, µB(t) results from an entry decision detailed later.
The matching function is of the Leontieff type. Precisely, the probability λS(t)
(resp. λB(t)) for a seller to meet a buyer (resp. for a buyer to meet a seller) in
period t is:
λS(t) = min
{
µB(t)
S
, 1
}
, λB(t) = min
{
S
µB(t)
, 1
}
Search frictions are minimal because the short side of the market finds a counter-
party for sure12. Search is random so that a matched buyer meets an owner with
type (τ i, a) with probability µia(t)/S where i ∈ {1, 2} and a ∈ {L,H}. This is the
fraction of that type in the population of asset owners. Private information and ran-
domness generate inefficiencies because agents with no gains from trade may meet.
Stage Bargaining Game
In a match, the buyer does not know the quality of the asset held by the seller. He
offers a price13 to trade that the seller may accept or refuse. Formally, a strategy for
11We follow most of the literature on bargaining with common value in giving the bargaining
power to the uninformed party. The search costs matters primarily to compare the OTC and
the Exchange structure in a meaningful way. In equilibrium, buyers will indeed always make zero
profit. Since they do not compete simultaneously in price in the OTC market, this would not be
possible without the cost.
12I make this assumption for tractability. Most of the search models set in continuous time a la
Duffie et al. (2005) use a purely random search technology but specific functional forms as well.
In discrete time however, Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) use a similar matching function.
13We can extend the set of possible offers to contracts formed by a price and a probability to
10
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buyer (τ k, 0) where k ∈ {1, 2} in period t is a distribution Πk(t, .) over the real line.
We let Supp(Πk(t, .)) denote the support of this distribution. A strategy for owner
(τ i, a) in period t is a probability αia(t, p) ∈ [0, 1] to accept offer p. To introduce
the primitives of the bargaining game, let {via(t)}i=1,2a=0,L,H be the value functions in
period t before the market opens, net of the value of the endowment stream. Then:
v¯ia(t+ 1) := (1− γ)via(t+ 1) + γvja(t+ 1), a ∈ {0, L,H}, i ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i
is agent (τ i, a) expected future utility from holding asset a, given that he may switch
valuation. We can now write down payoffs in the bargaining game. When offered p,
owner with type (τ i, a) solves:
max
αia(t,p)
αia(t, p)
[
p+ δv¯i0(t+ 1)
]
+ (1− αia(t, p))
[
τ ida + δv¯
i
a(t+ 1)
]
(1.2)
If he accepts, a seller obtains the price p and the future utility from being a non
owner δv¯i0(t + 1). If he refuses the offer, he enjoys the dividend τ
ida and obtains
next period expected utility from the asset δv¯ia(t+ 1). For buyer (τ
k, 0), price p∗ is
optimal if:
p∗ ∈ arg max
p

∑
i=1,2
a=L,H
µia(t)
S
(
αia(t, p)
[
τ kda + δv¯
k
a(t+ 1)− p
]
+ (1− αia(t, p))δv¯k0(t+ 1)
)
(1.3)
Under asymmetry of information, the buyer forms expectations over the asset owner
type he matched with. When offering p, he obtains the asset with probability αia(t, p)
if he meets seller (τ i, a). He then enjoys the current dividend from the asset τ kda
and its future value δv¯ka(t + 1) minus the price he pays p. Otherwise, the buyer
goes on to the next period where his utility is v¯k0(t+ 1). We can now introduce the
solution concept for the stage bargaining game.
trade. An offer would thus be a menu of such contracts. It can be shown that buyers do not use
this extra dimension to screen sellers, that is all proposed contract have probability of trade equal
to 1. This result by Samuelson (1984) obtains because preferences are linear.
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Definition 1 (Bargaining Equilibrium). For value functions {via(t+ 1)}i=1,2a=0,L,H , the
bargaining equilibrium of period t is given by probabilities {αia(t, p)}i=1,2a=L,H and dis-
tribution {Πk(t, .)}k=1,2 such that
1. Probability αia(t, p) solves seller’s problem (1.2) for any p ∈ R.
2. A buyer offers p, that is p ∈ Supp(Πk(t, .)) if p solves (1.3).
Subgame perfection follows from the requirement that sellers reply optimally to
any price, including out of equilibrium offers. Although the primitives of the game
are ultimately endogenous, we may partially characterize the bargaining equilibrium
of period t, using the reservation values for each type of asset owner. Define:
ria(t) := τ
ida + δ(v¯
i
a(t+ 1)− v¯i0(t+ 1)), i = 1, 2, a = L,H (1.4)
In words, ria(t) is the net value attached to holding asset a for agent i in period t over
not owning an asset. The label reservation value comes from the seller problem (1.2).
Indeed, an asset owner (τ i, a) would never accept an offer below ria(t). Reservation
values are thus inversely related to the eagerness to sell the asset which is the
relevant statistic for each type of asset owner. The following Lemma simplifies the
description of the bargaining equilibrium, anticipating on Definition 2:
Lemma 1. In any OTC equilibrium (Definition 2), the following statements hold:
1. Type ranking:
r1L(t) < r
2
L(t) < r
1
H(t) < r
2
H(t) (1.5)
2. Only type (τ 2, 0) search and Supp(Π2(t, .)) ∈ {r1L(t), r1H(t)}.
Let pi(t) := Π2(t, r1H(t))−Π2(t, r1L(t)) be the probability of a pooling offer r1H(t).
To prove this Lemma, we anticipate on equilibrium definition 2 and use the free
entry condition. Buyers make zero profit which simplifies the expression of (1.4) for
the reservation values14. Agents with low valuation or low asset quality accept a
14In Chiu and Koeppl (2014), this is not an issue because the only way a type τ1 asset owner
switches back to type τ2 is by selling his asset. Observe that the difficulty also vanishes in the case
where types are iid across time, that is γ = 1/2 since then v¯1a(t) = v¯
2
a(t) for a ∈ {0, L,H}
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lower price to sell. In particular, Assumption (LC) implies that r2L(t) < r
1
H(t). Even
high valuation owners of lemons are more eager to sell than low valuation owners of
H assets. From (1.5), it is clear that (τ 1, 0) non-owners do not gain from trade with
any asset owner type. Hence they do not pay the cost κ to search. A buyer is thus
an agent of type τ 2. Buyers only target low valuation asset owners with whom they
have gains from trade. From (1.5) however, an offer addressed to (τ 1, H) owners
attracts all L asset owners. In the following, we refer to the probability of a pooling
offer pi(t) as market liquidity. Indeed it measures the probability that a (τ 1, H) asset
owner sells his asset. Building on Lemma 1, the buyer’s problem boils down to a
binary choice between a separating price offer r1L(t) and a pooling offer r
1
H(t) > r
1
L(t).
Let us write his profit vB(t, pi) from randomization pi in period t:
vB(t, pi) :=
1
S
{
pi
[
µ1H(t)(r
2
H(t)− r1H(t)) + S(1− q)(r2L(t)− r1H(t))
]
+ (1− pi)µ1L(t)(r2L(t)− r1L(t)
)}
+ δv¯20(t+ 1) (1.6)
Equation (1.6) captures the standard rent-efficiency trade-off. The pooling offer
r1H(t) (weight pi) attracts high quality assets but generates losses r
1
H − r2L(t) on low
quality assets. With a separating offer r1L(t) (weight 1−pi), buyers forgo gains from
trade on the H asset to extract rents r2L(t)− r1L(t) from (τ 1, L) sellers. Illiquidity
materializes in this case. For simplicity, we let vB(t) denote the value of vB(t, pi) at
the optimum, which is the utility of a matched buyer.
Buyers entry
Non-owners decide whether to search for an asset, given the matching probability
λB(t) and the outcome of the bargaining game vB(t). Non-owner (τ 2, 0) obtains a
net payoff equal to −κ+λB(t)vB(t)+(1−λB(t))δv¯20(t+1) from searching. Otherwise,
he goes on to the next period with utility δv¯20(t+1). The equilibrium mass of buyers
derives from the optimal search choice of non-owners:
µB(t) =
0 if − κ+
[
vB(t)− δv¯20(t+ 1)
]
< 0
S(vB(t)−δv¯20(t+1))
κ
otherwise
(1.7)
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Assumption (A2) ensures that the search cost κ is small enough so that the last case
prevails in equilibrium, that is non-owners do enter as buyers.
Dynamics
An agent valuation for an asset depends both on its reservation value and the
price he may obtain for the asset in the OTC market. Precisely, for i ∈ {1, 2},
viH(t) = τ
idH + δv¯
i
H(t+ 1) (1.8)
viL(t) = τ
idL + δv¯
i
L(t+ 1) + λ
S(t)pi(t)[r1H(t)− riL(t)] (1.9)
Equation (1.8) shows that H asset owners are at most indifferent between trading
today and waiting next period. Indeed, they never receive an offer above their
reservation value. Low quality asset owners earn information rents when matched -
the second term in (1.9). These are proportional to the probability pi(t) of a pooling
offer and the difference between the pooling price r1H(t) and the reservation value
riL(t). For non asset owners, we obtain:
v10(t) = δv¯
1
0(t+ 1) (1.10)
v20(t) = max
{
0,−κ+ λB(t)[vB(t)− δv¯20(t+ 1)]}+ δv¯20(t+ 1) (1.11)
Non-owners (τ 1, 0) might only become active buyers if they switch type. Non-owners
(τ 2, 0) decide whether to search and become buyers.
Finally, we need to characterize the evolution of asset ownership across time.
For a given asset, the owner type might change because the original owner sold the
asset or switched valuation. Figure 1.1 describes these dynamics for the H asset.
Consider the µ1H(t) assets initially held by (τ
1, H) agents at the beginning of period
t. Some agents fail to find a match with probability 1 − λS(t) or do not trade in
a match with probability λS(t)(1− pi(t)). Overall, a fraction 1− λS(t)pi(t) of these
assets is not traded. Summing over the solid lines in Figure 1.1, we thus obtain:
µ1H(t+ 1) =
[
(1− γ)(1− λS(t)pi(t)) + γλS(t)pi(t)]µ1H(t) + γµ2H(t)
= γSq + (1− 2γ)(1− λS(t)pi(t))µ1H(t) (1.12)
14
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Period t Period t+ 1
Type
Switch
τ1, H
τ2, H
µ1H(t)
µ2H(t)
OTC
Market
τ1, H
τ2, H
Type
Switch
τ1, H
τ2, H
µ1H(t+ 1)
µ2H(t+ 1)
1− λS(t)pi(t)
λ S
(t)pi(t)
1
1− γ
γ
1− γ
γ
Figure 1.1: Law of motion for the H asset
where I used the balance condition µ2H(t) = γSq − µ1H(t) in the last line. We may
similarly derive the law of motion for L assets with the difference that (τ 1, L) agents
fail to trade only when they do not find a match. We obtain:
µ1L(t+ 1) = γS(1− q) + (1− 2γ)(1− λS(t))µ1L(t) (1.13)
Equation (1.12) highlights the effect of past buyers’ offer on the composition of
the pool of sellers. The mass µ1H(t + 1) of H asset owners looking to sell in period
t + 1 decreases with the probability pi(t) of a pooling price in period t. Intuitively,
favorable offers in period t deplete the pool from high quality sellers in period t+ 1.
For (τ 1, L) owners, pi(t) affects the price received but not the trading probability as
they always sell their asset. Overall, market liquidity thus affects negatively the pool
of sellers, and hence future market liquidity. We can now introduce the definition
of a stationary OTC equilibrium.
Definition 2 (OTC Equilibrium). An OTC equilibrium is a collection of value func-
tions {via(t)}i=1,2a=0,L,H and reservation functions {ria(t)}i=1,2a=L,H , a distribution of asset owners
{µia(t)}i=1,2a=L,H , a mass of buyers µB(t) and a probability pi(t) of a high price offer r1H(t) for
any t such that:
1. Buyers’ offers verify pi(t) ∈ arg maxpi vB(t, pi) and µB(t) verifies condition (1.7).
2. Functions {via(t)}i=1,2a=0,L,H and {ria(t)}i=1,2a=L,H verify equations (1.9)-(1.11) and (1.4).
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3. Distribution {µia(t)}i=1,2a=L,H verifies equations (1.1) and law of motion (1.12)-(1.13)
4. Stationary property: ∃ T ∈ N+ such that for all endogenous variables z
z(t+ T ) = z(T )
The lowest T for which this property holds is the period of the equilibrium.
By imposing the stationary property, I focus on the long-run dynamics of the
model, hence the absence of reference to the initial distribution {µia(0)}i=1,2a=L,H . The
permanent component of liquidity fluctuations captures most of the model dynamics.
Observe that an equilibrium with period T = 1 is a steady sate. The main result
of the paper is to show that there can be other (cyclical) stationary equilibria with
period T ≥ 2.
1.3 Equilibrium Liquidity Dynamics
We first present a series of preliminary results. We then characterize equilibrium
cycles in Section 1.3.1 and steady states in Section 1.3.2.
Lemma 2. In any OTC equilibrium, the following statements hold
i) Agents (τ i, H) obtain their autarky payoff:
∀ t, i ∈ {1, 2}, viH(t) = riH :=
(1− δ)τ i + δγ(τ + 1)
(1− δ)[1− δ(1− 2γ)]dH
ii) Buyers make zero profit: ∀ t, vi0(t) = 0, for i = 1, 2 and equilibrium entry is
µB(t) =
SvB(t)
κ
iii) Sellers find a match with probability 1: ∀ t, λS(t) = 1.
As he receives offers through sequential matching, an H asset owners enjoys
the same utility than in autarky15. Part ii) follows from free-entry since buyers
15The market would then shut down if asset owners were to pay the search cost κ, a result known
as the Diamond paradox. Interestingly, this result also arises as an equilibrium outcome in Section
1.5 where buyers compete simultaneously for sellers.
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enter as long as they earn a positive profit. For part iii), assumption (A2) further
ensures that buyers’ entry is enough to match all asset owners. This implies that
trading does not fail for lack of buyers and that market illiquidity is fully driven by
asymmetry of information and adverse selection16.
We now identify the two main dynamic forces at play in the model. Using the
expression for buyers’ profit vB(t, pi) from (1.6), let us derive the net profit from a
pooling offer over a separating offer:
vB(t, 1)− vB(t, 0) = µ
1
H(t)
S
(r2H − r1H)− (1− q)
[
r1H − r2L(t) + γ(r2L(t)− r1L(t))
]
(1.14)
where we replaced µ1L(t) and r
i
H(t) by γS(1− q) and riH respectively, using Lemma
2. Pooling becomes more advantageous as the share of high quality assets for sale
µ1H(t)/S or the reservation values {riL(t)}i=1,2 for the L asset increase. The following
Lemma shows how these quantities react to past and future prices to shape today
buyers’ trade-off (1.14).
Lemma 3. In any OTC equilibrium, the following statements hold:
i) Competition effect: pi(t) increases with {pi(t+ l)}l=1,..,∞
ii) Composition effect: pi(t) decreases with pi(t− 1).
Part i) states that the probability of a pooling offer today increases with the
probability of pooling offers in the future. The crucial insight is that higher future
prices raise the value of a lemon both to the prospective buyer and the current
owner. First, the ex-post loss on lemons r1H − r2L(t) from a pooling offer decreases
as the buyer’s valuation r2L(t) goes up. When he knows he can resell the lemon at a
good price tomorrow, the buyer is inclined to offer a (high) pooling price although
the quality is uncertain. Second, future high prices also squeezes the buyer’s margin
r2L(t)− r1L(t) on a low offer r1L(t). The high offer r1H(t) thus becomes more relatively
more profitable. To see this, suppose that a lemon owner receives a pooling offer the
16The fact that sellers find a buyer with probability 1 is a byproduct of the efficient rationing
property attached to the matching function. The analysis can accommodate a matching function
of the form αmin{µB(t), µS(t)} with α < 1. Under appropriate modifications to A2, we would
obtain similar results.
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next period, that is pi(t+ 1) = 1. Then this resale price determines the future value
of the lemon both for the current and the new potential owner. Hence, the gains
from a separating offer boil down to the difference in the current dividend valuation
(τ−1)dL. Gains from trade would be larger if agents were to stay in autarky forever
after (or pi(t + l) = 0 for l ≥ 1). Both components of the competition effect work
in the same direction so that pi(t) increases with {pi(t + l)}l=1,..,∞, that is future
liquidity begets present liquidity. The competition effect captures complementarity
across time in decisions to pool sellers, which is a source of equilibrium multiplicity.
Part ii) establishes that the probability of a pooling offer today pi(t) depends
negatively on the probability pi(t − 1) in the last period. The composition effect
hinges on the endogenous asset holdings dynamics captured by law of motion (1.12).
Suppose indeed that liquidity was high in the last period, or pi(t − 1) = 1. This
pooling offer clears the market for all assets. In particular, the implicit supply of
H assets, µ1H(t) = γSq reaches its lowest point in period t. As the pool of sellers
now contains mostly L assets, buyers should find it more profitable to make a low
separating offer. But if liquidity is indeed low today, that is pi(t) = 0, we obtain:
µ1H(t+ 1)− µ1H(t) = 2γ(Sq/2− µ1H(t)) > 0
The distribution tomorrow becomes more favorable to a pooling offer because the
implicit supply of H assets for sale increases. Delaying trade thus improves the pool
of sellers through the accumulation of selling pressure of H assets. The composition
effect creates a negative relationship between present and future liquidity which is
key to equilibrium fluctuations. The relative strength of the composition and the
competition effect then determines the nature of equilibrium.
1.3.1 Liquidity Cycles
For T ≥ 2, I solve for OTC equilibria involving pure strategies17 for buyers, that is
where pi(t) ∈ {0, 1} for any t. Lemma 4 first shows that liquidity cannot be high in
two consecutive dates.
17If anything, cycles with pure strategies generates starker price fluctuations and are thus harder
to sustain. In the next section, I also characterize mixed-strategy equilibria steady state (T = 1).
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Lemma 4. In an OTC equilibrium with period T ≥ 2, if pi(t) = 1, then pi(t+1) = 0,
that is a period with low liquidity always follows a period with high liquidity.
The intuition for Lemma 4 follows from our previous discussion. After a pooling
offer in period t, µ1H(t+ 1) = γSq using law of motion (1.12). The distribution
of assets becomes least favorable to pooling18 and buyers prefer to offer the low
separating price. When they do so, the quality in the pool of sellers improves but it
might take time before buyers find it optimal to pool sellers again depending on the
speed of the type switching process. Hence, there can be several consecutive periods
with low liquidity pi = 0.
For a given period T , we label without ambiguity by 0 the peak dates t, t +
T, t + 2T where pi(t) = 1. In these periods, buyers offer a pooling price r1H . Labels
1, 2, ..., T−1 are for the intermediate “trough” dates when buyers offer the separating
price r1L,T (t). The additional subscript T captures the dependence of endogenous
variables on the cycle length when relevant. We may now state the main Proposition
of the paper.
Proposition 1. Let T ≥ 2. There exists thresholds (q
T
, q¯T ) such that an OTC
equilibrium of period T exists if and only if q ∈ [q
T
, q¯T ] and
1− (1− 2γ)T
1− (1− 2γ)T−1 ≥
r1H − (1− γ)r2L,T (0)− γr1L,T (0)
r1H − (1− γ)τdL − γdL − δr1H
(ET )
where for i ∈ {1, 2} and t = 0, .., T
riL,T (t) =
[
1− δT−t
1− δ (τ + 1) + (−1)
i1− (δ(1− 2γ))T−t
1− δ(1− 2γ) (τ − 1)
]
dL
2
+ δT−tr1H (1.15)
For T ≥ 2, (ET+1)⇒ (ET ) and q¯T+1 < qT .
In a cycle of period T , the mass of (τ 1, H) agents is
µ1H,T (t) =
1− (1− 2γ)t
2
Sq, t = 1, .., T (1.16)
Observe first that, in a cycle, agents’ valuation for a lemon riL,T (t) weighs the
18The argument thus relies partially on the fact that search frictions are mild, or λS(t) = 1.
Intuitively though, entry by buyers should precisely be larger and frictions less severe for sellers at
the peak of the cycle.
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holding value over the remaining trough periods and the pooling price they will
receive at the peak, in T − t periods. During the trough, equation (1.16) captures
the accumulation of selling pressure of H assets that leads to the peak. Let us now
interpret the existence condition (ET ) for a cycle of period T . The left hand side
measures the relative improvement in the pool quality between the last date of the
trough and the peak as can be seen from (1.16). It thus captures the benefits in date
T − 1 from waiting one more period to make a pooling offer. The right hand side
represents the costs from waiting. Indeed, in period T − 1, losses on lemons from a
pooling offer would be low since a buyer can resell at the pooling price next period.
In period 0 however, acquiring lemons is costly because a buyer can flip them at a
high price only T periods after the purchase. A cycle thus exists if the improvement
in the pool quality from the composition effect overcomes the loss increase from the
competition effect. Adding one period to the cycle leaves more time for the pool to
improve. Hence longer period cycles exist for lower values of the share of H assets
q, that is q
T+1
< q
T
. Observe that as T increases though, the last period marginal
improvement in the pool quality µ1H,T (T )− µ1H,T (T − 1) goes down. On the other
hand, buyers’ incentives to anticipate the gains from trade with H assets go up.
Low periods equilibrium cycles are thus easier to sustain, that is (ET+1)⇒ (ET ) for
T ≥ 2.
Figure 1.2 illustrates price and composition dynamics for a 3 period cycle. In
Figure 1.2a, the solid blue line represents the transaction price over the cycle. It
coincides with the reservation value r1L,T (t) (lower dashed red line) of (τ
1, L) owners
during the trough and equals the pooling offer r1H (upper dashed red line) at the
peak. After the peak, Figure 1.2b illustrates the drop in the supply of H assets
µ1H,T (t) measured as a fraction of the total quantity of H assets. During the trough,
only L assets are traded but the price increases. Indeed, it must reflect (τ 1, L)
sellers’ outside option of waiting for a better offer in t = 3. In particular, the
asset trades above the full information price although buyers know for sure they are
buying a L asset. We can interpret this premium as a bubble component reflecting
the future high value of the lemon at the peak of the cycle. These dynamics then
evoke the “hot potato” story for a financial crisis. Agents know they purchase bad
assets at inflated prices but ride the bubble to resell them at an even higher price
20
Chapter 1. Liquidity Fluctuations in Over the Counter Markets
t
p(t)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2
4
6
r1H
r1L,T (t)
(a) Prices and Reservation Values
t
µ1H(t)/Sq
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.05
0.1
0.15
(b) Asset Supply of quality H
Figure 1.2: A 3 Period Cycle (δ = 0.3, dL = 1, dH = 4, τ = 2, γ = 0.05)
in the future. When they do (at the peak of the cycle), the price drops significantly
and the bubble bursts. More generally, our analysis shows that liquidity fluctuations
arise naturally in markets with asymmetry of information. Prices reflect the average
quality of assets offered for sale but the supply responds endogenously to past prices.
1.3.2 Steady State Equilibria
This section describes steady state equilibria, that are OTC equilibria of period
T = 1, this time both in mixed and in pure buyers’ strategy. I shorten the presenta-
tion since the characterization mostly serves as a basis for welfare comparison with
liquidity cycles. I drop the time arguments for endogenous variables.
Proposition 2. There exists two thresholds in the share of H assets in the economy
(q, q¯) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that the only steady state equilibria are the following:
i) When the share q is low, q ≤ q, there is a separating equilibrium pi = 0.
ii) When the share q is high, q ≥ q¯, there is a pooling equilibrium pi = 1.
iii) For q ∈ (min{q, q¯},max{q, q¯}), there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategy
pi(q) ∈ (0, 1).
When q ≤ q¯, there is a unique equilibrium for any value of q. When q ≥ q¯, equilibria
i), ii) and iii) coexist on [q¯, q].
Intuitively, a pooling equilibrium with high liquidity pi = 1 may only exist if the
share of H assets q is high enough. When q is too low, buyers thus cater only to
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(τ 1, L) owners and the equilibrium is separating with pi = 0. For intermediate values
of q, a partial equilibrium exists with pi(q) ∈ (0, 1). The mixed strategy equilibrium
highlights the tension between the composition and the competition effect. As pi
goes up, lemons become more valuable and pooling offers more profitable. The
competition effect thus favors pooling. However, the steady state share of H quality
assets decreases with pi. Indeed, from law of motion (1.12), we obtain:
µ1H(pi) =
γ
2γ + pi(1− 2γ)Sq (1.17)
Hence, through the composition effect, higher market liquidity makes it less prof-
itable for buyers to offer a pooling price. These forces work against one another so
that mixed strategy equilibria exist for an open interval of values of q.
When the upper bound of the pooling region q exceeds the lower bound q¯ of the
pooling region, a separating, a pooling and a mixed equilibrium coexist. The proof
to Proposition 2 shows that the multiplicity condition q ≥ q¯ writes:
δγ(1− δ)(1− 2γ)(τ − 1)dL
(1− δ)(dH − τdL) + γδ(τ + 1)(dH − dL) + γ(1− δ)(τ − 1)dL ≥ 1− δ − 2γ (1.18)
In the limit case where dL → 0, the condition writes19 δ > 1− 2γ. From equation
(1.17), 1− 2γ measures the sensitivity of the H asset supply µ1H to liquidity pi and
thus captures the strength of the composition effect. The discount factor δ deter-
mines the weight assigned to future payoff and thus the strength of the competition
effect. Hence, in the parameter region with steady state multiplicity, the competition
effect dominates the composition effect. We now gather the existence results from
Propositions 1 and 2 to provide a complete picture of OTC equilibria. In particular,
we are interested in the nature of the steady state equilibrium in the region where
cycles exist.
Corollary 1. An OTC equilibrium of period T ≥ 2 exists when there is a unique
steady state equilibrium, that is (ET ) ⇒ q ≤ q¯. A cyclical equilibrium exists in the
region where the steady state is in mixed strategy, that is [q
T
, q¯T ] ⊂ [q, q¯] with q¯2 = q¯.
19This is the case analyzed by Chiu and Koeppl (2014) in a continuous time environment.
Although, strictly speaking, this case is not well-defined in my model because of Assumption (A2),
it is useful to form intuition.
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium Existence (dL = 1, dH = 4, τ = 3)
The proof of Proposition 1 establishes these results. First, cycles exist when the
composition effect is strong whereas steady state multiplicity relies on the compe-
tition effect. Second, there is a natural relationship between mixed strategy steady
state and cycles. When the share of H quality assets is intermediate, neither pooling
nor separating can be sustained in every period. In a steady state, liquidity spreads
out evenly across periods as sellers face a constant probability to receive a high
price. In a cycle, liquidity fluctuates with the average quality in the pool of sellers
and terms of trade change over time. Figure 1.3 describes the equilibrium regions
in the (γ, δ) parameter space. The uppermost downward sloping line represents
equation (1.18) and breaks the parameter space into two regions. In the bottom
left part, there is a unique steady state for each value of q. Within this sub-region,
equilibrium cycles may exist. Higher value of the period T corresponds to darker
shades. The figure shows that cycles with period T ≥ 3 require low discount fac-
tors20. Hence, in the rest of the analysis we focus on period 2 cycles (lighter shade
on Figure 1.3), that is (ET ) holds for T = 2 only and q ∈ [q2, q¯]
20This is in part driven by our focus on equilibrium cycles in pure buyers’ strategies.
23
Chapter 1. Liquidity Fluctuations in Over the Counter Markets
1.3.3 Welfare Comparison
Aggregate surplus W (t) is defined recursively as follows:
W (t) = S(1−q)τdL+µ1H(t)(1−pi(t))dH+
[
µ1H(t)pi(t)+µ
2
H(t)
]
τdH−µB(t)κ+δW (t+1)
(1.19)
The first three terms correspond to allocative efficiency. With symmetric informa-
tion, type τ 2 agents would hold all the assets after trading. Market illiquidity, gen-
erates misallocation of a fraction µ1H(t)(1− pi(t)) of the H assets. The fourth term
measures trade costs which are proportional to equilibrium entry. Since buyers get to
make TIOLI offers, entry is typically inefficient21. The last term is self-explanatory.
In this section, the subscript ss (resp. cy) refers to endogenous variables in the
steady state (resp. 2 period cycle). We thus denote Wss welfare in steady state and
(Wcy(0),Wcy(1)) welfare in the high and low date of cycle. Since liquidity fluctuates
between picy(0) = 1 > piss and picy(1) = 0 < piss in a cycle, one could guess that wel-
fare in a cycle also fluctuates around the steady state level Wss. We show however
that fluctuations entail a dynamic welfare loss with respect to the steady state.
Proposition 3. There exists qˆ ∈ [q
2
, q¯] such that for all q ∈ (qˆ, q¯],
Wss > Wcy(0) > Wcy(1)
that is the surplus in a steady state is greater than in a cycle in every date.
Proposition 3 shows that when q ∈ [qˆ, q¯] the steady state equilibrium dominates
the cyclical equilibrium, irrespectively of the “starting date” for the cycle. The
striking part of the result is that surplus may be lower at the peak of the cycle than
in steady state, that is Wss ≥ Wcy(0), although trading volume and liquidity are
maximal at a peak date. However, high liquidity at the peak lowers future market
liquidity through the composition effect and generates dynamic misallocation of the
H asset - the fourth term in (1.19). When q is close to q¯, piss(q)→ 1, that is the
steady state equilibrium features full liquidity in the limit. In a cycle however,
every two periods some H assets are not traded. With the composition effect, there
21In general search frictions could also affect allocative efficiency if sellers can fail to meet buyers,
that is λS(t) < 1, which is not the case in equilibrium here.
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is too much trade at the peak and too little in the trough. When q ∈ [q, qˆ], the first
inequality is reversed and surplus evaluated at the peak is higher than in steady
sate. The comparison then depends on the reference date for the cycle although
the average value of Wcy lies below Wss. The unambiguous welfare ranking when
q ∈ [qˆ, q¯] suggests that policy interventions can be desirable when the economy is in
a cycle. Intuitively, a benevolent policy maker would seek to prop up (resp. tame)
trading in the trough (resp. peak) of the cycle. In the following Section, we show
how an asset purchase program can achieve this objective.
1.4 Liquidity and Policy Intervention
In this section, I study an asset purchase program by a benevolent government who
seeks to jump-start the market but must resell the assets he purchased. Unlike pre-
vious works including Tirole (2012) and Chiu and Koeppl (2014), I can thus capture
a realistic policy constraint because the government must eventually close his po-
sition. With respect to a permanent policy, a revertible program does not change
the fundamentals of the economy in the long-run. In the following, I characterize
feasible policies analytically and provide numerical results for the surplus maximiz-
ing policy. Although its effects are smaller, I also show that a budget-neutral policy
is feasible and can increase welfare in the Pareto sense. Formally, the benevolent
government is a large agent with the same discount factor δ as private agents and
preferences:
uG(c, d) = c+ τGd
over the consumption good and the dividends where τG ∈ [0, τ ]. The government
derives a lower utility from the dividends than type τ 2 agents, as for instance, he
would not value potential services (borrowing, hedging) from holding assets. The
government has deep pockets and can hold many assets.
1.4.1 Timing and Policy Design
Prior to the intervention, the economy is in an equilibrium cycle of period T = 2. Let
tint be the intervention date which corresponds to a low date of the cycle. At the be-
25
Chapter 1. Liquidity Fluctuations in Over the Counter Markets
ginning of period tint, the distribution of agents across assets is thus {µia,cy(1)}i=1,2a=L,H .
We divide periods tint and tint + 1 into phases i) and ii) as follows:
1. Date tint: Purchase.
i) The government announces that he will buy up to SG assets at unit price
PG. Asset owners may apply and sell their asset to the government.
ii) OTC market with asset owners who have not participated in the program.
2. Period tint + 1: Resale.
i) The government quotes a resale price RG at which he resells all assets
purchased in tint. Non-asset owners may apply to purchase these assets.
ii) OTC market with asset owners including buyers of step i).
The division of period tint into steps i) and ii) is important. By removing assets
before the OTC market opens, the government can affect the distribution of sellers
faced by buyers22 and hence the probability of a pooling offer. For simplicity, we
abstract from issues related to the timing of the exit strategy since the government
must resell assets one period after. A policy is a triplet (SG, PG, RG) ∈ R3+ where
SG is the program size, PG the purchase price and RG the resale price. Besides the
obligation to resell assets, I impose a medium-run stabilization constraint on the
intervention.
In order to explicit these constraints, I take as given the sequence (pi(tint), pi(tint + 1), ...)
of buyers’ offers. In equilibrium, this sequence will be consistent with the policy.
The stabilization constraint sets the mass of (τ 1, H) agents in period tint + 2 to:
µ1H(tint + 2) = µ
1
H,ss (SC)
When (SC) holds, we know from Proposition 2 that the steady state is a continuation
equilibrium from period tint+2 onward. We can thus avoid dealing with equilibrium
transitions and focus on the short-term policy trade-off. The resale constraint puts
22Buying assets in the private OTC market would not have an impact if sellers are captive. If they
are not, they could use the government program as a credible threat to induce more competitive
offers from buyers which generates higher liquidity. We are interested in a policy that is actually
implemented in equilibrium rather than an equilibrium selection device.
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an upper bound on the price RG the government can ask to sell his assets. This
bound depends on the selection of assets acquired in period tint and thus on agents’
participation decisions. Agent (τ i, a) for i ∈ {1, 2} and a ∈ {L,H} opts in the
program if and only if PG ≥ via(tint) that is when23 the price offered exceeds the
utility he expects from trading in the OTC market at tint. Observe that the outside
option via(tint) is endogenous since it depends on the equilibrium induced by the
intervention. The crucial insight from Lemma 1 is that L asset owners have a lower
market utility and would thus be the first to opt in. This leaves room for the policy
to improve the distribution of assets in the OTC market. Since the government has
no more information than private buyers, he obtains a random selection (SGL , S
G
H)
of assets held by those agents who opt in where for a ∈ {L,H}:
SGa = min
1, SG∑
j,a′ µ
j
a′,cy(1)1{PG≥vj
a′ (tint)}
∑
i=1,2
1{PG≥via(tint)}µ
i
a,cy(1) (1.20)
where the term between curly brackets captures rationing of sellers when the pro-
gram is over-subscribed. We assume that SG can adjust so that the program is never
under-subscribed. The government cannot quote a resale price RG higher than the
buyer’s valuation for the average asset from the government pool:
RG ≤ v2L(tint + 1)SGL /S + v2H(tint + 1)SGH/S (RC)
Although conditions (SC) and (RC) bear on endogenous objects, they ultimately
constrain the policy that induces this equilibrium. Let us now define the government
payoff vG as:
vG = SG(δRG − PG) + [SGHdH + SGL dL]τG (GP)
The first term is the capital gain. The second term measures the government val-
uation for the dividends and depends on the selection of assets acquired by the
government. In the numerical analysis of Section 1.4.2, we first allow the govern-
ment to run a loss vG < 0 and then impose budget-neutrality. We may now define
23If PG = via(tint), the agent is indifferent between opting in or out of the program and could
randomize. We can dismiss this concern because the government could induce participation strictly
by raising the price by an infinitesimal amount
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formally a feasible policy
Definition 3. A policy (SG, PG, RG) is feasible if there exists (pi(tint), pi(tint + 1)) ∈
[0, 1]2 such that:
1. Given the sequence of buyers’ strategies (pi(tint), pi(tint + 1), piss, piss, ...), the
resale constraint (RC) and the stabilization constraint (SC) hold.
2. Strategies (pi(tint), pi(tint + 1)) are optimal for buyers, that is for l ∈ {0, 1}
pi(tint + l) ∈ arg max
pi
vB(tint + l, pi)
given that pi(t+ l) = piss for l ≥ 2.
We now take as granted that the equilibrium with a feasible intervention is the
steady state piss from period tint + 2 onward. In words, a feasible policy satisfies the
resale (RC) and the stabilization constraints (SC) in an equilibrium induced by this
policy24. The first objective of the policy is to maximize the net surplus gain ∆Wint
from the intervention:
∆W (tint) =
[
γSq − (1− pi(tint))µ1H(tint)− δ(1− pi(tint + 1))µ1H(tint + 1)
]
(τ − 1)dH︸ ︷︷ ︸
Short-Term Trading Gains
− (SGHdH + SGL dL)(τ − τG)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Holding Costs
+
[
µBC(1)− µB(tint) + δ(µBC(0)− µB(tint + 1))
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trading Costs Difference
κ
+ δ2(Wss −Wcy(1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Long-Run Gains
(1.21)
The short term trading gains account for the increase in liquidity from 0 to pi(tint)
in period tint, but also its potential decrease from 1 to pi(tint + 1) in period tint + 1
when the government resells assets. The holding costs are negative because the
government must hold asset he values less than private agents. The long-run gains
are positive because surplus is higher in steady state (reached after 2 periods) than
in the low date of the cycle. The purchase and resale prices PG and RG do not enter
expression (1.21) since transfers are neutral with linear utility. Still, the level of
24A feasible policy and an induced equilibrium thus solve a fixed-point problem. Although this
is a relevant concern, we cannot claim the policy uniquely implements this equilibrium.
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the intervention price PG matters as it induces a particular selection of applicants
through the participation constraint.
1.4.2 Welfare Improving Policy: Numerical Analysis
In this section, I use the numerical values reported in Table 1.1. Deep parameters
are in bold characters. Although the 2 period cycle exists for less than 2.5% of the
possible range of values of q, the features of the intervention may change significantly
over this range as we show below. Appendix 1.7.3 describes the step to construct
δ γ τ dL dH τ
G q
2
q¯2
0.7 0.05 3 1 4 0 0.610 0.632
Table 1.1: Benchmark parameter values
and rank feasible policies. Essentially, with discrete types of asset owner, the policy
selection boils down to a discrete choice over these four types. The selection then
reduces to a binary choice as a welfare maximizing policy should not target H asset
owners. Intuitively, removing H from the market does not improve liquidity in the
intervention period tint.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the results. On the left panel, the red dotted line shows the
intervention size targeting (τ 1, L) agents whereas the green dotted line is for (τ 2, L)
agents. The blue line is the selection of the surplus maximizing intervention. The
most efficient intervention targets (τ 1, L) agents. However, these agents only hold
γ = 5% of the L assets - the horizontal line on the graph. For a larger intervention,
the government needs to target (τ 2, L) owners. The pecking order from low to
high valuation owners of lemons arises because buying L assets from (τ 1, L) is more
efficient to jump-start the market. Indeed, it decreases both the cost from a pooling
offer and the benefits from a separating offer for buyers. The latter effect is not
present for (τ 2, L) agents. We see that the size of the intervention decreases with
the share of H quality assets q. To understand this result, observe that the gap
between the target supply of H quality assets µ1H,ss(q) imposed by the stabilization
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Figure 1.4: Revertible Asset Purchase Program
constraint (SC) and that in the trough of a cycle µ1cy,H(q) is
µ1H,ss(q)− µ1cy,H(q) = (1− 2γ)
γSq(1− piss(q))
2γ + piss(q)(1− 2γ) −−→q→q¯ 0
An intervention targeting exclusively (τ 1, L) agents suffices to bridge this gap if q is
high.
Figure 1.4b represents the average price path in the OTC market with the inter-
vention (solid line) for the median value q = 0.6213. Before tint = 4, it coincides with
the no-intervention price25 (dashed line). The asset purchase program smoothes out
fluctuations very quickly. Indeed, the price in the intervention period nearly reaches
the equilibrium steady state price of period tint + 2. The picture looks similar for
other values of q. The next Section shows how these results change with a budget-
balanced intervention.
On figure 1.5, the left panel plots the net surplus gain ∆Wint whereas the right
panel highlights the contribution of each component according to the decomposition
of equation (1.21). Surplus gains increase in q together with the inverse of the pro-
gram size. A large intervention might even be undesirable (the hatched area in figure
1.5a). Figure 1.5b shows indeed that for low values of q, government holding costs
25Announcing the policy in tint − 1 = 3 would have no effect here. If anything, a pooling offer
in that period then becomes even more profitable but the equilibrium would not change.
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Figure 1.5: Efficiency properties
proportional to (τ − τG)SG dominate. As the intervention size decreases for higher
values of q, the positive components take over. In particular, welfare improves with
the long-term stabilization gains and the short-term trading gains.
1.4.3 Budget-Neutral and Pareto Improving Intervention
We find that the government earns a negative net return of −30% across values of
q. Holding costs that are proportional to the difference in valuation τ − τG = 3 con-
tribute significantly to this loss. However, even when τG = τ = 3, the average net
return is still around −7%. Indeed, this number also reflects a premium the govern-
ment pays to induce participation from asset owners. Suppose indeed that q is low
(below the kink on Figure 1.4a). The government must attract (τ 2, L) owners and
offer at least their market value of PG = v2L(tint). This price also compensates asset
owners for the information rents earned in the OTC market while the government
obtains L assets for sure. In comparison, the maximum price a buyer would pay in
the OTC market for a L asset is r2L(tint). Hence, the government pays a premium:
v2L(tint)− r2L(tint) = pi(tint)(r1H − r2L(tint)) > 0
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Interestingly, the higher liquidity pi(tint) in the market following the purchase, the
bigger this premium. The objective to increase liquidity thus raises the government
losses. It is then natural to ask whether a budget-neutral policy is feasible. Indeed, a
loss-making intervention does not constitute a Pareto improvement as private agents
who would contribute those funds are worse-off despite surplus gains.
To finance the intervention, the government may now tax transactions in the
OTC market of period tint + 1. Every buyer who purchases an asset must pay
σG > 0 units of the reference good c. The main point of this part of the analysis
is to stress the interaction between designing and financing the policy. Indeed, a
transaction tax distorts buyers’ trade-off between a pooling and a separating offer.
To see this, let us write the expression for the net gains from a pooling offer with
tax σG adapting equation (1.14):
vB(t, 1)− vB(t, 0) =µ
1
H(t)
S
(r2H − r1H)− (1− q)(r1H − r2L(t)) +
µ1L(t)
S
(r2L(t)− r1L(t))
− σG
[
µ1H(t) + µ
2
L(t)
S
]
(1.22)
The first line is similar to equation (1.14) while the second line shows the effect of
the tax. When offering a pooling price r1H , a buyer increases his trading probability
and thus its tax payment proportionally to the mass of traders who only accept that
offer, that is agents (τ 2, L) and (τ 1, H). Ceteris paribus, the tax thus lowers the
benefits from a pooling offer. Hence, if the government were to set the tax naively
so as to offset the loss, he would actually destroy liquidity in period tint + 1. Hence,
all the parameters (SG, PG, RG, σG) of the policy must now be determined jointly.
The government payoff with tax verifies:
vG := SG(δRG − PG) + σG[µ1L(tin + 1) + pi(tint + 1)(µ1H(tint + 1) + µ2L(tint + 1))]
where in expression (GP), we used τG = 0. The term between brackets is the vol-
ume of trade in period tint + 1. A feasible budget-neutral policy is a policy feasible
according to Definition 3 with the additional budget-neutrality constraint vG = 0.
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Figure 1.6: Budget Balanced Program
Numerical Results
Across values of q ∈ [0.6195, 0.6302] where the intervention increases aggregate
welfare, an average 20% of surplus is lost because of the budget-balance constraint26.
Figure 1.6 provides some intuition by comparing intervention size and price paths
with the constraint (solid line) and without (dashed line). The intervention becomes
smaller in order to reduce the holding costs. Interestingly, the asset purchase does
not flatten fluctuations as much. Indeed, maintaining fluctuations between tint and
tint + 1 relax the budget-balance constraint in two ways. First, it allows for a high
resale price RG for the government assets. Second, increasing liquidity in period tint
with a large intervention would decrease the mass of (τ 1, H) asset owners in period
tint + 1 through the composition effect. These asset owners precisely belong to the
implicit tax base in period tint + 1 as show by equation (1.22). The budget balance
condition thus creates a trade-off between jump-starting the market to increase
surplus and riding the cycle to finance the intervention.
Asset Purchase vs. Subsidy
We finally compare27 the asset purchase program to another feasible budget-neutral
26The range of values of q where the policy increases surplus is q ≥ 0.6195 instead of q ≥ 0.6183
previously,which is 6% smaller. Hence the effect appears larger on the intensive margin.
27In the US, during the recent financial crisis, the Public Private Investment Program for legacy
Mortgage Backed Securities was a form of subsidy while the SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program
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intervention: a subsidy χG in period tint, also financed by a tax σ
G in period tint+1.
As we discussed, purchasing lemons modifies the composition of the pool of sellers
since the relative probability to find a H asset in the OTC market is:
µ1H(tint)
µ1H(tint) + µ
2
L(tint) + µ
1
L(tint)
=
γSq
γSq + S(1− q)− SG
The effect of the purchase size SG increases in q. Instead, the subsidy increases the
net gain from a pooling offer by:
∆vB(tint)
∂χG
=
µ1H(tint) + µ
2
L(tint)
S
= γq + (1− γ)(1− q)
where we used equation (1.22) because a subsidy is merely a negative tax. This
time, the effect is larger when q is small. In addition, the government needs not
hold asset in this case. Figure 1.7 plots the surplus gains for the subsidy and for the
asset purchase program under various values of τG. Besides our benchmark τG = 0,
we also consider the case where the government has the same valuation for the asset
as low valuation (τG = 1) and high valuations (τG = τ) agents. The results show
that for a given value of τG, the asset purchase becomes relatively more attractive as
q increases, in line with our informal analysis. Second, the asset purchase program
performs better for high values of τG since the costs from holding assets go down.
We have shown that a revertible asset purchase program can jump-start the
market in the short-run and stabilize it in the long-run. However, large interventions
entail important misallocation costs for the government and budget neutral policies
have more limited effects. In the next section, we study the impact of a structural
change to the OTC market on equilibrium liquidity.
1.5 Liquidity and Market Structure
In the wake of the financial crisis, regulators pointed at the very structure of OTC
markets as a source of illiquidity and instability28. In my model, random search with
for small business loans was a direct asset purchase.
28On its website, the IMF referring to OTC markets explains that “some types of market ar-
rangements can very quickly become disorderly, dysfunctional, or otherwise unstable”. Ongoing
Dodd-Frank and EMIR reforms notably mandate central clearing of OTC instruments such as
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ex-post bargaining generates several inefficiencies. First, buyers enter as long as they
can make profit while fewer buyers could match all sellers. Resources are thus wasted
on search costs. Second, with captive sellers, buyers reduce demand to extract
rent, lowering trading volume and liquidity. In a centralized market place, a trader
implicitly observes demand and supply from the rest of the market simultaneously
and may signal his interest in trading. To capture these differences, I modify the
model to allow buyers to post and commit to prices before meeting a counterparty
while keeping the matching technology unchanged. Pre-trade transparency improves
as sellers may pick their trading price from those posted by buyers. I show however
that while the Exchange brings traders together more efficiently, liquidity shuts
down for high quality assets.
1.5.1 Exchange
Formally, an exchange in period t is a continuum of markets p ∈ R+ where p is
a price for the asset29. Each market p in period t is characterized by the ratio of
derivatives and swaps with a stated objective to increase transparency and competition.
29There is no loss in generality in assuming that buyers post prices and not contracts since
rationing plays the same role as probabilities of trade. Implicitly, the OTC market has only one
such sub-market where all asset owners and buyers must go.
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buyers to sellers θ(t, p) and a belief vector {γia(t, p)}i=1,2a=L,H about the share of each
type of asset owner in market p. Each agent takes these quantities as given.
Matching
The bilateral matching technology is identical. Buyers and sellers choose the
market they want to trade in, taking θ(t, p) as given. The probability for a seller
(resp. a buyer) to meet a buyer (resp. a seller) in market p, in period t is:
λS(t, p) = min {θ(t, p), 1} , λB(t, p) = min{θ(t, p)−1, 1}
Hence, for a seller, θ(t, p) measures the extent of rationing in market p. Importantly,
owners can not sell their asset in two different markets p and pˆ 6= p in the same pe-
riod. Hence, an attempt to sell at a price p is a commitment not to try and sell at a
different price p′ < p. This can act as a signal of quality if sellers expect rationing at
high prices30. As in the OTC market though, exclusivity only restricts intra-period
trades.
Sellers Problem
Asset owner (τ i, a) chooses the market which maximizes his utility:
via(t) = max
p∈R+
via(t, p)
where via(t, p) = λ
S(t, p)(p− ria(t)) + τ ida + δv¯ia(t+ 1) (1.23)
For an asset owner, via(t, p) is the utility from trading in market p. Asset own-
ers may always choose a very high price where θ(t, p) = 0 if they do not want to
trade. One can interpret a decision to sell at a high price with rationing as a limit or-
der while a decision to sell at a low price without rationing would be a market order.
30Models of competitive adverse selection such as Gale (1996), (Guerrieri and Shimer, 2014),
Chang (2014) also impose this exclusivity assumption. Kurlat (2015) allows for non-exclusivity in
a static model and obtains pooling. For an analysis of non-exclusivity with a strategic equilibrium
concept, see Biais et al. (2000) and Attar et al. (2011).
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Buyers Problem
Let γia(t, p) ∈ [0, 1] denote buyers’ belief about the share of type (τ i, a) in market
p in period t. The buyer’s payoff from market p for non asset owner τ 2 writes:
vB(t, p) = λB(t, p)
[(
γ2H(t, p)+γ
1
H(t, p)
)
r2H(t)+
(
γ2L(t, p)+γ
1
L(t, p)
)
r2L(t)−p
]
+δv¯20(t+1, p)
(1.24)
A buyer cares about the quality of the asset a not the type τ i of the seller. We let
µB(t, .) be the measure of buyers over markets p ∈ R+ with support P(t) and define:
µB(t) =
∫
P(t)
µB(t, p)dp
as the total mass of buyers.
Law of Motion
The law of motion for types (τ 1, a) writes:
µ1a(t+ 1) =
[
1− γ − (1− 2γ)
∫
γ1a(t, p)λ
B(t, p)µB(t, p)dp
]
+ γµ2a(t) (1.25)
The expression is similar to the one derived for OTC markets except that agents
might visit different markets p with different trading probabilities31.
Beliefs
On markets where trade takes place, beliefs {γia(t, p)}i=1,2a=L,H shall reflect the dis-
tribution of sellers choosing this market. A complete description of the exchange
requires buyers to form expectations about inactive markets p 6∈ P(t) as well. Many
pessimistic equilibria can be sustained if buyers believe sellers would supply the L
asset in inactive markets. We thus impose a refinement similar to Gale (1996) and
Guerrieri et al. (2010). On inactive markets, buyers expect to see asset owners who
find it most profitable to deviate to that market. This belief refinement formalized
31The formula above seems convoluted but economizes on notation as we do not need to introduce
measure of sellers µia(t, p) in the market. We would have
λS(t, p)µia(t, p) = λ
B(t, p)µB(t, p)γia(t, p)
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in Point 2 of Definition 4 essentially adapts Cho and Kreps (1987) to a compet-
itive environment. We refer to the papers mentioned above for a more extensive
discussion.
Definition 4 (Exchange Equilibrium). An Equilibrium of the Exchange is given
by value functions {via(t)}i=1,2a=L,H , distributions {µia(t)}i=1,2a=L,H a measure µB(p, t) with
support P(t) and total mass µB(t), a rationing function θ(t, p) : R+ 7→ R+ ∪ {∞}
and belief function γ(t, p) : R+ 7→ ∆4 for any t such that
1. Buyers optimality and free entry. For all p ∈ R+, P(t) = arg maxp vB(t, p)−κ
and µB(t) is determined by (1.7).
2. Sellers optimality. For all p ∈ R+, i = 1, 2 and a ∈ {L,H}, via(t) ≥ via(t, p)
with equality if θ(t, p) <∞ and γia(t, p) > 0.
3. Market Clearing. For i = 1, 2 and a = L,H∫
P(t)
γia(t, p)
θ(t, p)
µB(t, p)dp ≤ µia(t)
with equality if via(t) > τ
ida + δv¯
i
a(t+ 1)
4. Law of motion : {µia(t)}i=1,2a=L,H verify (1.25) and balance conditions (1.1).
5. Stationary Property : ∃T ∈ N+ such that for all endogenous variables z
z(t+ T ) = z(t)
The definition follows closely Guerrieri et al. (2010) and Guerrieri and Shimer
(2014). Active markets P(t) are those buyers choose to visit. Point 2 formalizes
the requirement that sellers choose the market(s) which maximizes their utility. In
addition, on markets where θ(t, p) < ∞, buyers should expect to see sellers who
are indifferent between that market and their optimal choice. This is formally the
refinement we discussed above. Point 3 ensures that supply on active markets is
consistent with buyers beliefs. When one asset owners might find it optimal not
to trade, that is via(t) = τ
ida + δv¯
i
a(t+ 1), they can supply their asset on inactive
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markets where θ(t, p) = 0. Finally, point 4 says that the mass of owners depends
on past trading decisions since asset owners face different levels of rationing on each
market. Point 5 is the stationary property already present in Definition 2 for an
OTC equilibrium.
1.5.2 Equilibrium
As in the construction of the OTC equilibrium, an important statistic is the ordering
of types of asset owners.
Lemma 5. In any exchange equilibrium, for all t,
r1L(t) ≤ r2L(t) < r1H(t) ≤ r2H(t) (1.26)
I omit the proof which can be readily adapted from that of Lemma 1 and does
not rely on the price formation process. The important information for our analysis
is the monotone relationship between types: agents with a lower quality assets are
more eager to sell, independently of their private valuation for the asset32. In an
Exchange, it means that sellers with a higher type in the sense of Lemma 5 would
accept (more) rationing to trade at higher prices and signal their quality. When type
τ 2 agents hold L assets, which they do to realize gains from trade, Proposition 4
shows that this logic leading to separation has an extreme consequence as no market
opens for H assets.
Proposition 4. The unique exchange equilibrium is a steady state where
i) Buyers make zero profit ∀t, v20 = 0.
ii) Owners (τ 1, L) trade in the only open market P = {pL} where
pL :=
τdL − δγκ
1− δ − κ
32Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) only consider private information about the asset dividend. In
Guerrieri and Shimer (2015), the two dimensions actually collapse to one with a monotonicity
assumption similar to my lemon condition (LC). Chang (2014) relaxes this assumption to obtain
bunching in equilibrium. In my model, while the monotonicity condition follows closely from (LC),
it is endogenous.
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Other asset owners do not trade. Reservation values for L asset owners are
r1L = dL + δpL + δγκ
r2L = pL + κ
iii) The rationing function θ satisfies θ(p) =
pL−r1L
p−r1L
if p ∈ [pL, pL + κ] and θ(p) = 0
otherwise. The belief function is
(γ1L, γ
1
Hγ
2
L, γ
2
H)(p) =
(1, 0, 0, 0) if p ∈ [pL, pL + κ](0, 0, 1, 0) if p > r2L
iv) The masses of traders areµ
1
L = γS(1− q)
µ2L = (1− γ)S(1− q)
µ
1
H = Sq/2
µ2H = Sq/2
while equilibrium entry µB(., .) is an atom of mass µ1L at pL.
The last part of the result shows that the mass of buyers is equal to the mass of
asset owners who sell in equilibrium, that is (τ 1, L) agents. Since asset owners can
signal their willingness to trade, search from buyers is not random as in the OTC
market. Competition between buyers drives equilibrium entry and search costs to
the minimal level to support trade33. However, the existence of different prices with
different level of rationing allows agents to signal the quality of their asset. The
first consequence is that a pooling price p cannot be sustained as otherwise, H asset
owners would want to deviate to a higher price p′ > p. Higher rationing at that
price, θ(., p′) > θ(., p) makes this signal credible for buyers who would then propose
price p′, a logic similar to the cream-skimming deviation in strategic models. The
equilibrium is thus separating. In this environment, equilibrium rationing of (τ 1, H)
owners is extreme since they do not trade: liquidity pi is 0. Indeed, the monotonicity
result r2L < r
1
H in Lemma 5 shows that (τ
2, L) agents would then like to trade in any
33The result that µB = µ1L exactly comes from the matching function and the positive search
costs κ > 0. If κ = 0, there could additional entry at no aggregate cost.
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market chosen by type (τ 1, H) where p > r1H . These L asset owners with no gains
from trade thus block trading for (τ 1, H) agents. As a result, misallocation is severe
as half of the H assets are held by low valuation τ 1 agents. Selling pressure is large
but does not lead to trade.
Both components of private information are important for the result. When buy-
ers only ignore the quality of the asset proposed, a similar logic leads to separation
between (τ 1, L) and (τ 1, H) agents but the latter trade with positive probability
as long as dL > 0. Otherwise, the so-called no gap at the bottom condition of
the Akerlof (1970) model shut downs all trade. Asymmetry of information about
valuation creates a middle type (τ 2, L) which prevents trade of the H asset. The
lemon condition τdL < dH is much weaker than dL = 0 but also generates trading
freeze of the H asset while the low quality market functions smoothly. In the OTC
market as well, bi-dimensional private information reduces liquidity since buyers
face disproportionately more L assets. However, ex-post offers protect buyers from
cream-skimming deviations who may thus propose a pooling price if the share of H
assets is high enough. Interestingly, the inter-temporal competition effect reinforces
buyers’ incentives to pool sellers in the OTC market and increases liquidity but
intra-temporal competition reduces liquidity.
1.5.3 Welfare
We formalize the discussion above by comparing aggregate surplus across market
structures. Let WE(q) be our measure of welfare in the unique stationary equilib-
rium of the exchange. In the OTC market, we focus on the steady state equilib-
rium and denote welfare by WOTC(q). This is the unique stationary equilibrium
for q ∈ [0, q
2
) ∪ (q¯, 1]. In q ∈ [q
2
, q¯], our results would change quantitatively but not
qualitatively when considering the cycle. The aggregate surplus gains from trading
in an exchange rather than in the OTC market as a function of q are:
WE(q)−WOTC(q) = µ
B(pi(q))− γS(1− q)
1− δ κ−
Sq − 2µ1H(pi(q))(1− pi(q))
2(1− δ) (τ − 1)dH
(1.27)
The first term is positive and captures the gains from improving the meeting process
with price posting. These gains have two sources. First, with random search, it
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Figure 1.8: Welfare: Exchange vs. OTC (%)
Parameter Values: δ = 0.8, γ = 0.05, dL = 2, dH = 6, τ = 2
must be that at least S buyers enter to match all sellers. Second, OTC equilibrium
entry µB(pi(q)) might even be higher because buyers do not compete in price. In
the Exchange, the price adjusts so that entry matches exactly the mass of asset
owners that are selling. The second term is negative and measures the difference in
misallocation of the H asset. While half of the H assets are not properly allocated in
the Exchange, this fraction falls to µ1H(pi(q))(1− pi(q))/S in the OTC market since
buyers may offer a pooling price (pi(q) > 0). The following proposition derives the
sign of expression (1.27) as a function of the share of H assets q.
Proposition 5. There exists qW ∈ [q, q¯] such that WE(q)−WOTC(q) ≥ 0 for q ≤ qW
and WE(q)−WOTC(q) ≤ 0 otherwise.
Proposition 5 states that when the share of H assets is above the threshold qW
aggregate surplus is higher in the OTC market. When q ≤ q, the OTC equilibrium
is also separating (pi(q) = 0) and only lemons are traded. Hence only the component
related to trading costs plays a role and favors the Exchange. Pooling arises in the
equilibrium of the OTC market when q ≥ q and reduces the misallocation of H
assets - the second term in (1.27). The threshold qW is such that the realized gains
from trade on the H assets overcome the difference in trading costs. Figure 1.8 plots
the welfare difference of equation (1.27) in percentage as a function of q for specific
numeric values of the other parameters. The dashed red lines delimit the region
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where the OTC steady state equilibrium is in mixed strategy, that is q ∈ [q, q¯]. In
that region, the welfare difference becomes negative and decreases steeply because H
assets start trading and the difference in trading costs per unit traded decrease with
intertemporal competition in the OTC market. Observe that in the region where
the OTC equilibrium is pooling in pure strategy, that is [q¯, 1], the welfare difference
might increase. Although trade in the OTC market improves the allocation of the
increasing mass of H quality assets, the lack of intertemporal competition for that
asset also raises trading costs significantly. Still, the first effect dominates and in
the limit WE(1)−WOTC(1) < 0.
Our analysis thus emphasizes the ambiguous role of pre-trade information for
market efficiency in the presence of asymmetry of information. The centralization
of the trading platform saves on trading costs as buyers do not have to search for
potential sellers. Sellers in turn may observe all buyers’ offer simultaneously rather
than sequentially through search which reduces the inefficiencies due to monopoly
pricing in the OTC market. However, competition lowers liquidity as sellers are now
able to signal their type which hinders the correct allocation of high quality assets34.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a theory of endogenous liquidity fluctuations based on asymme-
try of information and re-trade in secondary markets. I show that Over the Counter
Market are prone to fluctuations where prices and trading volume vary in the ab-
sence of aggregate shocks. Equilibrium cycles are inefficient because of the dynamic
externality attached to the composition effect. Hence although market conditions
will eventually improve, it is desirable to bring liquidity forward in the short-run and
stabilize the market in the long-run. I show that a revertible asset purchase program
can achieve these objectives. However, our analysis highlights several limitations.
First, the government asset purchase program interferes with the efficient allocation
of assets in the economy. Indeed, private agents also value assets for their conve-
34This comparison leaves open the question of the endogenous choice of platforms by traders.
Observe however that in our environment, (τ1, H) sellers do not gain from trade. In the OTC
market, the trading price is at most equal to their reservation value while they fail to trade in
the Exchange. Hence pure OTC and pure Exchange market structures can be interpreted as a
particular selection of equilibrium in the larger game where traders would choose their platform.
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nience to realize transactions while the government does not. In addition, absent
taxation, the government runs a loss because he must pay a premium to convince
asset owners to part with their assets. The need to finance the intervention interacts
with the design of the policy and mitigates its effect. The last part of the paper
draws mixed conclusions about the current set of structural reforms of the OTC
market. When buyers may post prices before meetings, matching is more efficient
to bring buyers and sellers together but high quality assets become illiquid. Hence,
the lack of competition and information in OTC markets can be desirable to foster
liquidity.
This analysis still leaves many interesting questions open for policy design in
asset markets with adverse selection. I imposed an immediate resale constraint to
capture realistic constraint for policy makers in a tractable way. In practice, the
timing and the pace of these exit strategies seems important. In addition, the sup-
ply of asset is fixed and constant in my model while it could react endogenously to
liquidity in secondary markets. On the issue of competition and information, the
comparison between OTC and Exchange highlights a negative role of transparency
on liquidity. More work is needed to understand the coexistence of platforms with
different degree of competition and opacity and its implication for efficiency.
44
Chapter 1. Liquidity Fluctuations in Over the Counter Markets
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Assumption: Upper bound on search costs
I give the expression for the upper bound κ¯(γ, δ, τ, dL, dH) of the search cost κ in Assumption (A2).
The condition ensure that buyers find it profitable to enter if they match for sure λB = 1 and face
the least favorable prospects. Building on expression (1.14), we can provide a lower bound for the
net gains from entering the market. Precisely
vB ≥M(q) := max
{
γ(1− q)(τ − 1)dL, γq τ − 1
1− δ(1− 2γ)dH
−(1− q) (1− δ)(dH − τdL) + δγ(τ + 1)(dH − dL
(1− δ)[1− δ(1− 2γ)]
}
Intuitively, the first (resp. second) argument is the minimum possible payoff from a separating
(resp. pooling) offer. Hence we define κ¯(γ, δ, τ, dL, dH) := minqM(q). It is easy to check that this
expression is strictly positive if dL > 0 and γ > 0.
1.7.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Part 1
We want to show that for any (τ i, τ j , a, a′) such that τ ida ≥ τ jda′ , we have ria(t) ≥ rja(t). An-
ticipating equilibrium free entry condition, we know that non-owners make zero profit so that
ria(t) = τ
ida + δv¯
i
a(t). Hence, we establish the following sufficient condition for the result:
v¯ia(t) ≥ v¯ja(t). For this proof, let pi(t, p) be the probability that an owner receive offer p in period t.
Since the matching technology is symmetric and buyers ignore seller’s type, {pi(t, p)}p is the same
across asset owners. By optimality, agent (i, a) obtains a higher utility than if he behaves from t
on-wards like agent (j, a′) for j ∈ {i,−i}. Hence,
via(t) ≥ ria(t) + λS(t)
∑
p∈Γ(t)
pi(t, p)αja′(t, p)[p− ria(t)]
where αja′(t, p) is the acceptance probability of type (j, a
′). Hence
via(t)− vja′(t) ≥ ria(t)− rja′(t)− λS(t)
∑
p∈Γ(t)
pi(t, p)αja′(t, p)[r
i
a(t)− rja′(t)]
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Using the expression for ria(t) and denoting f
j
a′(t) = λ
S(t)
∑
p∈Γ(t) pi(t, p)α
j
a′(t, p) ≤ 1 we obtain
via(t)− vja′(t) ≥(1− f ja′(t))(τ ida − τ jda′) + δ(1− f ja′(t))(v¯ia(t)− v¯ja′(t))
=(1− f ja′(t))(τ ida − τ jda′) + δ(1− γ)(1− f ja′(t))(via(t+ 1)− vja′(t+ 1))
+ δγ(1− f ja′(t))(v−ia (t+ 1)− v−ja′ (t+ 1))
Hence we can rewrite the following expression as
v2L(t)− v1L(t)
v1H(t)− v2L(t)
v2H(t)− v1H(t)
 ≥

(τ − 1)dL
dH − τdL
(τ − 1)dH
+ δM(t)

v2L(t+ 1)− v1L(t+ 1)
v1H(t+ 1)− v2L(t+ 1)
v2H(t+ 1)− v1H(t+ 1)
 (1.28)
where
M(t) =

(1− f1L(t))(1− 2γ) 0 0
γ(1− f2L(t)) 1− f2L(t) γ(1− f2L(t))
0 0 (1− f1H(t))(1− 2γ)

Iterating on the inequality above and using the transversality condition limt→∞ δtvia(t) = 0, it
follows that the left hand side of (1.28) is positive. It is then straightforward to show that the
result extends to reservation values.
Part 2
From subgame perfection of the bargaining game, seller (τ i, a) strategy is simply αia(t, p) = 1p≥ria(t)
for i = 1, 2 and a = L,H. A seller accepts any offer weakly above his reservation value. It follows
immediately that a buyer may only offer one of these reservation values. To characterize the buyers’
offer, let us rewrite the buyer’s problem (1.3) as
Supp
(
Πk(t, .)
)
= arg max
p

∑
i=1,2
a=L,H
µia(t)
S
αia(t, p)
(
rka(t, p)− p
)+ δv¯k0 (t+ 1)
Consider first an agent (τ1, 0). Since r2a(t)− r1a(t) ≥ 0 for a = L,H, this agent weakly prefers not
to make an offer. This means that not participating in the market is a strictly dominant strategy
since searching costs κ > 0. Let us turn now to type (τ2, 0) agents. Using law of motion (1.13)-
(1.12), observe first that µ1a(t) > 0 for a = L,H. In any period, there is a strictly positive mass
of each type of asset owners due to the type switching process. We argue now that offer r2a(t) is
strictly dominated by offer r1a(t). Indeed, by lowering his offer, the buyer makes a strictly greater
profit on all types (τ i, a′) for which ria′(t) ≤ r1a(t). In addition, while the lower offer fails to attract
(τ2, a) agents anymore, the buyer was breaking even on this group with the higher offer. Hence
the only possible offers are r1L(t) and r
1
H(t).
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Proof of Lemma 2
Point i). Since agent (τ2, H) never trades and agent (τ1, H) only receives offer (weakly) below his
reservation value. By stationarity, we can drop the time argument in dynamic equation (1.8) to
obtain the following system
r1H = dH + δ
[
(1− γ)r1H + γr2H(t+ 1)
]
r2H = dH + δ
[
(1− γ)r2H + γr1H(t+ 1)
]
Straightforward manipulations give:
riH =
(1− δ)τ i + δγ(τ + 1)
(1− δ)[1− δ(1− 2γ)]dH , i = 1, 2
Point ii). From the free entry condition (1.7) and dynamic equations (1.10)-(1.11) we obtain
for i = 1, 2
vi0(t) = δv¯
i
0(t+ 1)
By stationary property 5 of Definition 2 , it is immediate that for all t, and i ∈ {1, 2}, vi0(t) = 0.
Point iii). We want to show that in equilibrium µB(t) ≥ S. Suppose that the opposite
inequality holds. Then the net profit from searching for a type τ2 agent is −κ + vB(t) since the
matching probability is 1 for a buyer. If this expression is strictly positive, buyers would enter
and since there is no rivalry in the matching technology as long as µB(t) ≤ S, entry would be
µB(t) ≥ S, proving the conjecture wrong. Using expression (1.6), a lower bound on vB(t) is
vB(t) ≥max
{
γ(1− q)(τ − 1)dL, γq τ − 1
1− δ(1− 2γ)dH
−(1− q) (1− δ)(dH − τdL) + δγ(τ + 1)(dH − dL
(1− δ)[1− δ(1− 2γ)]
}
:= M(q)
Our assumption that κ ≥ minqM(q) = κ¯(γ, δ, τ, dL, dH) ensures that −κ + vB(t) > 0 so that in
equilibrium µB(t) ≥ S, that is λS(t) = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
Observe first that pi(t) weakly increases when vB(t, 1)− vB(t, 0) increases.
Competition effect
From equation (1.14), vB(t, 1)− vB(t, 0) increases with {riL(t)}i=1,2. For i = 1, 2, riL(t) = τ idL +
δv¯iL(t+ 1) where v¯
i
L(t+ 1) = (1−γ)viL(t+ 1) +γvjL(t+ 1) for j 6= i. From dynamic equations (1.9),
we have
viL(t+ 1) = pi(t+ 1)r
1
H + (1− pi(t+ 1))
[
τ idL + v¯
i(t+ 2)
]
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Since r1H ≥ riL(t+ 1) := τ idL + v¯i(t+ 2) for i = 1, 2 by Lemma 1, the result follows.
Composition effect
From equation (1.14), vB(t, 1)− vB(t, 0) increases with µ1H(t). From law of motion (1.12), we have
µ1H(t) = γSq + (1− 2γ)(1− pi(t− 1))µ1H(t− 1)
Since γ < 1/2, 1− 2γ > 0 and thus µ1H(t) decreases with pi(t− 1).
Proof of Lemma 4
B The proof is by contradiction. Let t0 be such that pi(t0) = 1. Suppose then that pi(t0 + 1) = 1.
We want to establish that pi(t0 + 2) = 1. Then by induction, it means that for all t ≥ t0, pi(t) = 1,
a contradiction with having a cycle of period T ≥ 2.
Using law of motion (1.12), we have that µ1H(t0 +1) = γSq, that is the distribution of assets is least
favorable to a pooling offer in period t0 + 1. Since pi(t0 + 1) = 1, we also have µ
1
H(t0 + 2) = γSq.
Suppose now pi(t0 + 2) = 0. Then , the sequence of offers {pi(t)}t>t0+1 is weakly less favorable to
a pooling offer than the sequence {pi(t)}t>t0+2 since it starts with 0. Hence, using Lemma 3, since
pi(t) is weakly increasing in {pi(t + l}l=1,..,∞, if pi(t0 + 1) = 1, it must be that pi(t0 + 2) = 1, a
contradiction. C
Proof of Proposition 1
In the following, we characterize a T period cycle and then derive conditions for it to be an
equilibrium. Let us first write down the endogenous variables in the conjectured equilibrium.
Using the results in the main text, we have
µ1H,T (t) =
1− (1− 2γ)t
2
Sq, t = 1, .., T
Reservation values {riL,T (.)}i=1,2 verify the following equations:
riL,T (t) =
τ
idL + δ
[
(1− γ)riL,T (t+ 1) + γrjL,T (t+ 1)
]
if t = 0, ..., T − 2
τ idL + δr
1
H if t = T − 1
where j 6= i. We obtain for t = 0, .., T − 1
r1L,T (t) + r
2
L,T (t) =
1− δT−t
1− δ (τ + 1)dL + 2δ
T−tr1H
r2L,T (t)− r1L,T (t) =
1− [δ(1− 2γ)]T−t
1− δ(1− 2γ) (τ − 1)dL
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from which we get for t = 0, .., T − 1
r1L,T (t) =
[
1− δT−t
1− δ (τ + 1)−
1− (δ(1− 2γ))T−t
1− δ(1− 2γ) (τ − 1)
]
dL
2
+ δT−tr1H
r2L,T (t) =
[
1− δT−t
1− δ (τ + 1) +
1− (δ(1− 2γ))T−t
1− (δ(1− 2γ)) (τ − 1)
]
dL
2
+ δT−tr1H
Since for all t and i = 1, 2, riL,T (t) ≤ r1H , we obtain by backward induction that
riL,T (t) ≤ riL,T (t+ 1), t = 0, .., T − 2
The net gain from a pooling offer writes
vBT (t, 1)− vBT (t, 0) = µ1H(t)(r2H − r1H)− S(1− q)
[
r1H − (1− γ)r2L,T (t)− γr1L,T (t)
]
The conjecture is an equilibrium if this expression is strictly negative in periods t = 1, .., T −1 and
strictly positive in period 0. From the analysis above, this expression is increasing over [|1, T − 1|].
Hence, we need only to verify that vBT (0, 1) − vBT (0, 0) > 0 and vBT (T − 1, 1) − vBT (T − 1, 0) < 0.
These conditions are respectively equivalent to
q ≥ q
T
:=
2(r1H − r2L,T (0)) + 2γ
(
r2L,T (0)− r1L,T (0)
)[
1− (1− 2γ)T ](r2H − r1H) + 2(r1H − r2L,T (0)) + 2γ(r2L,T (0)− r1L,T (0))
q ≤ q¯T :=
2(r1H − r2L,T (T − 1)) + 2γ
(
r2L,T (T − 1)− r1L,T (T − 1)
)[
1− (1− 2γ)T−1](r2H − r1H) + 2(r1H − r2L(T − 1)) + 2γ(r2L,T (T − 1)− r1L,T (T − 1))
Hence the T periods cycle exists if and only if q
T
≤ q¯T that is
1− (1− 2γ)T
1− (1− 2γ)T−1 ≥
r1H − r2L,T (0) + γ
(
r2L,T (0)− r1L,T (0)
)
(1− δ)r1H − τdL + γ(τ − 1)dL
(ET )
The LHS decreases with T . On the RHS, the denominator does not depend on T while the
numerator is equal to r1H− (1−γ)r2L,T (0)−r1L,T (0) and increases in T . This proves that for T ′ ≥ T
(ET ′)⇒ (ET )
It is clear that q¯T only depends on T through the first term of the denominator 1−(1−2γ)T−1.
It is then immediate that the sequence {q¯T } is decreasing in T . Cumbersome but straightforward
computations show that q¯2 = q¯ where q¯ is defined in Proposition 2. Finally, we are left to show that
q¯T+1 ≤ qT for T ≥ 2. From, the expression above, this is true if riL,T+1(T ) ≥ riL,T (0) for i = 1, 2.
By definition, we have riL,T+1(T ) = r
i
L,T (T − 1) and the result follows from the monotonicity of
riL,T .
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Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 1, we proceed as follows. First, we write all endogenous variables as a function
of pi. Then we solve for a fixed point equation in pi.
Step 1
Using law of motion (1.12), we obtain
µ1H(pi) = γSq + (1− 2γ)(1− pi)µ1H(pi)
=
(1− γ)pi + (1− pi)γ
pi + 2γ(1− pi) Sq
We determine the reservation values for L asset owners (r1L(pi), r
2
L(pi)) which solve
r1L(pi) = dL + δ
(
pir1H + (1− pi)
[
(1− γ)r1L(pi) + γr2L(pi)
])
r2L(pi) = τdL + δ
(
pir1H + (1− pi)
[
(1− γ)r2L(pi) + γr1L(pi)
])
Hence
r2L(pi) + r
1
L(pi) = (τ + 1)dL + 2δpir
1
H + δ(1− pi)
[
r2L(pi) + r
1
L(pi)
]
r2L(pi)− r1L(pi) = (τ − 1)dL + δ(1− pi)(1− 2γ)(r2L(pi)− r1L(pi))
From which we obtain for i = 1, 2
riL(pi) = τ
idL +
1
1− (1− pi)δ
[
piδr1H + (1− pi)δ
(
τ idL + γ
τ j − τ i
1− δ(1− pi)(1− 2γ)dL
)]
Step 2
Using the buyer’s problem (1.14), with a slight abuse of notation, let us write vB(pi, pˆi) where the
first argument is the strategy played by other buyers and the second argument is the strategy of
an individual buyer. An equilibrium pi must verify
pi =

0 if vB(0, 0) ≥ vB(0, 1)
∈ (0, 1) if vB(pi, 0) = vB(pi, 1)
1 if vB(1, 1) ≥ vB(1, 0)
(1.29)
We can first characterize too cutoffs (q, q¯) for the existence of the pure strategy equilibria pi∗ = 0
and pi∗ = 1. Plugging the expressions obtained above, we have
vB(0, 1)− vB(0, 0) = q
2
τ − 1
1− δ(1− 2γ)dH − (1− q)
(1− δ)(dH − vdL) + δγ(v + 1)(dH − dL)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− 2γ))
− γ(1− q) τ − 1
1− δ(1− 2γ)dL
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and thus vB(0, 1)− vB(0, 0) ≤ 0 if and only if
q(1− δ)(τ − 1)dH − 2(1− q)(1− δ)(dH − τdL)− 2(1− q)δγ(τ + 1)(dH − dL)
− 2γ(1− q)(1− δ)(τ − 1)dL ≤ 0
We thus obtain the threshold q introduced in the main text:
q =
2a
(1− δ)(τ − 1)dH + 2a
a = (1− δ)(dH − τdL) + γδ(τ + 1)(dH − dL) + γ(1− δ)(τ − 1)dL
Similarly, we have
vB(1, 1)−vB(1, 0) = γq τ − 1
1− δ(1− 2γ)dH−(1−q)
[
1− δ + δγ(τ + 1)
1− δ(1− 2γ) dH − τdL
]
−γ(1−q)(τ−1)dL
and thus vB(1, 1) ≥ vB(1, 0) if and only if
γq(τ − 1)dH − (1− q)(1− δ)dH − (1− q)δγ(τ + 1)dH + (1− q)(1− δ(1− 2γ))τdL
− γ(1− q)(1− δ(1− 2γ))(τ − 1)dL ≥ 0
We obtain
q¯ =
a− b
γ(τ − 1)dH + a− b , where b = δγ(1− 2γ)(τ − 1)dL
To derive mixed strategy equilibria, let us focus on the case q < q¯ (a similar argument applies
when the multiplicity condition holds). Then for q ∈ (q, q¯), we have vB(0, 1) − vB(0, 0) > 0 and
vB(1, 1)− vB(1, 0) < 0. Hence by continuity of vB(., 1)− vB(., 0) in its first argument, there exists
pi(q) ∈ (0, 1) such that vB(pi(q), 0) = vB(pi(q), 1). We are left to prove uniqueness of this mixed
strategy equilibrium. We have
vB(pi, 1)− vB(pi, 0) = γSq
2γ + pi(1− 2γ) (r
2
H − r1H)− S(1− q)
(1− δ)r1H − (γ + (1− γ)τ)dL
1− (1− pi)δ
− S(1− q) (1− pi)(1− 2γ)(τ − 1)δγdL[
1− (1− pi)δ][1− δ(1− pi)(1− 2γ)]
The expression above shows that the zeros of vB(., 1) − vB(., 0) are solutions to a second order
equation in pi which may have at most 2 real roots. Hence, the second root cannot belong to (0, 1)
as otherwise the expression would need to change sign twice on (0, 1) and have a third root. This
concludes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Using equation (1.19), we obtain the following expression for steady state welfare:
Wss(q) =
S(1− q)τdL + SqτdH
1− δ −
(1− pi(q))µ1H(pi(q))(τ − 1)dH + µBssκ
1− δ
For the high date of the cycle we obtain:
Wcy(0, q) =
S(1− q)τdL + SqτdH
1− δ −
δγSq(τ − 1)dH + µBcy(0)κ+ δµBcy(1)κ
1− δ2
Since buyers make zero profit in equilibrium, trade costs cover the gains from trade that is µB(t)κ =
SvB(t) using equation (1.7). in equilibrium. In steady state, the trade costs are thus equal
to µBssκ = γS(1 − q)(r2L(pi(q)) − r1L(pi(q)). In a cycle, trade costs are respectively µBcy(1)κ =
γS(1−q)(τ−1)dL in the trough and µBcy(0)κ = µ1H,C(0)(r2H−r1H)+S(1−q)(r2L,cy(0)−r1H) > µBcy(1)κ
at the peak. Hence we obtain
Wss,q −Wcy(0, q) > 1
1− δ
[(
δ
1 + δ
− 1− pi(q)
2γ + pi(q)(1− 2γ)
)
γSq(τ − 1)dH + (µBcy(1)− µBss)κ
]
As q → q¯, pi(q) → 1. Hence µBss → µBcy(1). The second term in the brackets thus converges to 0.
The first term however is bounded away from 0 as q converges towards q¯. This proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is in two steps. First, I show that there cannot be a market where θ(t, p) > 0 and
γiH(t, p) > 0. Finally, I show that the allocation in Proposition 4 is the only equilibrium possible.
Step 1
Observe first that in a stationary equilibrium, it must be that µ2L(t) > 0 since agents have a positive
probability to switch type The argument is by contradiction. Observe first that maxP(t) < r2H(t).
Indeed, the maximum price buyers will pay for an asset is r2H(t)−κ, that is the value of a H asset
minus the search cost. Hence, (τ2, H) will never sell their asset. Practically, they choose a market
p > r2H(t) where θ(t, p) = 0. Define now
PH(t) = {p ∈ P(t) | γ1H(t, p) > 0}
The set PH(t) is the set of active markets where H assets are for sale. We want to show that
PH(t) = ∅. By (τ1, H) sellers optimality condition, we have minPH(t) ≥ r1H(t). Let p¯H(t) =
maxPH(t) = maxP(t).
Suppose first that γ1H(t, p) = 1. It must be that (τ
2, L) sellers are at most indifferent about
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trading at that price. Let thus be
p¯2L(t) = max{p ∈ P(t) | γ2(t, p) > 0} < p¯H(t)
Market p¯2L(t) is the maximum price at which agents (τ
2, L) trade. For p¯2L(t) to be optimal, it must
be that:
λS(t, p¯2L(t))(p¯
2
L(t)− r2L(t)) ≥ λS(t, p¯H(t))(p¯H(t)− r2L(t))
In particular, we must have p¯2L(t) > r
2
L(t). Since r
2
L(t) − κ is the maximum price a L asset can
command, it must be that γ1H(t, p
′) > 0. By seller’s optimality, agents (τ1, H) must weakly prefer
market p2L(t) to any market p
′ > p¯2L(t), that is
λS(t, p¯2L(t))(p¯
2
L(t)− r1H(t)) ≥ λS(t, p′)(p′ − r1H(t))
This is only possible if λS(t, p′) < λS(t, p¯2L(t)) ≤ 1. Then since r2L(t) < r1H(t), agents (τ2, L) strictly
prefer market p¯2L(t) over p
′. Hence, using Part 2 of the Equilibrium definition, γ1H(t, p
′) = 1. Let
us now write buyers profit in market p¯2L(t) and p
′ > p¯2L(t)
v20(t, p¯
2
L(t)) = −κ+ λB(t, p¯2L(t))
[
(γ1L(t) + γ
2
L(t, p))r
2
L(t) + γ
1
H(t, p)r
2
H(t)− p¯2L(t)
]
v20(t, p
′) = −κ+ r2H(t)− p′
Hence,
lim
p′→p¯2L(t)
v20(t, p
′) > v20(t, p¯
2
L(t))
which is incompatible with buyers’ optimality condition.
But if we suppose now that γ1H(t, p¯H) < 1, the same argument applies. Hence, we have shown
that PH(t) = ∅.
Step 2
We have shown that only (τ1, L) asset owners might trade. To conclude the proof we must derive
the equilibrium price pL(t) for trade as well as equilibrium entry from non-owners. With free entry,
buyers make zero profit so that v20(t, pL) = 0. This implies that
pL(t) = τdL + δv¯
2
L(t+ 1)− κ
Asset owners (τ1, L) find a match for sure while (τ2, L) asset owners do not trade, so that
v1L(t) = pL(t)
v2L(t) = τdL + δv
2
L(t+ 1)
Using these equations together with the stationary condition of Definition 4, we obtain that (pL, v
2
L)
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are constant over time and equal to
v2L =
τ − δγκ
1− δ dL
pL = v
2
L − κ
Finally, non-owners make zero profit upon entering if and only if λB(t) = 1. Hence µB(t) =
µ1L(t) = γS(1− q).
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider first the case where q ∈ [0, q]. In this region, expression (1.27) become:
WE(q)−WOTC(q) = γS(1− q)
1− δ
[
τ − 1
1− δ(1− 2γ) − κ
]
which is positive and decreasing in q. When q ∈ [q, q¯], we obtain
WE(q)−WOTC(q) =γS(1− q)
1− δ
[
τ − 1
1− δ(1− pi(q))(1− 2γ) − κ
]
− Sqpi(q)
(1− δ)[2γ + pi(q)(1− 2γ)] (τ − 1)dH
We have that pi(.) is strictly increasing in q over q ∈ [q, q¯]. Hence both terms of the expression
above are increasing in q. We establish now that that this expression is negative when evaluated
in q¯
WE(q¯)−WOTC(q¯) = γS(1− q¯)
1− δ
[
(τ − 1)dL − κ
]− Sq¯
2(1− δ) (τ − 1)dH
It is sufficient to establish that 2γ(1− q¯)dL − q¯dH ≤ 0. Using the expression derived in the proof
of Proposition 2, straightforward computations show that this is the case. Finally, on the interval
[q¯, 1], we have
WE(q)−WOTC(q) =− Sq
2
(τ − 1) (1− δ)(1− 2γ)
(1− δ)[1− δ(1− 2γ)]dH
− S(1− q)
[
κ− τdL
1− δ +
1− δ + δγ(τ + 1)
(1− δ)[1− δ(1− 2γ)]dH
]
It is immediate to see that this expression is negative in q = 1. Since it is also linear in q, it is
negative over [q¯, 1].
1.7.3 Numerical Exercise
We describe the method used to solve for equilibrium induced by feasible policies in Section 1.4.2.
We show that each policy ultimately depends the identity of a targeted type and on variables
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(SG, pi(tint), pi(tint + 1)) which solve three equations imposed by Definition 3. Let us first express
the reservation values for i ∈ {1, 2}. We have
riL(tint + 1) = r
i
L,ss
riL(tint) = τ
idL + δ
(
pi(tint + 1)r
1
H + (1− pi(tint + 1))
[
(1− γ)riL(tint + 1) + γrjL(tint + 1)
])
The first equality follows from the fact that the economy is in a steady state equilibrium from
period tint + 2 onward. We now turn to agents participation constraint. Reservation values in
period tint are determine exactly as before. From Lemma 1, we have that v
i
a(tint) ≥ vja(tint) if
τ ida ≥ τ jda′ for (i, j) ∈ {1, 2}2 and (a, a′) ∈ {L,H}2. We thus call targeted type the highest type
willing to participate in the program. Given a targeted type, (τ i, a), the purchase price PG must
verify
via(tint) ≤ PG < vja′(tint), ∀j ∈ {1, 2}, a′ ∈ {L,H}, such that τ jda′ > τ ida
For a given size SG, the value within the range does not change the effect of the policy and we
thus set PG = via(tint). Similarly, we set R
G to the upper bound defined by the resale constraint
(RC). For a given targeted type, the size of the intervention also pins down the selection of assets
(SGH , S
G
L ) through (1.20). Let us then express the masses of each type of trader in period tint + 1:
µ1L(tint + 1) = γ(S(1− q)− SGL ),
µ1H(tint + 1) = γ(Sq − SGH) + (1− 2γ)(1− pi(tint))µ1H(tint)
In phase i) of period tint + 1, the government sold his assets to τ
2 buyers. The masses of type τ1
traders in phase ii) of period tint+1 thus obtain from law of motions (1.13)-(1.12) substituting total
supply by non-government supply. It is now clear that for a given targeted type, an equilibrium
with intervention is pinned down by a triplet (SG, pi(tint), pi(tint+1)) verifying the three conditions
in Definition 3 the stabilization constraint SC and the optimality of offer (pi(tint), pi(tint + 1)) for
buyers. We thus adopt the following numerical procedure:
1. Select the highest type (τ i, a) to attract where i ∈ {1, 2}, a ∈ {L,H}.
2. Derive the lower bound on the purchase price PG and the upper bound on the resale price
RG as a function of (pi(tint), pi(tint + 1)) thanks to (RC).
3. Solve for a fixed point in (SG, pi(tint), pi(tint + 1)) following Definition 3.
4. Rank the policies derived in Point 3. across types using surplus criterion (1.21).
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Chapter 2
Re-using the Collateral of Others
2.1 Introduction
In credit markets, lenders frequently require borrowers to post collateral as a pro-
tection against default. Households pledge their house as collateral in a mortgage
while banks use financial assets such as government securities. Households with
mortgages own and use their house. In financial markets however, the lender may
become the owner of the asset. More precisely, counterparties can arrange for the
legal transfer of the collateral from the borrower to the lender. This provision allows
the lender to enjoy rehypothecation rights over the collateral received: he may sell or
re-use the collateral for his own funding1. While rehypothecation may seem bizarre,
the ISDA2 reports that borrowers grant such rehypothecation rights in 73.7% of
trades surveyed for swaps and derivatives. With rehypothecation, collateral circu-
lates through credit chains. These chains also generate risk as borrowers may be
wary of losing access to their re-used asset. On account of those risks, Canadian law
prohibits rehypothecation and several pending reforms in the US and the EU3 seek
to limit re-use. The current debates relies mostly on qualitative assessments and the
literature does not yet offer a formal analysis of rehypothecation. The mere size of
collateralized financial markets where rehypothecation is common practice (deriva-
tives alone represent $700 trillions of gross notional) thus motivates this analysis.
1Strictly speaking, rehypothecation refers to the onward use of collateral pledged in a financial
relationship. In swaps or derivatives markets, this re-use right can be granted by the collateral
pledgor in an annex to the contract. Rehypothecation also applies to the US repo market where
the asset is pledged together with a contractual right to re-use. In the non-US repo market,
counterparties transfer the title of the asset during the sale. Hence, (re)-use is a fundamental
right of the collateral receiver rather than one granted by the pledgor and rehypothecation is not
appropriate. We refer to the ICMA website for further details.
2International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2013 Margin Survey
3Section VII of the Dodd-Frank Act on central clearing of swaps implies that collateral cannot
be rehypothecated. Similarly, dealer banks now have to obligation to notify their clients that their
collateral can be segregated. The EU’s own EMIR regulation introduces similar requirements for
cleared swaps.
59
Chapter 2. Re-using the Collateral of Others
This paper provides a model to account for the trade-off between circulation of
collateral and re-use risk in a general equilibrium framework. My theory of rehy-
pothecation builds on Geanakoplos (1996) where a durable asset is used as collateral
to secure short positions in financial securities4. In this environment, borrowers can-
not commit to repay a loan and thus need to post collateral. I add rehypothecation
whereby lenders can re-use a fraction of the collateral received to secure their own
short positions. Lenders however also face limited commitment when required to
return the collateral they received. Indeed, with re-use rights, the (cash) borrower
ultimately extends an asset loan to the lender against the initial cash loan. Hence,
fundamentally, collateral cannot circulate without generating re-use risk.
The technical contribution of this paper is to frame a model of rehypothecation
as a simple extension of Geanakoplos (1996). Its first building block is the distinc-
tion between segregated and unsegregated collateral. Only the latter may be re-used
by traders. I also adapt the settlement mechanism to accommodate double sided
limited commitment, resulting from ex-post default decisions. The main result of
the paper establishes that rehypothecation proves redundant if agents may already
trade collateral efficient securities without re-use. A precise combination of securi-
ties with optimal collateral requirements can deliver the same asset velocity as the
original transaction with re-use. Hence, re-use is not a free lunch in this environment
because (money) lenders become asset borrowers and face limited commitment. My
analysis thus suggests that the implicit relationship between re-use and collateral
efficiency in many recent studies should be revised5.
The rest of the paper examines departures from the complete market bench-
mark to understand when rehypothecation can strictly increase efficiency. With
incomplete markets, rehypothecation helps freeing up collateral and relaxes collat-
eral constraints. Re-use then essentially completes the markets by allowing trades
that were not permitted under an incomplete financial structure. I show that these
4Some important models of default with limited commitment use a different technology than
collateral to enforce promises. In Kehoe and Levine (1993), defaulting agents are excluded from
financial markets. Dubey et al. (2005) uses non-pecuniary penalties for default. However, my work
focuses precisely on the utilization of collateral, hence this modeling approach
5Several papers focusing on collateral demand induced by central clearing including Galbiati
and Soramaki (2013) and Duffie et al. (2014) factor rehypothecation as an unambiguous gain for
dealer banks
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gains from re-use are larger with decentralized trading. Consider indeed a situation
where three agents A,B,C trade in a chain. A and C may only trade with B who
effectively acts as an intermediary. If A wishes to borrow from C, B would first ex-
tend a collateralized loan to A and then fund this loan by borrowing collateralized
from C. Hence, intermediation mechanically doubles the need for pledgeable asset.
Rehypothecation is beneficial as it allows agent B to re-use the collateral he receives
from A in his transaction with C. If A could trade directly with C, re-use would
not be needed.
Finally, I also show how re-use may generate fragility in the settlement process
when many agents must return a scarce asset to their counterparty. Indeed, rehy-
pothecation creates additional collateral out of a fixed quantity of pledgeable asset.
The system fragility to external shocks depends on the strength of this multiplier
effect.
Rehypothecation received much attention from policy-making circles as the 2007
financial crisis exposed risky collateral management practices at some dealer banks6.
Monnet (2011), Singh (2011) or Kirk et al. (2014) describe the trade-off between
collateral circulation and collateral risk and provide rough measures of circulation
at the aggregate or bank level. Bottazzi et al. (2012), account for re-use of secu-
rities through repurchase agreements but sidestep the commitment issue attached
to returning securities. In Andolfatto et al. (2014), the value of a long-term rela-
tionship between traders mitigate the commitment issue and effectively substitutes
for collateral. Their different focus on monetary policy complements the analysis
in this paper. Monnet and Nellen (2012) analyze different collateral segregation
regimes with pure limited commitment. This paper combines the features from the
contributions outlined above.
The need to re-use collateral suggests that pledgeable assets might be too scarce
to sustain an efficient level of borrowing in the economy7. Concerns about collat-
eral scarcity gained prominence as Central Banks massive purchases of Treasuries
reduce the supply of collateral-eligible assets, a point developed in Arau´jo et al.
(2013). Re-use of collateral resembles other financial innovations such as tranching
6The 2011 failure of MF Global, a broker dealer who took bets on the European debt market
re-using the collateral of its clients brought the practice to light.
7See CGFS (2013) for a recent take on the empirical debate around asset scarcity.
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or pyramiding studied in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) or Gottardi and Kubler
(2014) to economize on the pledgeable asset. Somewhat surprisingly, I show that
in the absence of frictions, re-use fails to deliver the same efficiency gains. When
markets are incomplete however, rehypothecation proves useful if pyramiding or
tranching are not possible for legal or technical reasons. In practice, the widespread
use of plain vanilla assets8 as collateral justifies rehypothecation over pyramiding.
A the aggregate level, rehypothecation contributes to the creation of credit chains
resembling that of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). As in their model, an unanticipated
shock propagates through the system when agents hold large gross positions (cf Sec-
tion 2.6). This effect is reminiscent of contagion in interbank networks as in Allen
and Gale (2000) or clearing mechanisms a la Eisenberg and Noe (2001). Rehypoth-
ecation may also generate contagion through the need to return the asset used as
collateral. Indeed, when the same piece of collateral secured many loans, settlement
and collateral delivery might not proceed smoothly. I show that a contract feature
for settlement based on actual market practice mitigates these concerns.
Finally, rehypothecation stresses the analogy between collateral and money. As
means of exchange, both determine the economy’s ability to trade efficiently in an
environment with limited commitment. The concept of money velocity extends to
collateral with rehypothecation as the same piece of asset can back several trans-
actions. However, money ultimately replaces credit transactions with spot trades
for exchanging goods. On the contrary, collateral fundamentally backs credit trans-
actions for future state contingent commodities. Hence limited commitment is an
issue for re-using collateral and limits the gains from rehypothecation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I present a simple example
to illustrate the main mechanisms at play with rehypothecation. Section 2.3 then
introduces the general model and discusses its novel features. The main irrelevance
result on rehypothecation appears on Section 2.4 while Section 2.5 shows how re-
hypothecation can restore efficiency in an incomplete market environment. Section
2.6 features a discussion on settlement and fragility. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
8The ISDA 2013 Margin Survey reports that cash and government securities make up for more
than 90% of collateral pledged by a sample of financial institutions
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2.2 Re-using collateral: an example
This example illustrates how rehypothecation facilitates trade and increases wel-
fare when collateral is scarce and markets are (collateral)-incomplete. I strip down
the presentation to avoid repetitions with the exposition of the model in Section 2.3.
Example 1
Consider a two period (t = 0, 1) competitive one good economy with 3 types of
agents, i = A,B,C. There are two states of the world in t = 1 denoted s = 1, 2
with equal probability pi(s) = 1/2. Agents are risk-averse, have identical VNM
preferences and do not discount period 1 payoffs. Agent i endowment is denoted by
ei0 in period 0 and e
i
1(s) in period 1 and state s. Let e ∈ (1,∞). We have
eA0 = e+ 3/4
eA1 (1) = e− 1/2
eA1 (2) = e− 1

eB0 = e+ 1/4
eB1 (1) = e− 1/2
eB1 (2) = e

eC0 = e− 1
eC1 (1) = e
eC1 (2) = e− 1
In addition, agent C is endowed with one unit of the a tree that delivers x(s) =
s units of the consumption good in state s of period 1. With this endowment
specification, there is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy since
x(s) +
∑
i=A,B,C
ei1(s) = 3e, s = 1, 2
In period 0, agents may trade the tree and a riskless bond in zero net supply with
face value 1. Let agent i’s portfolio be given by (θi, φi) where θi (resp. φi) denotes
agent i holdings of the tree (resp. the bond).
Symmetric Efficient Allocation
In this example, total endowment is constant in very date/state and equal to
3e. Because agents are risk-averse, consumption across states must be constant in a
Pareto Efficient allocation. Hence, the symmetric efficient allocation has any agent
consuming c∗ = e in every date/state.
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Decentralization
The symmetric efficient allocation is also the competitive equilibrium of this econ-
omy. Agents can trade two assets (the tree and the bond) with payoff matrix
R =
1 1
1 2

With two states and two non-colinear assets, a unique portfolio profile finances c∗
(θA, φA) = (1/2, 0) (θB, φB) = (−1/2, 1) (θC , φC) = (1,−1)
Collateral constraints without rehypothecation
We suppose now that agents can default at no cost on promises to deliver goods.
However, they may use the tree as collateral to secure borrowing. Hence, a bond
seller (i.e. a borrower) must post one unit of the tree as collateral for every bond
unit sold. Observe that this is the minimum quantity to ensure repayment by a
borrower in state s = 1. This friction leads to the following constraint on portfolios.
θi + min{0, φi} ≥ 0 (1a)
One can read (1a) as the collateral constraint of agent i. Observe that (1a) nests a
no short-sale constraint θi ≥ 0 on the tree. Shorting the tree indeed amounts to a
non-credible promise to pay x(s) in state s. Agent B’s portfolio violates (1a) since
he would need to sell the tree short. We show below that this becomes possible with
rehypothecation.
Rehypothecation
With the trades outlined above, agent B would receive 1 unit of the tree as collateral
since he has a long position φB = 1. Assume that he can re-use half of this collateral
for his own trades. Formally, constraint (1a) becomes:
θi + 1/2 max{0, φi}+ min{0, φi} ≥ 0 (1b)
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Now B may sell half of the tree he receives as collateral as if it were his own. It is
easy to verify that the portfolios described above verify collateral constraints (1b)
and thus that agents reach allocation c∗.
With rehypothecation, however, agent B issued an implicit promise to return
1/2 units of the tree. We are thus left to check that agent B wants to make good
on his promise by buying the tree back from A. We argue that he does since
1− 1/2x(s) ≥ 0, s = 1, 2
The left hand side is agent B’s payoff when he delivers. It costs 1/2x(s) = 1/2s to
buy back the re-used tree and he obtains 1 from the bond payment. The right hand
side is the payoff from failing to deliver. In this case, agent C obligation towards
agent B is canceled and the later gets 0. It is thus crucial that agent B’s failure to
deliver the collateral cancels the obligation to repay of the debtor C.
Collateral backs promises by borrowers to pay in consumption goods and make
them credible. Credible promises by borrowers then back lenders’ promises to return
the asset used as collateral. Two elements were important for this analysis though:
(i) Agent B may only re-use half of the collateral he receives but he is liable up
to the full value of posted collateral upon default. As we show in the main
model, this wedge between posted collateral and re-usable collateral is crucial.
(ii) Agent B is able to buy back the tree in period 1. In general, many re-users
might try to buy back the same piece of collateral simultaneously, generating a
bottleneck effect. We will see that a well-defined settlement process or a right
to return equivalent collateral allow to sidestep this difficulty.
In this example, agent B re-uses the collateral to sell it to agent A. In general, the
collateral receiver could also re-pledge, that is using the pledged collateral to secure
additional borrowing in the same or different debt instruments. This will depend on
which collateralized trades are the most valuable. However, the example suggests
that agents who re-use collateral must be given proper incentives to return it to their
counterparties. This friction limits the economic value of rehypothecation. The rest
of the paper is concerned mainly with identifying environments where re-use may
bring about strict welfare gains, as in this example.
65
Chapter 2. Re-using the Collateral of Others
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Physical Environment
Consider a pure exchange economy with two periods t = 0, 1 and several states
of the world s = 1, ...S in period 1. The economy consists of a set of agents
I = {1, 2, ..., I} and a perishable consumption good. Each type i represents a
continuum of agents of mass 1. Agent i endowment of the consumption good is
ei = (ei0, e
i
1(1), ..., e
i
1(S)) ∈ RS+1. Preferences are Von Neumann-Morgenstern over
consumption streams. Function ui denotes instantaneous utility so that agent i’s
preferences over consumption bundle (c0, c1) are given by
U i(c0, c1) = u
i(c0) +
S∑
s=1
pi(s)ui(c1(s))
where pi(s) denotes the probability that state s realizes in period 1. Utility functions
ui : R++ → R are strictly monotone, C2, strictly concave and verify the Inada
condition : limc→0 uic(c) =∞.
The economy is endowed with θ0 units of a tradable Lucas tree: a durable asset
9
which delivers a quantity x(s) of consumption good in state s ∈ {1, ...S} of period
1 but no dividend in period 0. Agent i initially holds θi0 > 0 units of the tree.
Each agent has two different accounts called a segregated and a non-segregated
account to handle his holdings of the tree. This distinction becomes effective when
I describe securities in the financial environment. Agent i total endowment in state
s is then given by ωi1(s) = e
i
1(s) + θ
i
0x(s). The main friction of the model is that
the first component of endowment, ei1 cannot be pledged. This means that that no
agent can be liable beyond his holdings of the durable asset10.
9There are actually two goods in the economy: the perishable consumption good and the
tree. Here we assume that the intrinsic valuation for the tree depends only on the quantity of
consumption goods (dividends) it yields in period 1. The only difference is that in multiple good
economies with incomplete markets, pecuniary externalities can arise independently of collateral
re-use.
10The lack of punishment besides the loss of collateral plays an important role for rehypothecation
as illustrated in Gottardi et al. (2016). The threat of bankruptcy or reputation cost could help
discipline agents but would also reduce the usefulness of collateral which is the object of study of
this paper.
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2.3.2 Financial Environment
Securities
With limited pledgeability, agents must use the tree as collateral to borrow. Lenders
can re-use the collateral they receive to secure their own borrowing. A financial se-
curity (or simply a security) is thus defined as follows :
Definition 1: A security j is a triplet (R¯j, k¯j, αj) ∈ RS+ × R+ × [0, 1] where
R¯j(s) is the promised amount to be paid in state s, k¯j is the quantity of tree to be
posted as collateral and αj is the fraction of this collateral to be held in the buyer’s
segregated account.
In the following, I call seller or borrower (resp. buyer or lender) the agent who
sells (resp. buys) a security. My definition with rehypothecation collapses to the
standard concept of a collateralized security of Geanakoplos (1996) and others when
αj = 1. When αj < 1, the security grants rehypothecation rights to the buyer.
The set of all tradable securities is J . The transfers involved by the sale of a
security j are illustrated on Figure 2.1. The seller must then transfer k¯j units of
the tree as collateral, a fraction αj of which is segregated
11. The buyer may use
the 1− αj fraction of non-segregated collateral to carry his own transactions. With
Seller
Buyer
Segregated Non-Segregated
αj k¯j (1− αj)k¯j
Market
Promise R¯j
Collateral k¯j
Re-pledge
Sell
Figure 2.1: Sale of security j
limited commitment, borrowers or lenders may opportunistically renege on their
promises. To make a distinction, I call Failure the action of a lender not turning
11Practically, the segregated collateral could be stored in a third party’s dedicated account. In
the tri-party repo market, BNY Mellon and JP Morgan provide this collateral storage facility.
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back collateral12 as in Johnson (1997). The terminology Default is saved for the
decision of the borrower not to repay. Ultimately, rehypothecation introduces a
double sided limited commitment (henceforth 2SLC) problem. I now analyze default
and failure pattern for securities in J .
Default and Securities Payoff
I now characterize securities’ payoff provided that borrowers may default on repay-
ments and lenders may fail to return collateral. An important and realistic feature
of the bankruptcy process is that an agent is freed of his obligations if the coun-
terparty does not comply. We guess and verify that an agent takes as given that
the counterparty would comply. Consider first the decision of an agent short in
security j. He will default on the promised amount R¯j(s) if it exceeds the value of
the collateral he is entitled to, that is:
R¯j(s) ≥ k¯jx(s) (Borrower Default)
Let us now turn to an agent long in security j. He will return the non-segregated
amount of the tree if the payment from the security lies below the value of the tree
he may hold on to, that is:
Rj(s) ≤ (1− αj)k¯jx(s) (Lender Fail)
The lender effectively has a short position in the spot market for the tree equal
to −(1 − αj)k¯j covered by the payment from security j he has a long position in.
Observed indeed that borrowers and lenders have countervailing incentives so that
decisions to default do not overlap. In other contingencies, payment and delivery
follow contractual obligations. We can thus write the actual payoff of a security j
12Strictly speaking, Fleming and Garbade (2005) explain that failure (to settle) is not a default
event but a delay in delivering the tree. Because such delays can matter when re-used collateral
must be returned, I analyze this issue in Section 2.6
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as
Rj(s) =

(1− αj)k¯jx(s) if R¯j(s) < (1− αj)k¯jx(s)
R¯j(s) if R¯j(s) ∈ [(1− αj)k¯jx(s), k¯jx(s)]
k¯jx(s) if R¯j(s) > k¯jx(s)
(2.2)
Observe that all three components of a security matter to determine the actual
payoff but traders’ anonymity is preserved. Partial segregation (that is αj < 1)
creates a wedge between the default threshold for a borrower and the failure point
for a lender. With complete segregation (αj = 1), equation (2.2) simplifies to
Rj(s) = min{R¯j(s), k¯jd(s)} as only borrowers face a strategic choice. Alternatively,
without segregation (αj = 0), the payoff is given by Rj(s) = k¯jx(s). The transaction
cannot be distinguished from a sale of the tree “pledged” as collateral. When αj is
interior, security j is made of two components. A sale of (1−αj)k¯j units of the tree
and security j′ with payoff Rj′(s) = Rj(s) − (1 − αj)k¯jx(s), with k¯j′ = αj k¯j and
αj′ = 1. This simple observation is the basis for the spanning result in Lemma 2.
I denote E(J ) the economy where the set of agents I, preferences U := {ui}i∈I
and endowmentsW = {ei, θi0}i∈I are fixed. Securities in J are traded competitively.
The matrix R ∈M(S)×J+1 collects the payoffs of securities J .
2.3.3 Agent’s Optimization Problem and Equilibrium
Consumer Problem
Denote θi agent i’s position in the market for the tree. Short security positions
need to be backed up by collateral while long positions may grant re-use rights. We
then distinguish purchases φi+j ≥ 0 and sales φi−j ≥ 0 of security j ∈ J . Prices of
collateral and securities are respectively p ∈ R+ and q ∈ RJ+. Given asset prices
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and security payoffs as given by (2.2) - agent i solves:
max
{c,θ,φ}
ui(ci0) +
∑
s∈S
pi(s)ui(ci1(s)) (2.3)
s. to ci0 +
∑
j∈J
qjφ
i+
j + pθ
i ≤ ei0 + pθi0 +
∑
j∈J
qjφ
i−
j (2.4)
ci1(s) +
∑
j∈J
φi−j Rj(s) ≤ ei1(s) + θix(s) +
∑
j∈J
φi+j Rj(s) ∀s ∈ S (2.5)
θi +
∑
j∈J
(1− αj)k¯jφi+j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Re-use
−
∑
j∈J
k¯jφ
i−
j ≥ 0 (2.6)
Equations (2.4)-(2.5) are budget constraints in period 0 and 1 respectively. Equa-
tion (2.6) is the collateral constraint. An agent must have enough asset to cover
all his short positions
∑
j∈J k¯jφ
i−
j . As usual, this asset can be bought in the spot
market (the first term θi). With rehypothecation however, an agent might also re-
use collateral he receives as a lender. Indeed, when he acquires a long position φi+j
in security j, agent i may re-use a fraction 1 − αj from the k¯j units of collateral
he receives. This re-usable collateral can be sold (θi goes down) or re-pledged for a
short position φi−j′ . In particular, agents may effectively hold a negative position in
the tree market θi < 0 if they receive collateral through long positions. This feature
is reminiscent of Bottazzi et al. (2012) where the Box Constraint implies that agents
cannot issue securities they have not borrowed first.
Equilibrium Definition
A competitive equilibrium of economy E(J ) is a feasible allocation (c0, c1) ∈ R(S+1)×I ,
a price vector (p, q) ∈ RJ+1+ such that ∀i ∈ I, (ci0, ci1) solves agent i’s optimization
problem (2.3)-(2.6) and securities market clear, that is:
(Feasibility)
I∑
i=1
ci0 ≤
I∑
i=1
ei0,
I∑
i=1
ci1(s) ≤
I∑
i=1
ei1(s) + θ0x(s) ∀s = 1..S
(2.7)
(Market Clearing)
I∑
i=1
θi = θ0,
I∑
i=1
(φi+j − φi−j ) = 0, ∀j = 1..J (2.8)
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Proposition 1 : Economy E(J ) admits a competitive equilibrium.
Proof : B Given the regularity conditions imposed on utility functions, the
existence of equilibrium follows as in the standard 1SLC environment. This result
can be seen as a particular case of Theorem 1 in Geanakoplos and Zame (2013) .C
The existence result would hold in most 2 period financial market models with
any linear constraint (this is the case of collateral constraint 2.6). Hence, the contri-
bution here consists in setting a general equilibrium model of rehypothecation in a
familiar environment to exploit standard results. Existence of equilibrium does not
require any new technique, hence the outside reference for the proof.
2.3.4 Discussion of the assumptions
Rehypothecation Rights
In the model, the re-usable fraction of collateral may be specified between 0 and
1. In practice rehypothecation rights follow from a binary decision by counterparties:
either complete or no segregation. In the repo market for example, as we explained
the full right of re-use is implicit to the contract. Still, current or upcoming reg-
ulations aim to put a cap on the re-usable amount of collateral13. My framework
would thus accommodate these possible developments with a lower bound α¯ on αj.
More generally, partial segregation or limited re-use may arise because of market
illiquidity or other technical impediments in the settlement process. At the macro
level, Singh provides an estimate of collateral velocity around 3, hinting at a value
of α = 1/3 in my model.
Collateral Pledges and Settlement
In the model, it is assumed that collateral transfers take place simultaneously at
the trading and settlement stage. Consider for instance agent B in our introductory
example. He can only sell the asset to agent A after he receives it from a pledge
13In the US, brokers/dealers may re-use an amount up to 140% of the debit balance. See
SEC Rule 15c3-3. The debit balance is an equilibrium object in our model hence the different
formulation as a fraction of total collateral posted of their client under Regulation T. In the EU,
future reforms contemplate the possibility to impose partial segregation.
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by agent C. I assume here that these steps take place simultaneously under a sin-
gle price for the tree. Appendix A accounts precisely for collateral circulation by
introducing trading and settlement rounds. There, agent B would receive collateral
during round 1 and re-sell it during round 2 of the trading process. Essentially, he
cannot use the proceeds of the re-usable part of collateral to finance the loan he
extends to agent C anymore. In this sequential process, each piece of asset can only
be pledged (resp. returned) once in each trading (resp. settlement) round. We show
in Appendix A the equivalence between the two representations.
Observe that the model also abstracts from trading or search frictions whereby
lenders might have difficulty to locate a piece of asset they re-used. In practice,
some Master Agreements contain provisions to smooth settlement. This is the case
of the English Credit Support Annex to the ISDA Master Agreement which only
bind receivers to return “equivalent” property. Counterparties may thus agree on
the delivery of a different security than that pledged initially, thereby recognizing
the potential difficulty to settle trades when a certain type of collateral is scarce14.
In this environment, this would imply that a lender can either return k units of asset
or pay kx(s) in consumption goods to the borrower, that is the consumption value
of collateral.
The next section presents the main irrelevance result of the paper which states
that rehypothecation is redundant when markets are complete in a sense made
precise below.
2.4 Collateral Scarcity
In this model, agents trade in order to share risk and smooth consumption over time.
The ability to conduct these trades might be limited by market incompleteness as
in the standard GEI literature. More importantly, when agents face collateral con-
straints, the availability of the tree proves crucial for efficiency. In the extreme case
where the economy has no tree, θ¯0 = 0, agents cannot commit to repay any debt and
14See Monnet (2011) for a comparison of the different Credit Support Annexes. Unfortunately,
the ISDA does not provide detailed numbers on the use of each of this Annex. In practice, other
impediments to locate a security like search frictions help rationalize this provision
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stay in autarky. Singh (2011)’s emphasis on the link between rehypothecation and
collateral velocity suggests that re-using collateral allows to save on a potentially
scarce resource and ultimately improves market efficiency. The rest of this paper
analyzes this claim and characterizes financial environments where it holds.
Proposition 2, the main result of this paper, plays down the importance of rehy-
pothecation. Indeed, I show that without restrictions on security design, agents are
equally well-off trading securities without rehypothecation rights. In other words,
welfare gains from collateral re-use may only materialize in a situation of market
incompleteness.
2.4.1 Replicating Financial Structure
The first step towards Proposition 2 is to show that some securities in a financial
structure J may be redundant. The following definition formalizes this concept in
our environment with collateral constraints.
Definition 3 : A financial structure J1 replicates another structure J iff ∀j ∈ J ,
∃J1(j) ⊂ J1, (θ,φ) ∈ R+ ×R|J1(j)|+ such that
(i) ∀s ∈ S, θx(s) +∑j1∈J1(j) φj1Rj1(s) = Rj(s)
(ii) θ +
∑
j1∈J1(j) φj1 k¯j1 ≤ k¯j
(iii)
∑
j1∈J1(j) αj1φj1 k¯j1 ≤ αj k¯j
(θ,φ) is called a replicating portfolio and we denote J1 ∈ Sp(J )
In words, for every security of J , there must be a portfolio made of the tree and
securities in the set J1 that delivers the same payoff. This is the standard spanning
feature of a replicating portfolio. In addition, selling this portfolio does not require
more collateral than the original security. Finally, the replicating portfolio leaves the
same amount of asset free to use for the agent long in the portfolio. Criteria (ii) and
(iii) acknowledge the role of the tree as collateral and recognizes the importance of
tree availability or unencumbered collateral to carry trades. We can now introduce
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the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Let J and J1 be such that J1 ∈ Sp(J ). Then, any equilibrium
allocation of E(J ∪ J1) is an equilibrium allocation of E(J1).
The proof is in Appendix 2.8.2. Lemma 1 can be seen as an extension of Propo-
sition 2 in Arau´jo et al. (2012) for rehypothecation. There is no loss of generality in
restricting trades to a replicating financial structure. Intuitively, we can substitute
every security j of J \J1 traded in equilibrium by its replicating portfolio in J1.
This result is of limited interest unless the former entails some genuine restrictions.
Precisely, the next Lemma will show that securities with rehypothecation rights are
redundant.
Consider indeed the unrestricted set of securities J0 together with a subset of
J∗ ⊂ J0 of securities without rehypothecation rights.
J0 =
{
(R¯j, k¯j, αj) ∈ RS+ ×R++ × [0, 1]
}
J∗ =
{
(R¯j, k¯j, αj) ∈ ×s=1..S{0, x(s)} × {1} × {1}
}
Observe that J∗ contains but is not equal to the set of (collateralized) Arrow Secu-
rities. This arises because of security-specific collateral constraints. Suppose indeed
that S = 4 and x(s) = 1 for all s and that an agent wants to sell the payoff (0, 0, 1, 1).
With Arrow securities only, he needs to short (0, 0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1) hence requir-
ing 2 units of collateral. Only 1 is necessary if the security is available.15. The next
Lemma show that the no-rehypothecation structure J∗ replicates the unrestricted
financial structure J0
Lemma 2 : J∗ ∈ Sp(J0).
15This argument also makes clear that with ex-post (or equivalently portfolio wide) collateral
constraints as in Chien et al. (2011), Arrow Securities do suffice. For Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
transactions, initial margins are a mix of both. Still, I consider that security-specific collateral
constraints better approximate market practice in general.
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The proof adapted from Kilenthong (2011) is in Appendix 2.8.2. Lemma 1 thus
shows that for spanning purposes and collateral utilization, a smaller set of securities
without rehypothecation suffices16. Intuitively, a transaction with rehypothecation
can be broken down into two components : a collateral sale and a residual full
segregation security. To see this, let us consider a generic security j = (R¯j, k¯j, αj).
The actual payoff Rj verifies
Rj(s) = (1− αj)k¯jx(s) +
[
Rj(s)− (1− αj)k¯jx(s)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rj2 (s)
(2.9)
The first term on the RHS amounts to a sale of the unsegregated (1 − αj)k¯j units
of the tree. The second term is the residual payoff Rj2(s) ∈ [0, αj k¯jx(s)]. Observe
that this is equal to the payoff a security j2 with payoff Rj2(s) and collateral require-
ment αj k¯j. It is clear that the replication uses the same amount of tree k¯j and also
segregates (1− αj)k¯j units of the tree. If such operation is feasible for any security
j, rehypothecation becomes redundant. The proof of Lemma 2 shows how to re-
alize this substitution for any generic security thanks to the no re-use securities in J ∗
2.4.2 Neutrality under Complete Markets
We can now state the main result of this paper. A complete financial structure with-
out rehypothecation rights J∗ can deliver the same outcomes as the unconstrained
structure J0.
Proposition 2 Any equilibrium allocation of economy E(J0) is an equilibrium
allocation of E(J∗). Under collateral-complete markets, rehypothecation is redun-
dant.
The proof follows directly from Lemma 1 and 2. Proposition 2 reads as a neg-
ative statement. Rehypothecation does not effectively improve collateral use and
allocations when the standard securities in J∗ are available. This seems to con-
16It can be shown that subsets of J∗ containing only 2S−1− 1 securities also span J0 but this is
of limited interest to our analysis
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tradict our initial intuition that re-use relaxes collateral constraints. However, the
collateral receiver might default on the asset loan that he receives. This affects the
security payoff ex-post and limits the benefits from re-usability of collateral.
Proposition 2 thus states that rehypothecation is no more efficient than standard
security specific margins without re-use. This is an interesting, albeit surprising re-
sult, in comparison with other existing techniques for collateral re-use. Asset specific
margins indeed entail two types of restriction, given the fundamental pledgeability
friction of our environment. First, a given piece of collateral cannot back several
securities (no tranching). Second, only the tree itself, not financial securities, can
serve as collateral (no pyramiding). Gottardi and Kubler (2014) precisely show that
pyramiding or tranching realize the efficient use of the tree as collateral17. The rel-
atively higher performance of pyramiding against rehypothecation is striking since
both techniques have a similar flavor of collateral re-use. The key difference is that
pyramiding allows to use financial wealth as collateral in a more subtle way since any
long position can be posted as collateral. With rehypothecation, only the tree may
be posted. In addition, pyramiding abstracts from the limited commitment problem
of the lender since he may never re-use more than the value of a debt contract he
is long in. Although proposition 2 suggests that traders should prefer pyramiding
to rehypothecation, in practice, the use of pyramiding is restricted to some asset-
backed securities markets while rehypothecation appears more prevalent. Although
we abstract from these issues here, observe that collateral is good only to the extent
that it is easily recognizable and that the corresponding asset market is liquid. This
might be the case for Treasuries that are re-used extensively but not for complex
financial products resulting from pyramiding.18.
17We refer the reader to this paper for a formal definition of these concepts as well as that of
a feasible allocation with limited pledgeability. In our two periods environment, the additional
feasibility requirement is that an allocation must verify
∀i ∈ I, ∀s ∈ S, ci1(s) ≥ ei1(s)
which is simply stating that financial wealth cannot be negative
18Abstracting from these issues, in Gottardi et al. (2016), we consider an environment with lim-
ited instead of no-commitment and show hat rehypothecation can be beneficial. Muley (2016) also
considers a simpler model with heterogeneity in commitment power and shows that rehypotheca-
tion can then dominate pyramiding.
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2.5 Incomplete Collateral Markets
The literature has emphasized a number of reasons why markets may be incomplete19
and lack the securities needed for Proposition 2. This section considers exogenously
incomplete markets in the sense of Proposition 2 and shows that rehypothecation
may be strictly desirable. To do so, I revisit first Example 1 to identify precisely
the role of rehypothecation. Then Example 2 shows that the gains from re-using
collateral in incomplete markets are magnified with decentralized trade. This last
result usefully rationalizes rehypothecation patterns in repos, swaps or derivatives
markets where trade takes place Over the Counter.
2.5.1 Example 1: Market incompleteness and short sale
constraint
Let us remind the setting of Example 1 introduced in Section 2.2. There are 3 types
of agents, i = A,B,C. and two states of the world in t = 1 denoted s = 1, 2 with
equal probability pi(s) = 1/2. Agents have identical VNM preferences and do not
discount period 1 payoffs. Let e ∈ (1,∞) be given. Endowments are as follows.
eA0 = e+ 3/4
eA1 (1) = e− 1/2
eA1 (2) = e− 1

eB0 = e+ 1/4
eB1 (1) = e− 1/2
eB1 (2) = e

eC0 = e− 1
eC1 (1) = e
eC1 (2) = e− 1
In addition, agent C is endowed with one unit of the a tree that delivers x(s) = s
units of the consumption good in state s of period 1. With our notation θC0 = 1 while
θA0 = θ
B
0 = 0. As we highlighted before, the symmetric Pareto efficient allocation c
∗
features constant consumption across agents, time and states equal to e.
19Market incompleteness is exogenous in my model since I do not model the supply side for
financial securities. Private information about aggregate or idiosyncratic outcomes sometimes
justify why some securities are not traded. In the first case, DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and
more recently Dang et al. (2012) show that debt-like securities are desirable because of their low
information sensitivity. For the second case, there exists a long tradition of Bewley models where
idiosyncratic shocks are private information and hence uninsurable. Even without such frictions,
Carvajal et al. (2012) prove that security designers might find it optimal not to complete the
market.
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Complete Markets
Suppose two Arrow securities j1, j2 are available to trade. Security js pays 1 in state
s and zero in the other state and requires 1/s units of collateral. Define RC (where
C stands for complete) the matrix of payoff :
RC =
1 1 0
2 0 1

where the first column contains the tree payoff. Period 1 transfers implied by allo-
cation c∗ may be decentralized with portfolios {(θi, φij1 , φij2)}i=A,B,C if∑
i
θi = 1
For s = 1, 2
∑
i
φijs = 0
∀i ∈ {A,B,C},
e
e
 =
ei1(1)
ei1(2)
+ RC.(θi, φij1 , φij2)
0 ≤ θi + min{φij1 , 0}+
1
2
min{φij1 , 0}
One can easily check that the following portfolios are a solution to the problem
above:
(θA, φAj1 , φ
A
j2
) = (1/2, 0, 0) (θB, φBj1 , φ
B
j2
) = (0, 1/2, 0) (θC , φCj1 , φ
C
j2
) = (1/2,−1/2, 0)
Finally, prices for the tree and the securities are equal to their state weighted payoff
since the allocation exhibits perfect risk sharing and constant consumption. Thus
we have p = 3/2 and qj1 = qj2 = 1. Arrow securities are collateral efficient because
agents can diversify idiosyncratic risk with a minimal amount of the tree.
Incomplete Markets : Bond Economy
We now turn back to the incomplete (i.e. collateral inefficient) financial structure
where agents can only trade the tree and a bond with face value equal to 1. The
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payoff matrix RI (where I stands for incomplete) thus writes
RI =
1 1
2 1

As shown in Section 2.2, granting rehypothecation rights on half of the collateral
pledged for a bond allows to finance c∗. The collateral constrain thus writes
∀i ∈ {A,B,C}, θi + 1
2
max{φi, 0}+ min{φi, 0} ≥ 0
To finance c∗, agent C borrows one unit from agent B who then sells half of the
tree obtained as collateral to agent A. Agents thus hold the following portfolios
(θA, φA) = (1/2, 0) (θB, φB) = (−1/2, 1) (θC , φC) = (1,−1)
Fundamentally, agent B wishes to increase consumption by (1/2, 0) in state 1
and 2 respectively. Under complete markets, he needs 1/2 units of Arrow Secu-
rity, mobilizing 1/2 units of collateral: the tree agent C has to post. In the bond
economy however, agent B must take a long position of 1 unit in the bond and sell
1/2 units of tree: this locks 1 unit of the tree as collateral. With rehypothecation,
1/2 units of this collateral can be re-used, leaving as before only 1/2 units segre-
gated. Ultimately, with incomplete markets, rehypothecation frees up tree pledged
as collateral for which segregation is not fundamentally required for risk-sharing.
In fact, rehypothecation makes use of the slack in the lender’s limited commitment
constraint which for a no re-use security j = (R¯j, k¯j, 1) writes as
1− α¯j = min
s∈S
Rj(s)
k¯j(s)x(s)
One can check that this number indeed equals 1/2 for the bond collateralized by
one unit of the tree.
As we mentioned before, the irrelevance result illustrated with this example may
not provide a positive theory of rehypothecation. One should not observe collateral
re-use in the first place if some collateral efficient securities could be traded instead.
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Again, this analysis remains agnostic as to why markets would be incomplete in the
first place. The purpose of this example was rather to show the positive effect of
re-use given that such a friction exists.
2.5.2 Centralized vs. Bilateral Trading
This section emphasizes rehypothecation gains with decentralized trading. Again,
given the equivalence results of Section 2.4, this analysis is meaningful only with an
incomplete market environment. I show that higher collateral needs with bilateral
trade can justify rehypothecation, when it is not warranted in a centralized market.
Example 2
To account for decentralized trading, at least 3 agents i = A,B,C are needed.
There are again 2 states of the world. The asset pays off x(s) = s for s = 1, 2.
Agents have the same utility function and do not discount period 1 payoffs. Let
e ∈ (1,∞) be given and consider the following endowments:
eA0 = e+ 1/2
eA1 (s) = e− 1/2
θA0 = 0

eB0 = e+ 1/2
eB1 (s) = e− 1/2
θB0 = 0

eC0 = e− 1
eC1 (s) = e+ 1− s
θC0 = 1
Given convex preferences and the absence of discounting, it is easy to see that the
symmetric Pareto optimal allocation is cit = c
∗ = e for all i = A,B,C and all
t = 0, 1. Agent C wishes to borrow while agents 1 and 2 desire to lend. To put it
otherwise, agents want to trade endowment across time and not across states as in
2.5.1. Hence, a non-contingent bond with face value R(s) = 1 appears as the perfect
instrument. For borrowers not to default, it needs to be collateralized by one unit
of asset so k¯ = 1. Finally, for lenders not to fail, rehypothecation should be limited
by α ≥ 1
2
, exactly as in the previous example.
Centralized Trading
With centralized trading, the bond decentralizes the efficient allocation and agents
need not re-use collateral. For this, agent C borrows 1 while agents A and B both
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lend 1/2. This trades verifies agent C’s collateral constraint since φC,− = 1 ≤ θC0 = 1.
The allocation c∗ is supported by price q = 1 for the bond given perfect risk shar-
ing and absence of discounting. The inequalities above are also equivalent to the
fundamental constraints on the limited pledgeability of income and no other trade
pattern can improve upon this one.
Decentralized Trading
Suppose now that trading is bilateral as shown in figure 2.2 so that agent B is
essential to trading20. Precisely, to implement c∗ agent B needs to lend 1 to agent
C and borrow 1/2 from agent A. Hence, he is still a net lender of 1/2 but he holds
both long and short positions in the bond. The continuous (resp. dahsed) curved
arrows illustrate the transfer of cash (resp. collateral) in period 0.
A B C
1
1
1/2
1/2
Re-use
Good
Collateral
Figure 2.2: Bilateral Trades
Since 3/2 units are lent on aggregate, 3/2 units of collateral must be posted while
there is only 1 unit of tree. With rehypothecation, agent B can re-use a fraction 1/2
of the collateral posted by agent C to borrow in turn from agent A. While 3/2 units
of collateral are posted, total physical holdings of the tree still sum up to 1. After
trading took place in period 0, we can decompose holdings between segregated and
unsegregated account for every agent as follows :
(θAS , θ
A
U ) = (1/4, 1/4) (θ
B
S , θ
B
U ) = (1/2, 0) (θ
C
S , θ
C
U ) = (0, 0)
When borrowing from agent A, agent B recycles half of the collateral he receives
20The only difference with our benchmark model is that decentralization impose sub-markets
clearing constraints for the tree and securities, that is in the AB and BC sub-markets. I do not
develop further as the pattern of trades described below clearly highlights the role of these new
constraints.
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from agent C. We are left to verify that agents who receive collateral do not want to
fail on the tree loan they receive. As in the previous example, the no fail constraint
writes
R¯j(s) ≥ 1
2
x(s) ⇔ 1 ≥ 1
2
s
which holds for s = 1, 2. In period 1, A thus delivers the 1/2 units he holds against
the payment of 1/2 from B who can then return 1 unit of collateral to A against
a payment of 1. Hence, the final holder of the tree is agent C as required by the
optimal portfolio.
Bilateral trading implies double collateral posting for the intermediary (agent
B) to finance the trade. This cost disappears in a centralized market where agents
A and C can trade directly as explained before. On OTC markets, intermediaries
typically hold both short and long positions in the same security to match trading
needs of dispersed customers21. When collateral must be posted, the gross trade
mechanically requires more collateral than the net transaction. Rehypothecation
generates more collateral out of a given amount of tree to meet this increasing
demand.
2.6 Fragility
By definition, rehypothecation allows a lender to re-use a piece of collateral pledged
by a borrower. If he exerts his right, the lender may not have the asset on his
balance sheet upon settlement of their transaction. Assumption A, inspired by the
English Credit Support Annex, neutralizes this concern as a cash payment may
substitute for the physical asset delivery. However, some borrowers may not wish
to see their collateral transformed and can opt for a different scheme, the New York
Credit Support Annex.
In this case, the lender would purchase the asset in the market to make the
contractual delivery. In my framework, Appendix 2.8.1 indeed shows that a market
for the tree in period 1 allows agents to make up for their short positions before
21This is the essence of a matched-book repo trade when broker-dealers engage simultaneously
in a repo with one customer and a reverse repo with another customer. Atkeson et al. (2013) also
report that top dealer banks have large gross positions but small net positions in the CDS market
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turning back the collateral. The analysis also stresses the importance of a well-
behaved sequential process to ensure smooth settlement. Sequential settlement is
crucial when agents may not purchase back the tree simultaneously. This arises when
the total collateral pledged exceeds the quantity of tree available in the economy,
i.e:
θ0 <
∑
i
∑
j
k¯jφ
i,−
j (2.10)
Inequality (2.10) involves endogenous variables rather than deep parameters. How-
ever, this condition typically holds in equilibrium since the purpose of rehypothe-
cation is precisely to create more collateral out of a given quantity of pledgeable
asset. Then, the need for a sequential settlement process described in Appendix
2.8.1 proceeds from a resource constraint on the physical availability of the tree.
The rest of the paper presents modifications to the original set-up which gen-
erate fragility specific to rehypothecation in the settlement process. Section 2.6.1
introduces discounting during settlement to create a trade-off between early and
late delivery. I show that the trade-off works in favor of borrowers because they can
postpone payment until they receive their asset back, a point emphasized in Fleming
and Garbade (2005) for settlement fails. In Section 2.6.2, I discuss how exogenous
default might propagate along credit chains when (2.10) holds. For simplicity, In
introduce these shocks as zero probability events. Hence, the interest of this analysis
rests on the amplification mechanism specific to rehypothecation.
2.6.1 Delivery Race for Collateral
In this section, we consider Example 2 and look at the impact of an unantici-
pated preference shock in period 1 which affects discounting between settlement
sub-periods. Hence, the equilibrium positions derived in Section 2.5.2 are still valid.
Remember that agent C borrows one unit of consumption good from agent B, pledg-
ing 1 unit of tree with payoff x(s) = s. In turn, agent B borrows 1/2 units from
agent A, re-using half of the collateral he received from agent C. Hence, condition
(2.10) holds with the left and right hand side respectively equal to 1 and 3/2. Then,
2 rounds of settlement τ = 1, 2 are necessary to clear all equilibrium positions since
agent B must receive the collateral from A before he can return it to C.
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When the shock materializes, agents discount τ = 2 payoffs at rate δ < 1. Hence,
with obvious notations, consumption in period 1 is given by
ci1(s) = c
i
1,1(s) + δc
i
1,2(s)
Agents may save the consumption good between τ = 1 and τ = 2 with net interest
rate r = (1− δ)/δ. The tree pays its dividend in round τ = 2 which is normalized to
x(s)/δ. This ensures that the contribution of the tree to c1i (s) is still x(s) per unit
whether it is sold in round τ = 1 or consumed in period τ = 2. Indeed, the natural
price of the tree in round 1 would thus be p∗1,1(s) = δ × 1/δx(s) = x(s). A possible
interpretation of this preference shock is an unexpected increases of overnight rates
on reserves from 0 to r > 0. Settlement sub-periods then correspond to two different
business days. With discounting, the physical necessity to deliver over 2 rounds has
real consequences unlike in Appendix 2.8.1 where δ = 1. 22.
We now introduce the definition of a settlement equilibrium given positions
traded in period 0. Appendix 2.8.1 provides a more formal treatment.
Definition: A settlement equilibrium in state s is a pair of prices {p1,τ (s)}τ=1,2,
trades, default {d1,τ (s)}τ=1,2 and fail {f1,τ (s)}τ=1,2 decisions by borrowers and lenders
respectively such that :
i) {d1,τ (s), f1,τ (s)},τ=1,2 are optimal given {p1,τ (s)}τ=1,2
ii) Tree market clears in every sub-period τ = 1, 2
We now construct heuristically the settlement equilibrium when δ < 1. Observe
first that borrowers actually benefit from late delivery since the present value of
collateral is x(s) while the present value of the payment is δ < 1. Hence, since
borrowers did not default when δ = 1, they do not when δ < 1. Lenders, on the
other side of the trade, lose with a late delivery which drives up the price of the
asset in sub-period τ = 1. I will now determine the price p1,1(s) of the tree in the
first settlement round and whether lenders decide to fail or not. For this, one must
22Although relying on an unanticipated shock does not provide a fully satisfying answer, we
observe that such a shock would have no consequence absent rehypothecation
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equalize the value to deliver early and late for a lender. This writes
1− 1/2p1,1(s) = δ − 1/2x(s)
To deliver in the first period, an agent must buy 1/2 unit of tree at price p1,1(s).
For an agent who holds the collateral, this is the opportunity cost of not selling
it. Delivering in period 2 costs only p1,2(s) = x(s) but the security payment is
discounted by δ. In state s = 1, the clearing price is p1,1(s) = 3 − 2δ > p∗1,1(s).
In state s = 2, the RHS is negative and lenders fail. One can then work out
consumption in period 1 for all three agentsc
A
1 (1) = e
cA1 (2) = e
c
B
1 (1) = e− 1 + δ
cB1 (2) = e
c
C
1 (1) = e+ 1− δ
cC1 (2) = e
Hence there is an ex-post transfer from agent B to agent C for re-using his collateral.
This arises because collateral is scarce and all lenders cannot deliver in round 1. This
does not affect agent A who holds the collateral he needs to deliver before settlement
starts. If δ is sufficiently close to 1, the benefits from collateral circulation should
still overweight the settlement costs. Importantly, sequential delivery is necessary
because condition (2.10) holds. Otherwise, all agents could settle positions in the
first round of trading by buying the tree. Hence, the settlement costs associated to
rehypothecation materialize only when the pledgeable asset is scarce23.
2.6.2 Exogenous Default and Propagation
In this model, default and fails are purely opportunistic and apply to securities in-
dependently from one another. A default on a security does not affect the remaining
business of a trader or his ability to access spot markets. Precisely, an agents fails
when the spot market price of the (unsegregated) tree exceeds the payment from
the security he holds. The availability and liquidity of the spot market trade also
23This issue is often raised in the debate on rehypothecation. Terence Duffy, President of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) put it in a simple but compelling way during his MF Global
House hearing: “if [20 of us] are all looking to get the same security back at the same time [..], 19
of us are gonna have a problem”
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facilitates rehypothecation. Indeed, it also allows to settle positions smoothly along
a collateral re-use chain even when some agent defaults. The tree previously held
by this agent will be available in the spot market to settle remaining trades. In
financial markets, default or fails may have more severe consequences or arise for
exogenous motives. Banning defaulting agents from spot market would have little
impact in this model. Indeed, Lemma 2 shows that we can consider default and
fail-free securities without loss of generality. However, rehypothecation may amplify
the impact of non-opportunistic default.
Suppose indeed that an agent i may go out of business between period 0 and
period 1 with some exogenous probability η. In this case, any unsegregated col-
lateral held by agent i is lost (because of the length of bankruptcy proceedings for
example). Creditors may keep the collateral they received from this agent while
debtors can only collect the segregated fraction of the asset they posted. Without
rehypothecation, all the collateral is segregated. Hence both creditors and debtors
are better-off ex-post after agent i’s default. Importantly, they can still pay or de-
liver the asset for all transactions not implying agent i. With rehypothecation, the
tree available in the economy to settle positions is reduced by
∑
j(1 − αj)k¯jφi,+j ,
the amount of unsegregated collateral held by agent i. Hence, there might not be
enough collateral to settle all remaining positions in the economy if (2.10) holds.
Indeed, in this case, some of the unsegregated collateral held by agent i might be
crucial to settle other positions. To fix ideas, consider against Example 2 of Section
2.5.2. If agent A disappears, there is only 3/4 units of collateral while the total
demand from B for settlement with C amounts to 1 unit. Hence, a fraction 1/4 of
type B agents must default. In addition, the price of the tree shoots up because
of scarcity, affecting payoffs of type B agents who actually deliver. Hence, with
rehypothecation, an exogenous default of type A agents would trigger endogenous
default from some type B agents.
Both these examples show the importance of collateral scarcity in generating
fragility during settlement. Indeed, when (2.10) holds, many credit transactions are
ultimately backed by a limited amount of pledgeable asset. High aggregate leverage
paves the way for coordination problems in settlement or contagion through credit
chains. We hope to develop these interesting considerations in future research.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper introduces rehypothecation in a competitive economy where agents post
collateral to short securities. Re-use may facilitate the circulation of collateral but
limited commitment also affects the implicit asset lending transaction. I show that
rehypothecation can be replaced by an efficient financial structure without rehypoth-
ecation which delivers the same velocity of collateral. Hence, my results mitigate
the claim that a ban on rehypothecation would severely affect secured financial
markets. In the presence of market incompleteness however, the irrelevance result
breaks down as rehypothecation allows to free (inefficiently) encumbered collateral
and increase welfare. Decentralized trading magnifies these gains as intermediaries
typically need to take long and short positions simultaneously, which are costly in
terms of collateral use. Finally, I showed that when aggregate collateral is scarce,
settlement of positions along collateral chains is fragile.
This theory of rehypothecation fundamentally stresses the relationship between
market incompleteness and collateral velocity. In general, other frictions24 not mod-
eled in this paper could explain why dealer banks find it valuable to re-use collateral
pledged by customers. The analysis of Section 2.6 also calls for a better understand-
ing of collateral circulation and settlement of positions with re-used collateral.
Since rehypothecation does not improve upon our complete market benchmark,
this analysis further stresses the importance of asset availability for collateralized
financial markets. A clear consensus about the empirical relevance of such asset
scarcity has yet to emerge (cf CGFS (2013) for a recent overview). Still, the in-
creasing demand for high quality assets to be used as collateral appears as a major
trend in financial markets. In particular, the regulatory effort towards more central
clearing of OTC trades may have significant effects on collateral demand. The im-
plications of these trends for asset prices, public and private asset supply as well as
unconventional monetary policy still rank high on research agendas.
24Singh (2011) reports that collateral desk at dealer banks should be ‘self-funding” to avoid
dipping in their own balance sheet for collateral. On a similar note, Kirk et al. (2014) believe that
dealer banks might find it ‘uneconomical” to use their own collateral.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Sequential trading and settlement
In this section, I present a variation of the model with the same physical environment but where
trading and settlement takes place over several subperiods. This departure allows to get a better
understanding of collateral circulation and accommodates the need for sequential settlement when
collateral is scarce and Assumption A does not hold.
I show that there exists a way to settle trades in an orderly fashion whereby securities traded
first are settled last and conversely. In this configuration, by definition, collateral needs to deliver
may not exceed the amount pledged during the corresponding trading round. In the absence of
time discounting, agents agree to wait in line for settlement. In this context, in spite of its apparent
importance, Assumption A is immaterial to our results in the following sense. Any equilibrium
allocation of the model in the main text obtains as an equilibrium of the model introduced below.
Period 0 (resp. period 1) now contains T trading (resp. settlement) rounds. In each trading
round τ ∈ {1, .., T}, agent i may buy a quantity θi,B0,τ of the tree and take positions (φi,+τ,j , φi,−τ,j ) ∈ R2+
for securities j ∈ J . In round τ , the tree trades competitively at price p0,τ and security j trades
competitively at price qτ,j . We assume that an agent trades with a representative pool of agents
taking the opposite position so we need not index a security by the identity of the (seller,buyer)
pair25. In period 1, uncertainty is resolved and the settlement stage takes place in a backward
fashion. Securities traded in trading round τ ∈ {1, .., T} are settled in settlement round T − τ + 1.
The tree, which pays dividends after the last settlement round is traded at price p1,τ (s) in round τ
and state s. Trading the tree after uncertainty is resolved allows agents to get back the collateral
they rehypothecated for delivery. Consumption in period 0 and 1 take place at the last round of
the trading and settlement stages respectively. For every variable, subscript 0 (resp. 1) denotes
the trading (resp. settlement) stage as before. The second subscript τ denotes the round. Figure
2.3 presents the time-line of the sequential trading model.
Period 0 : Trading stage
Agent i enters trading round 1 < τ ≤ T with (i) a quantity ωi0,τ−1 of consumption good (also
called cash here), (ii) a quantity of tree θi0,τ−1 and (iii) a record of securities traded during the
τ − 1 previous rounds Φiτ−1 = (φi1, ..,φiτ−1) ∈ R2J×(τ−1). In line with the main model, the initial
values of the variables introduced above are ωi0,0 := ω
i
0 and θ
i
0,0 := θ
i
0. During round τ , given
respective prices (p0,τ , q
..
τ ), he chooses new purchases of collateral θ
i,B
0,τ and securities φ
i
τ ∈ R2J .
25This is not an issue in the simultaneous model of the main text since decisions to default or
fail are the same for all agents by construction
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1 τ2 T 1 τ2 T
Trading Round
(ωiτ−1,θ
i
τ−1,
Φ1τ−1)
Consumption
t = 0 Settlement
Claims
T − τ + 1 Consumption
t = 1s Realized
Trading Stage Settlement Stage
Figure 2.3: Timeline of the sequential trading model
The following equations then describe the evolution of the cash and tree accounts from one trading
round26 to the next:
ωi0,τ = ω
i
0,τ−1 − p0,τθi,B0,τ − qiτ .φi,+τ + qiτ .φi,−τ (2.11)
θi0,τ = θ
i
0,τ−1 + θ
i,B
0,τ −
∑
j
k¯jφ
i,−
τ,j +
∑
j
(1− αj)k¯jφi,+τ,j (2.12)
Furthermore, cash and collateral account balances must verify the following constraints in any
period τ
ωi0,τ ≥ 0 (2.13)
θi0,τ−1 + θ
i,B
0,τ ≥
∑
j
k¯jφ
i,−
τ,j (2.14)
Constraint (2.13) requires agents to hold positive cash holdings at the end of every trading
round. Inequality (2.14) is the the collateral constraint for trading round τ . Its formulation makes
the circulation of collateral explicit. When an agent receives collateral, the re-usable part can only
be sold or re-pledged in the next trading round. Hence, in a given trading round, no piece of tree
is used twice as collateral. The simultaneous model abstracts from such cash and tree-in-advance
constraints as it only requires that ωi0,T ≥ 0 and θi0,T ≥ 0. Naturally, the agent consumes in period
0 whichever amount of consumption good he has left after he conducted his trades, that is
ci0 := ω
i
0,T (2.15)
26When he takes long positions in securities, agent i also adds up
∑
j αj k¯jφ
i,+
τ,j to his segregated
account. For expository convenience, I abstract from the mechanical accounting of tree inflows in
the segregated account
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Period 1 : Settlement stage
In settlement round 1 ≤ τ ≤ T , only security traded during trading round T − τ + 1 are settled
if any. A trader i with a short position in security j φi,−j,T−τ+1 > 0 either repays the face value
R¯j(s) or defaults. A trader h with a long position φ
h,+
j,T−τ+1 > 0 decides either to turn back the
unsegregated collateral (1 − αj)k¯j or fails. Since uncertainty is resolved before settlement takes
place, I abstract from indexing variables by the realized state s in the following.
As in the trading stage, I introduce the variables summarizing an agent’s position upon entering
settlement round τ , i.e. (i) consumption good (sometimes referred to as cash) in quantity ωi1,τ−1,
(ii) a quantity of tree θi1,τ−1 and (iii) securities yet to be settled Φ
i
T−τ+1 = (φ
i
1, ..,φ
i
T−τ−1) ∈
R2J×(T−τ−1). At every settlement stage τ , an agent must decide whether to default on securities
he shorted at trading stage T − τ + 1 and whether to deliver collateral on his long positions. To
deliver collateral, he may either use his tree holdings or buy tree (quantity θi,B1,τ ) in the collateral
market of round τ .
The initial values of the variables introduced above are ωi1,0 := ω
i
1 and θ
i
1,0 := θ
i
0,T . In each
settlement round τ , given the tree price sequence (p1,τ , ..., p1,T ) agent i chooses optimally the tree
purchase θi,B1,τ , the default and fail decisions to maximize his period 1 consumption
ci1 = ω
i
1,T + θ
i
1,Tx (2.16)
In every settlement round τ , let us denote dij,τ the decision of agent i to default on security
(j, T − τ + 1) and f i,j,τ the decision to fail on security (j, T − τ + 1). Finally, actual payments
and deliveries are ultimately conditional on counterparties’ decisions which are taken as given27.
During the settlement stage, the cash and collateral accounts of agent i evolve as follows:
ωi1,τ =ω
i
1,τ−1 − p1,τθi,B1,τ +
∑
j
(1− f ij,τ )(1− dj,τ )R¯jφi,+T−τ+1,j −
∑
j
(1− dij,τ )(1− fj,τ )R¯jφi,−T−τ+1,j
(2.17)
θi1,τ =θ
i
1,τ−1 + θ
i,B
1,τ −
∑
j
(1− f iτ,j)k¯j
[
(1− dτ,j)(1− αj)− dτ,jαj k¯j
]
φi,+T−τ+1,j
+
∑
j
(1− diτ,j)k¯j
[
(1− fτ,j) + αjfτ,j
]
φi,−T−1+τ,j (2.18)
27Remember, that an agent trades with a representative sample of those agents who take an
opposite position, so that there is pooling.
90
Chapter 2. Re-using the Collateral of Others
Finally, let us write down the liquidity constraints imposed by sequential settlement.
ωi1,τ ≥0 (2.19)
θi1,τ−1 + θ
i,B
1,τ ≥
∑
j
(1− f iτ,j)(1− αj)k¯j(1− dτ,j)φi,+T−τ+1,j (2.20)
Equation (2.19) rules out inter-round credit because of limited commitment. Equation (2.20) states
that in order to return collateral on long positions during round τ , an agent should either dip in
its tree account or purchase the tree in the market. Essentially, he cannot use collateral that is
returned to him from a short position in the same round. Symmetrically to the trading round
where no piece of asset can be pledged twice in the same round, it cannot be returned twice in the
same settlement round. These cash and tree-in-advance trading constraints may generate frictions
along the sequential delivery process. Indeed, borrowers cannot use the proceeds of the sale of
returned collateral to pay their loan in a given round28.
Let us call d−i and f−i the T × (J −1)× (I−1) vectors collecting decisions to fail and default
by agents other than i. We label c∗1(ω
i
1, θ
i
0,T ,Φ
i
1T ,p1,d
−i,f−i) the optimal choice of a consumer
with initial balances (ωi1, θ
i
0,T ,Φ
i
1T ), taking as given the sequence of collateral price p1 and other
traders’ decisions (d−i,f−i) where trader i optimizes with respect to (θi,B1,τ ,d
i
τ ,f
i
τ )τ=1..T given
constraint (2.19)-(2.20).
Definition 5: Given initial positions (ωi1, θ
i
0,T ,Φ
i
1T )
i∈I , and a state s ∈ S, a settlement
equilibrium is a price sequence p1 = (p1,1, .., p1,T ), payments and delivery decisions {diτ ,f iτ}τ=1..T
for every agent i ∈ I and an allocation {ci1}i∈I such that
1. p1,τ clear the collateral market in round τ
2. ∀i ∈ I, ci1 = c∗1(ωi1, θi0,T ,Φi1T ,p1,d−i,f−i).
3. {diτ ,f iτ}τ=1..T is consistent with individual decisions to default and fail.
In a settlement equilibrium of the sequential model, default and fail decisions might differ from
that of the simultaneous model if liquidity constraints (2.13)-(2.13) bind or if the price sequence
for the tree {p1,τ}τ=1..T is non trivial. Equipped with the settlement equilibrium concept, we can
naturally define an equilibrium of the sequential model.
Definition 6: Equilibrium An equilibrium of the sequential model is a trading price vector
(p0,τ , qτ ) ∈ R(J+1)×T , a settlement price vector (p1(1), ...,p1(S)) ∈ RS×T , a default and fail map
(d,f) ∈ RJ×I×S×T and an allocation (c0, c1) ∈ RI×(S+1) such that
1. ∀s ∈ S, (c1(s),p1(s),d(s),f(s)) form a settlement equilibrium given (ωi1(s), θi0,T ,Φi1T )i∈I
28Observe that the situation is asymmetric here since lenders can use the cash received from the
borrower to purchase the tree he must return to this borrower. We could restore symmetry with
an additional constraint on trades but this is not central to our argument.
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2. ∀i ∈ I,
(θi,U0,T ,Φ
i
1T ) ∈ arg max ui(ωi0,T ) +
S∑
s=1
pi(s)ui(c1i (s))
where ωi0,T is defined by (2.11)− (2.13)
3. Security and tree markets clear in each round where they are traded.
4. Agents form correct expectations about p1, d and f .
Essentially, the sequential equilibrium concept involves more constraints than the equilibrium
of the main text. First, agents must satisfy cash and tree-in-advance constraints (2.13)-(2.14) and
(2.19) -(2.20) at every round of trading. In addition markets must clear in each round. In the
simultaneous model, these round constraints all collapse into a single constraint.
The two models are equivalent if any equilibrium allocation of the simultaneous trading model
of the main text is an equilibrium allocation of the sequential model developed above. In particular,
we are interested for a fundamental settlement equilibrium where the tree price equals the dividend
x in every round and default and fail decisions are similar to that of the main text. In the trading
round, the price of the tree and securities should not depend on the round either. We now prove
this equivalence.
Equivalence between the models
We show that an agent can finance any equilibrium consumption plan of the simultaneous model
(model Sim) when facing the budget constraint of the sequential model (model Seq) where the
securities and the tree trade in each round at their original price.
Proposition 3
Every equilibrium allocation of model Sim is budget feasible under model Seq.
Proof
B Let (c, p, q) be an equilibrium of the Sim model. By definition, for every trader i, there
exists a portfolio (θi,φi) ∈ R×R2J+ which finances ci under (p, q). We want to show that c can be
financed despite the liquidity constraints of the Seq model. For this, we consider a fundamental
settlement equilibrium of the Seq model with p1,τ = x for all τ . In addition, the relevant trading
prices are p0,τ = p and qτ = q for any τ , i.e. constant collateral and security prices. Denote
SimBC(p, q, ω0, θ0) (resp. SeqBCT (p, q, ω0, θ0)) the budget constraint in the Sim model (resp. the
Seq model with T trading rounds). We need to show that . c ∈ SeqBCT (p, q, ω0, θ0) for some T .
Let us consider the following trades over two rounds :
1. Buy θB0,1 = θ − θ0 + 1pq.φ+ units of tree and short φ−1 = φ−
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2. Buy θB0,2 = −q.φ+ units of tree and buy φ+
It is easy to see that as a result of the two operations, the agent effectively holds total portfolio
(θ,φ) which finances c under prices (p, q). In addition, the second round operation is budget
neutral. We are left to verify that liquidity constraints in trading round 1 and settlement rounds
2 are verified.
For the first point, use the fact that (p, q) are equilibrium prices of the simultaneous model.
By absence of arbitrage, an agent cannot make profit by extending loans and selling the re-usable
collateral. This writes: (
1
p
q − (1− α)k¯
)
.φ+ ≥ 0 (2.21)
Thus, for the collateral constraint observe that
θU0,0 + θ
B
0,1 = θ0 + θ − θ0 +
1
p
q.φ+ ≥ θ + (1− α)k¯.φ+ ≥ k¯.φ− = k¯.φ−1
where the first inequality uses (2.21), the second is the collateral constraint (2.6) of the simultaneous
model. For the liquidity constraint (2.13), note that
ω0,1 = ω0 − pθB0,1 + q.φ− = ω0 − p(θ − θ0)− q.φ+ + q.φ− = c0 ≥ 0
where the inequality follows from c ∈ SimBC(p, q, ω0, θ0)
Consider now settlement round 2. Since this is the last settlement round, the agent may cash
in the tree dividend to pay for short positions traded in round 1. Hence the cash in advance con-
straint for settlement does not bind because all the short positions where traded in trading round
1.
Finally, since budget feasible plans are the same and c is optimal in the simultaneous model
under prices (p, q), this is also the consumer’s choice in the sequential model29 under (p, q). C
2.8.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
B Let E := (c, p, q) be an equilibrium in economy E(J ∪ J1) where J1 ∈ Sp(J ). By definition,
for every agent i, there exists a portfolio (θi,φi+,φi−) ∈ R×R|J∪J1|+ ×R|J∪J1|+ of collateral and
securities of J ∪ J1 which finances the allocation ci under prices (p0, q0) according to budget
29The proof for Proposition 3 relies on a budget set argument. One should not infer from the
analysis above that we characterized the actual equilibrium trades in the sequential model leading
to c under (p, q), let alone that two trading rounds of the sequential model would suffice to reach
the allocation in equilibrium. Indeed, while they are budget feasible on an individual basis, the
trades described in the proof are not mutually consistent with the equilibrium requirement of
market clearing.
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constraint (2.4)-(2.6). In what follows, I show that c is an equilibrium allocation of economy E(J1)
where only securities in J1 are available for trade. Let E1 = (c, p1, q1) this equilibrium to be
constructed.
Every security is priced in E, even if it is not traded. Let us set prices for securities (p1, q1)
of J1 in E1 to their value in E. Since J1 ⊂ J ∪ J1 budget feasible allocations in E1 are feasible
in E.
Suppose now a security j = (R¯j , k¯j , αj) ∈ J \J1 is traded in equilibrium E. By definition of
J1, there exists a replicating portfolio ψ(j) = (θ(j),φ(j)) verifying criteria (i)− (iii) of Definition
3. For any agent i, replace every long position φi+j (resp. short position φ
i+
j ) in security j by φ
i+
j
(resp. −φi+j ) units of portfolio ψ(j). The following points prove that the substitution achieves our
goal
a) Using market clearing for security j in E, the securities in ψ(j) verify market clearing in E1.
To put it otherwise, the substitution is resource neutral.
b) Second, any agent’s payoff in period 1 stays identical by definition of ψ(j). Furthermore, the
replicating portfolio’s price in E0 equals that of the security. If the former were strictly lower,
by monotonicity of preferences long agents would have bought ψ(j) instead of j. If it were
strictly higher, short agents would have sold ψ(j) instead of j. Hence, the substitution is also
cost neutral.
c) Finally, substituting ψ(j) for j does not violate the collateral constraint. By construction the
substitution does not require more collateral or more segregation. To see this, consider a long
agent first. The net variation in the collateral constraint from this substitution is
∆θ+ = −(1− αj)k¯j + θ(j) +
∑
j1∈ψ(j)
(1− αj1)φj1 k¯j1 ≥ 0
The term to enter negatively is the quantity of collateral that can be re-pledged out of 1 unit
of security j. The positive terms are the quantity of tree in the replicating portfolio and the
re-usable collateral in the securities of ψ(j).
For an agent short in j, the substitution yields
∆θ− = +kj − θ(j)−
∑
j1∈psi(j)
φj1 k¯j1 ≥ 0
The term to enter positively is the collateral requirement for j. The first negative term accounts
for the sale of θ(j) units of tree while the second one represents the collateral requirement to
short the securities in ψ(j).
Hence, we have shown that c is budget feasible with securities in J1. Since this is the optimal
choice of agents under a larger budget set, c is the optimal choice of agents in E(J1) and thus
constitutes an equilibrium allocation. C
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Proof of Lemma 2
B Let j = (R¯j , k¯j , αj) ∈ J0 and consider security j′ = (Rj/k¯j , 1, αj) the face value of which
is proportional to the actual payoff of j. Since R¯j′(s) ∈ [(1 − αj)x(s), x(s)], we have Rj′(s) =
R¯j′(s) = (1/k¯j)Rj . Hence, security j can be replicated by k¯j units of security j
′. It is thus enough
to find a replicating portfolio for j′. We can then restrict our attention to the following set :
J1 =
{
(R¯j , k¯j , αj) | R¯j(s) ∈ [(1− αj)x(s), x(s)], k¯j = 1, αj ∈ [0, 1]
}
⊂ J0
which is exactly the set of no-default/no-fail securities collateralized by one unit of the tree. Let
now j = (R¯, 1, α) ∈ J1 and re-order the states s = 1, .., S so that
1 ≥ R¯(1)
x(1)
≥ R¯(2)
x(2)
≥ · · · ≥ R¯(S)
x(S)
≥ (1− α) (2.22)
Whenever R¯(s) = R¯(s′), let the initial ordering prevail. Next consider the S − 1 securities
{j1, j2, .., jS−1} := J∗(j) ⊂ J∗ which verify
Rjl(s) = x(s), if 1 ≤ s ≤ S − l
Rjl(s) = 0, otherwise
Security jl has the same payoff as one unit of collateral in the first S − l state. I now derive the
portfolio ψ(j) = (θ, φj1 , .., φjS−1) ∈ RS+ of tree and securities of J∗(j) to replicate j. To this effect,
set
∀l ≥ 1, φjl =
R(S − l)
x(S − l) −
R(S − l + 1)
x(S − l + 1)
θ =
R(S)
x(S)
By construction, this portfolio replicates security j’s payoff so that requirement (i) of Definition 3
holds. The collateral needed to sell portfolio ψ(j) is
k(ψ(j)) = θ +
S−1∑
l=1
φjl =
R(1)
x(1)
≤ 1 = k¯j
Finally, the collateral segregated when selling ψ(j) is:
k(ψ(j)) =
S−1∑
l=1
αjlφjl =
S−1∑
l=1
φjl
R(1)
x(1)
− R(S)
x(S)
≤ αj
Hence conditions (ii) and (iii) also hold. We thus proved that any contract in J0 can be replicated
by contracts in J∗ according to Definition 3. C
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3.1 Introduction
According to Gorton and Metrick (2012), the financial panic of 2007-08 started
with a run on the market for repurchase agreements (repos). Their paper was
very influential in shaping our understanding of the crisis. It was quickly followed
by many attempts to understand repo markets more deeply, both empirically and
theoretically as well as calls to regulate these markets1.
A repo is the sale of an asset combined with a forward contract that requires
the original seller to repurchase the asset at a given price. Repos are different from
simple collateralized loans in (at least) one important way. A repo lender obtains
the legal title to the pledged collateral and can thus use the collateral during the
length of the forward contract. This practice is known as re-use or re-hypothecation.
With standard collateralized loans, borrowers must agree to grant the lender similar
rights2. This special feature of repos has attracted a lot of attention from economists
and regulators alike.
Repos are extensively used by market makers and dealer banks as well as other
1See Acharya (2010) “A Case for Reforming the Repo Market” and (FRBNY 2010)
2Aghion and Bolton (1992) argue that securities are characterize by cash-flow rights but also
control rights. Collateralized loans grant neither cash-flow rights nor control rights over the col-
lateral to the lender unless the counterparties sign an agreement for this purpose. As a sale of
the asset, a repo automatically gives the lender full control rights over the security as well as over
its cash-flows. Re-use rights follow directly from ownership rights. As Comotto (2014) explains,
there is a subtle difference between US and EU law however. Under EU law, a repo is a transfer
of the security’s title to the lender. However, a repo in the US falls under New York law which
is the predominant jurisdiction in the US. “Under the law of New York, the transfer of title to
collateral is not legally robust. In the event of a repo seller becoming insolvent, there is a material
risk that the rights of the buyer to liquidate collateral could be successfully challenged in court.
Consequently, the transfer of collateral in the US takes the form of the seller giving the buyer (1)
a pledge, in which the collateral is transferred into the control of the buyer or his agent, and (2)
the right to re-use the collateral at any time during the term of the repo, in other words, a right
of re-hypothecation. The right of re-use of the pledged collateral (...) gives US repo the same legal
effect as a transfer of title of collateral.” To conclude, although there are legal differences between
re-use and rehypothecation, they are economically equivalent (see e.g. Singh, 2011) and we treat
them as such in our analysis.
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financial institutions as a source of funding, to acquire securities that are on specials,
or simply to obtain a safe return on idle cash. As such, they are important to explain
leverage in financial institutions land to determine the liquidity of certain assets. The
Federal Reserve Bank, the central bank in the United States, and other central banks
use repos to steer the short term nominal interest rate. The Fed’s newly introduced
reverse repos are considered an effective tool to increase the money market rate
when there are large excess reserves. Repos thus became essential to the conduct of
monetary policy. Finally, firms also rent capital and use collateralized borrowing and
some forms of repos to finance their activities or hedge exposures (notably interest
rate risk, see BIS, 1999). Hence, the use of repos also affects the real economy and
macroeconomic activity.
Most existing research papers study specific aspects of the repo markets, e.g.
exemption from automatic stay, fire sales, etc., taking the repo contract and most
of its idiosyncrasies as given. These theories leave many fundamental questions
unanswered, such as why are repos different from collateralized loans? What is
the nature of the economic problem solved by the repo contract? To answer these
questions, to understand the repo market and the effect of regulations, one cannot
presume the existence or the design of repo contracts. In this paper we characterize
a simple economic environment where repos emerge as the funding instrument of
choice. More precisely, we borrow techniques from security design to derive the
equilibrium collateralized contract. The interpretation as a repo contract is natural
since the borrower ultimately sells an asset spot combined with a promise to re-
purchase at an agreed price.
The model has three periods and two types of agents, a natural borrower and
a natural lender, both risk-averse. The borrower is endowed with an asset that
yields an uncertain payoff in the last period. The payoff realization becomes known
in the second period and is reflected in the second period price of the asset. To
increase his consumption in the first period, the borrower could sell the asset to the
lender in the spot market. However this trade will expose both parties to price risk
in the second period. Instead, the borrower can obtain resources from the lender
by selling the asset combined with a forward contract promising to repurchase the
asset in period 2. Unlike with an outright sale, a constant repurchase price in a
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repo hedges market price risk. Under limited commitment however, the borrower
might not honor his promise. Indeed, he may find it optimal to default if the value
of collateral falls below the promised repayment3. We assume that in addition to
the loss of the collateral, a defaulting borrower incurs a cost commensurate with
the size of default. To avoid this wasteful default, the repurchase price of the repo
contract cannot lie above a multiplier of the asset price proportional to this default
cost parameter. In high states of the world or when the asset is abundant, this
constraint does not bind and the repurchase price is constant. In low states of the
world however, the asset pays very little and the borrower exhausts his borrowing
capacity : the repurchase price increases with the spot market price.
Using this equilibrium contract we derive comparative statics for haircuts and
liquidity premia. Haircuts increase with counterparty risk as a riskier agent can
promise less income per unit of asset pledged. More risky collateral commands a
larger haircut and a lower liquidity premium. Compared to a safe asset, a risky secu-
rity pays less in bad times and more in good times. Since agents are constrained in
bad times, this is precisely when collateral is valuable. Hence the liquidity premium
is higher for the safe asset. In good times, agents do not exploit the higher value of
the riskier collateral since the repurchase price becomes constant. Hence, compared
to the safe asset, less of the risky asset’s payoff is pledged and the haircut is larger.
In Section 3.4, we introduce collateral re-use. In a repo, the lender indeed ac-
quires ownership of the asset used as collateral in the repo transaction. In our model,
a lender might re-use a fraction of the asset he receives as collateral. We show that
agents strictly prefer to re-use as it increases the borrowing capacity of the repo
seller. To fix ideas, suppose the collateral is perfectly safe and pays $100 in the
second period. The net interest rate is 0 so that $100 is also the price of the asset in
period 1. With the extra cost for default, a borrower can promise to repay more than
$100 per unit of the asset in period 2, say $110. The lender can then re-use some of
the collateral by selling it back to the borrower. The latter can now pledge another
$110 per unit. With one round of re-use, the borrower netted an extra $10 per unit.
3In practice, even in the absence of outright default, traders opportunistically delay the settle-
ment of transactions, as documented by Fleming and Garbade (2005). In our model, the repurchase
price can be made state-contingent to prevent default in equilibrium. The state-contingency some-
how plays a similar role to margin adjustment or repricing in actual transactions.
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These trades can be repeated as long as collateral can circulate. Overall, re-use has
a multiplier effect since a borrower can pledge more income with the same quantity
of the asset in those states where he is constrained4. Without the non-pecuniary
penalty, this extra borrowing capacity disappears and and re-use does not affect
the equilibrium allocation, a result in line with Maurin (2015). Overall, the model
implies that collateral re-use should be more prevalent for assets that command low
haircuts and when the lender’s trading partners have low counterparty risk.
Finally, Section 3.5 discusses the implications of collateral re-use for the repo
market structure. We argue that some participants naturally emerge as intermedi-
aries when they can re-use collateral. In practice, dealer banks indeed make for a
significant share of this market by intermediating between natural borrowers (say
hedge funds) and lenders (say money market funds or MMF). This might seem puz-
zling if direct trading platforms are available for both parties to bypass the dealer
bank5. Our model rationalizes intermediation with difference in trustworthiness and
ability to re-deploy the collateral. In our example, the hedge fund delegates borrow-
ing to the dealer bank if the later is more trustworthy. Although there are larger
gains from trade with the MMF, the hedge fund prefers borrowing from the dealer
bank if he is more efficient at re-using collateral. Indeed, through re-use, one unit
pledged to the dealer bank can then support more borrowing in the chain of trans-
actions. Our model thus provides an theory for repo intermediation based on the
endogenous choice of trading relationships.
Relation to the literature
Gorton and Metrick (2012) argue that the recent crisis started with a run on repo
whereby funding dropped dramatically for many financial institutions. Subsequent
studies by Krishnamurty et al. (2014) and Copeland et al. (2014) have qualified this
finding by showing that the run was specific to the bilateral segment of the repo
market. Recent theoretical works indeed highlighted some features of repo contracts
as sources of funding fragility. As a short-term debt instrument to finance long-term
4Our stripped down example suggested that re-use only works when haircuts are negative. This
is an artefact of the assumption that the asset is perfectly safe. When it is risky, borrowers only
want to pledge more income in low payoff states where they are constrained. In good states, they
might still want to pledge less income than the future value of the asset. The haircut averages over
states and might thus be positive.
5In the US, Direct RepoTM provides this service
102
Chapter 3. Repurchase Agreements
assets, Zhang (2014) and Martin et al. (2014) show that repos are subject to roll-over
risk. Antinolfi et al. (2015) emphasize the trade-off attached to the exemption from
automatic stay for repo collateral. Lenders easy access to the borrower’s collateral
may be privately optimal but collectively harmful in the presence of fire sales, a
point also made by Infante (2013) and Kuong (2015).
These papers usually take repurchase agreements as given while we want to
understand their emergence as a funding instrument. One natural question is to ask
why borrowers do not simply sell the collateral to lenders? Several works including
our highlight the role of the commitment to the repurchase price. In Narajabad
and Monnet (2012), Tomura (2013) and Parlatore (2015), it allows lenders to avoid
search frictions in the spot market when reselling the asset. In contrast, our model is
fully competitive but assets’ payoff are risky. As a result, repos are essential because
the repurchase price provides hedging against price risk. Bigio (2015) and Madison
(2016) emphasize asymmetry of information about the quality of the asset. There,
the commitment to repurchase insulates uninformed buyers from the information-
sensitive part of the asset cash flow. The repo contract thus resembles a leasing
agreement as in Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) or the optimal debt financing arrangement
of DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), both of which mitigate adverse selection. Our model
has symmetric information but assets payoff are random. With uncertainty, agents
may also want to pledge less than the future value of the cash flow when it is expected
to be high (the hedging component). Besides the different economic motivation,
these works essentially identify repos with standard collateralized loans. We account
for the sale of collateral in a repo by considering re-use. In addition, our theory
rationalizes haircuts since borrowers choose repos when they could obtain more
income in the spot market.
To derive the repo contract, we follow Geanakoplos (1996) , Arau´jo et al. (2000)
and Geanakoplos and Zame (2014) where collateralized promises traded by agents
are selected in equilibrium. Our model differs from theirs as we allow for an extra
non-pecuniary penalty for default in the spirit of Dubey et al. (2005). While our
results on the design of repo contracts carry through without this penalty, it is
crucial for the results in Section 3.4 and 3.5 related to collateral re-use.
In the second part of the paper, we indeed account for the transfer of the legal
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title to the collateral to the lender, opening the possibility for re-use. Singh and
Aitken (2010) and Singh (2011) argue that collateral re-use or rehypothecation lu-
bricates transactions in the financial system6. However rehypothecation may entail
risks for collateral pledgers as explained by Monnet (2011). While Bottazzi et al.
(2012) or Andolfatto et al. (2014) abstract from the limited commitment problem of
the collateral receiver, Maurin (2015) shows that re-use risk seriously mitigates the
benefits from circulation. In our model indeed, re-use relaxes collateral constraints
only thanks to the extra penalty for default besides the collateral loss. Asset re-use
then plays a role similar to pyramiding (see Gottardi and Kubler, 2015). One dif-
ference is that lenders re-use the collateral backing the debt rather than the debt
itself as collateral. We stress the role of collateral re-use in explaining repo market
intermediation as in Infante (2015) and Muley (2015). Unlike these papers, interme-
diation arises endogenously in our model as trustworthy agents re-use the collateral
from risky counterparties to borrow on their behalf. In an empirical paper, Issa
and Jarnecic (2016) indeed suggested that the fee based view of repo intermediation
whereby dealers gain from differences in haircuts does not stand in the data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We present the model and the complete
market benchmark in Section 3.2. We analyze the optimal repo contracts, including
properties for haircuts, liquidity premiums, and repo rates in Section 3.3. In Section
3.4, we allow for collateral re-use and study intermediation in Section 3.5. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Setting
The economy lasts three dates, t = 1, 2, 3. There are two types of agents i = 1, 2
and only one good each period. Both agents have endowment ω in all but the last
period. Agent 1 is also endowed with a units of an asset while agent 2 has none.
This asset pays dividend s in date 3. The dividend is distributed according to a
cumulative distribution function F (s) with support S = [s, s¯] and mean E[s] = 1.
6 Fuhrer et al. (2015) estimate an average 5% re-use rate in the Swiss repo market over 2006-
2013.
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In date 2, the realization of s in date 3 is known to all agents. This is an easy way
to model price risk at date 2.
Preferences from consumption profile (c1, c2, c3) for agent 1 and 2 are
U1(c1, c2, c3) = c1 + v(c2) + c3
U2(c1, c2, c3) = c1 + u(c2) + βc3
where β < 1, u(.) and v(.) are respectively strictly concave and concave functions.
We assume u′(ω) > v′(ω) and u′(2ω) < v′(0), so that there are gains from trans-
ferring resources from agent 1 to agent 2 in date 2 and the optimal allocation is
interior. These preferences contain two important elements. First, as β < 1, agent
2 values less consumption in date 3 so that agent 1 is the natural holder of the asset
in that period. Second, agents with concave utility function dislike consumption
variability in period 2 .
While they may want to engage in borrowing and lending, agents are not able
to fully commit to future promised payments. When agent i defaults on a promised
repayment r, he suffers a loss θir, where θi ∈ [0, 1], measured in consumption units.
The punishment is a deadweight cost, not transferable to the lender7. This non-
transferability feature rules out unsecured credit, except in the limit case θ = 1.
Indeed, from the borrower point of view, the cost of defaulting θr strictly exceeds
the cost of repaying r so that he would always default. The lender does not gain
anything from a default since he does not appropriate the amount θr. This gives a
natural role for the asset to be used as collateral8. We specify feasible collateralized
contracts in the next subsections. Besides the punishment and the loss of collateral,
there are no other stigma attached to default such as market exclusion. In the paper,
7A natural interpretation of our assumptions is that a defaulting borrower incurs non-pecuniary
costs (bankruptcy procedure, hassle, loss of reputation). This costs cannot be monetized and
transferred to the lender. An important feature is that the cost increases in the size of the default.
The linearity is just for tractability. For simplicity, we measure this cost in terms of consumption
units. Observe that u and v should be defined over negative real numbers since in theory, the
punishment can be very large.
8If the punishment were transferable, agents could actually borrow as much as they want by
defaulting and there would be no role for collateral. Our specification ultimately nests two familiar
cases. When θ = 1, agents always deliver on their promises so that limited commitment has no
bite and collateral is useless. When θ = 0, agents suffer only the loss of the asset used as collateral
like in standard models by Geanakoplos (1996) and others.
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we sometimes interpret the severity of the punishment θi as a proxy for the quality
or trustworthiness of agent i.
When trading collateralized contracts or repos, lenders may re-use the asset
pledged by the borrower. Specifically, lender i is able to re-use at most νi of the col-
lateral he receives where νi ∈ [0, 1] . We interpret νi as a measure of the operational
efficiency of a trader in re-deploying collateral for his own trades9.
The environment is a simple set-up where a repo contract arises naturally. Lim-
ited commitment implies that the value of the borrowers’ debt must be in line with
the (uncertain) market value of their collateral. But agents dislike risk and will try
to hedge using a forward contract - the repurchase leg of the repo. Our model speaks
to repos and not only collateralized loans because the lender may re-use the asset
pledged as collateral. All markets are competitive with price-taking agents.
3.2.2 Perfect commitment
When θ1 = θ2 = 1, agents can perfectly commit to future promises. Unsecured
credit is possible so that markets are complete. The resulting equilibrium allocation
is efficient. Hence, marginal rates of substitution should be equalized whenever
possible. We guess that in equilibrium, this is the case between the first and the
second period10. Let cit denote agent i consumption in period t. We obtain the
following equilibrium conditions:u
′(c22,∗) = v
′(2ω − c22,∗)
c23,∗ = 0
(3.1)
where we used the resource constraint of period 2 to substitute for c12,∗ = 2ω − c22,∗.
The implicit prices for period 2 and 3 consumption are respectively u′(c22,∗) and 1.
Intuitively, since β < 1, agent 2 does not consume in period 3 because he has a lower
marginal utility than agent 1. To pin down the equilibrium allocation completely,
9Singh (2011) discusses the role played by collateral desks at large dealer banks in channeling
these assets across different business lines. These desks might not be available for less sophisticated
repo market participants such as money market mutual funds or pension funds
10Conjecturing that marginal rates of substitution are equalized between the second and the
third period, we find a contradiction since the resulting allocation is not budget feasible at the
implied market prices.
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we use the budget constraint of agent 2 and obtain c21,∗ = ω−u′(c22,∗)(c22,∗−ω). This
expression is positive if :
ω ≥ u′(c22,∗)(c22,∗ − ω) (3.2)
which we assume in the remainder of the text. In equilibrium, agent 1 borrows
c22,∗ − ω at a net interest rate r∗ = 1/u′(c22,∗)− 1. Observe that agents consumption
(c12,∗, c
2
2,∗) in period 2 is deterministic although the asset payoff s is already known.
Indeed, risk averse agents prefer a smooth consumption profile.
3.2.3 Incomplete Markets with Limited Commitment
In this section, we let θi ∈ [0, 1). Markets are incomplete because agents cannot
write unsecured debt contracts and must use the asset to support trades. As we
will see, the quantity of asset in the economy will now determine the equilibrium
allocation. To build our intuition, we show first that agents cannot achieve the
complete market allocation by using only spot trades, as it exposes them to price
risk.
Spot Transactions and Efficiency
Agents can only trade the asset in a spot market. The price in period 1 (resp. period
2 and state s) is denoted p1 (resp. p2(s)). The price in period 2 reflects the future
known payoff s of the asset. Let us denote ai1 (resp. a
i
2(s)) the asset holdings of
agent i after trading in period 1 (resp. period 2 and date s). The budget constraints
of agent 2 in period 1 and 2 write
c21 = ω + p1a
2
1
c22(s) = ω + p2(s)(a
2
1 − a22(s))
Using spot trades, agent 2 can implicitly lend to agent 1 if he buys the asset
in period 1, that is a21 > 0 and re-sells it in period 2, that is a
2
2(s) < a
2
1. We give
a formal characterization of the equilibrium in the Appendix. Here, we stress our
main point: a combination of spot trades can never finance the first-best allocation
(3.1). Since agent 2 does not want to consume in period 3 (β < 1), he would resell
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any asset bought in period 1 so that a22(s) = 0. This implies c
2
2(s) = ω + p2(s)a
2
1.
Agent 2 consumption varies with s because of price risk. However, the first best
consumption level c22,∗ is deterministic. This inefficiency arises because spot trades
are too crude an instrument to transfer wealth across time. In particular, asset price
risk generates undesirable consumption variability in period 2. As we will see, the
repo allows agents to commit to a repurchase price to hedge against the asset payoff
variability.
Trading in Spot and Repo Markets
In this section, we specify the agents’ problem when they can also trade repo con-
tracts. A repo is the combination of a sale of an asset with a forward contract to
buy it back. The forward leg may provide insurance against future price risk. How-
ever, under limited commitment, agents may not always make good on the promises
implicit to that forward contract.
Repos
A repo contract at date 1 is a schedule f = {f(s)}s∈S where f(s) is the price
at which the period 1 seller agrees to repurchase the asset in state s of period
2. The seller i transfers one unit of the asset to the buyer j per unit of repo
traded. In exchange, he receives qij(f) per unit which is the price of the repo. We
explain below how this price may depend on traders’ type. A repo f is similar to a
collateralized loan where the seller/borrower obtains qij(f) per unit of asset pledged
against a promised repayment schedule {f(s)}s∈S . In this model, repos differ from
collateralized loans because lender j can re-use a fraction νj of the asset pledged.
Borrower and Lender Default
When entering a repo contract, the borrower promises to repurchase the asset
at a pre-agreed price while the lender promises to return the re-usable collateral at
that price. Hence, a dual limited commitment problem arises. As we stated above,
upon default, an agent loses his entitlement (the collateral or the cash) and incurs a
penalty proportional to the size of the default and his trustworthiness θ. Consider
a trade of one unit of repo contract f between borrower i and lender j. This comes
without loss of generality because of the linearity of the punishment. If the borrower
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defaults in state s, he loses the unit of the asset pledged and incurs a penalty with
pecuniary cost θif(s). Borrower i would thus repay if and only if
p2(s) + θif(s) ≥ f(s)
The left hand side is the cost of defaulting, that is the sum of the market value
of the asset and the penalty. The right hand side is the cost of repaying the loan.
Therefore, the borrower makes good on his promise to pay f(s) in state s whenever,
f(s) ≤ p2(s)
1− θi (3.3)
The right hand side is the maximum agent i can promise to repay per unit of
asset he holds. When θi > 0, he may pledge more income in state s than the value
p2(s) of the asset.
The lender acquires and promises to return the collateral. Observe however that
he can only re-use a fraction νj of this collateral. We assume that he can deposit
the non re-usable fraction 1−νj with a collateral custodian11. We call this collateral
segregated. If he chooses this option, he may only abscond with the re-usable fraction
νj of the collateral. It is easy to understand why this is optimal for him ex-ante.
First, he is less likely to default ex-post. Second, by definition, he would not derive
ownership benefits from keeping the non re-usable collateral on his balance sheet.
Therefore, lender j does not default when:
f(s) + θjνjp2(s) ≥ νjp2(s)
The left hand side is the cost of defaulting. It includes the loss of the promised
payment f(s) and the penalty θjνjp2(s), proportional to the value of the collateral
he defaults upon. The right hand side is the cost of returning the re-usable units of
collateral at market value12. Finally, the lender no-default constraint writes:
11In the tri-party repo market, BNY Mellon and JP Morgan provide these services.
12A lender might re-use collateral and not have in on his balance sheet when he must return it
to the borrower. However, observe that he can always purchase the relevant quantity of the asset
in the spot market to satisfy his obligation. The lender thus effectively covers a short position −νj
in the asset.
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f(s) ≥ νj(1− θj)p2(s) (3.4)
With state contingent repurchase prices, there is no loss in generality in focusing
on repo contracts satisfying no-default constraints (3.3) and (3.4). Indeed, for every
contract with equilibrium default, there exists another default-free contract that
agents weakly prefer to trade. We then define the set of no-default repo contracts
Fij between two agents i and j as a function of the period 2 spot market price
p2 = {p2(s)}s∈S
Fij(p2) =
{
f | ∀ s ∈ [s, s¯] , νj(1− θj)p2(s) ≤ f(s) ≤ p2(s)
1− θi
}
(3.5)
Observe that the set above is stable by linear combination with positive coeffi-
cients. In addition, all contracts require pledging one unit of the asset. Hence for
any combination of multiple contracts sold by i, there exists an equivalent trade of
a single repo contract. In the following, we thus call without ambiguity f12 and f21
the equilibrium contracts.
Agents optimization problem.
We can now write the agent’s optimization problem. We let b
ij
(resp lij) denote
the amount agent i borrows (resp. lends) with j using equilibrium contract fij (resp
fji). We call qij denotes the price of the equilibrium contract fij traded by agents i
and j. When indexing a contract, the subscript ij reflects the equilibrium choice of
repos by agents i and j. The subscript ij also indexes the price because some repo
contracts have different prices when traded by different pairs of agents because of
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heterogeneous incentives to default. For simplicity, we write qij := qij(fij).
max
ait,b
ij ,lij
E
[
U i(ci1, c
i
2(s), c
i
3(s))
]
(3.6)
subject to ci1 = ω + p1(a
i
0 − ai1) + qijbij − qjilij (3.7)
ci2(s) = ω + p2(s)(a
i
1 − ai2(s))− fij(s)bij + fjilij (3.8)
ci3(s) = a
i
2(s)s (3.9)
ai1 + νjl
ij ≥ bij (3.10)
bij ≥ 0 (3.11)
lij ≥ 0 (3.12)
At date 1, agent i has resources ω+p1a
i
0 and chooses asset holding a
i
1, lending `
ij
and borrowing bij. Given these decisions, his resources at date 2 is the endowment ω
and the value of his asset holdings p2(s)a
i
1 as well the net value of the repo positions
fij(s)`
ij−f(s)bij. Equation (3.10) is the collateral constraint of agent i. A borrower
(an agent for which b > 0) must hold one asset per unit of repo contract sold. He
can buy these assets either in the spot market (a1 > 0) or in the repo market (l > 0).
In the latter case, however, only a fraction νj of the asset purchased can be re-used.
The collateral constraint also shows that a lender can take a short position on the
spot market. Let indeed b = 0 and l > 0. Then, it can be that a1 < 0 if ν > 0.
With re-use, a lender acquires ownership of the asset pledged by the lender and can
then sell it. The only difference with a regular sale is the commitment to return the
asset to the agent who initially sold it.
Definition 1. Repo equilibrium
An equilibrium is a system of spot prices p1 and p2 = {p2(s)}s∈S , a pair of repo
contracts (f12, f21) ∈ F12(p2)×F21(p2) and their prices q12 and q21, and allocations
{cit(s), ait, `ij, bij}i=1,2.j 6=it=1..3,s∈S such that
1. {cit(s), ait, `ij, bij}j 6=it=1..3,s∈S solves agent i = 1, 2 problem (3.6)-(3.12).
2. Markets clear, that is a12 + a
2
1 = a and b
ij = lji for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i
3. For any contract f˜ 6∈ {f12, f21}, there exists a price q(f˜) such that agents do
not trade this contract.
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Points 1 and 2 are self-explanatory. Point 3 is a natural requirement to char-
acterize the repo contracts traded in equilibrium. A repo contract is chosen by
the agents if they do not wish to trade an alternative contract f˜ . For example, if
f˜ ∈ F12(p2), the implicit equilibrium price q(f˜) must be too low (resp too high) for
agent 1 (resp. agent 2) to wish to sell (resp. to buy) this contract. Hence, with
our equilibrium definition, all contracts are available to trade and agents select their
preferred contracts taking prices as given.
3.3 Equilibrium contract with no re-use
In this section, we solve for equilibrium when agents cannot re-use collateral. Since
ν = 0, repo contracts are indistinguishable from collateralized loans. We show
below that in equilibrium agents need not trade spot and agent 1 only sells a repo
f = {f(s)}s∈S to agent 2. This is intuitive since agent 1 is the natural borrower.
To gain intuition, remember that agent 1 wants to borrow in period 1 to repay
c22,∗ − ω in period 2. Consider the following trade pattern. Agent 1 sells all his
asset in a repo, that is b12 = a and does not trade spot. The maximum per-unit
payoff of the repo is p2(s)/(1− θ1). Hence, in period 2 and state s, using his budget
constraint, agent 2 ’s consumption can be at most c22(s) = ω + ap2(s)/(1 − θ). In
low states s, this amount may fall short of c22,∗. Since agents are not satiated then,
the repurchase price should indeed be f(s) = p2(s)/(1−θ1). In high states however,
this would raise agent 2 consumption too much. There, f(s) should be constant.
Define indeed s∗ as the solution to
c22,∗ = ω +
ap2(s
∗)
(1− θ) = ω +
as∗
v′(c12,∗)(1− θ)
. (3.13)
This is the minimal state where the first-best allocation can be financed. The second
equality follows from the observation that p2(s) = s/v
′(c12(s)) since agent 1 is the
natural holder of the asset into period 3. Observe that s∗ is decreasing with a and
θ. Therefore, it is easier to achieve the first best level of consumption the larger the
stock of asset and the more agent 1 is able to commit. We have the following result.
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Proposition 1. Define p2(s) as the unique solution - increasing in s- to
p2(s)v
′
(
ω − a p2(s)
1− θ1
)
− s = 0 if s < s∗
p2(s) = s/v
′(c12,∗) if s ≥ s∗
(3.14)
There is a unique equilibrium allocation with repo contract f where:
1. If s∗ ≥ s¯ (a is low), f(s) = p2(s)/(1− θ1) for all s ∈ S
2. If s∗ ∈ [s, s¯] (a is intermediate),
f(s) =

p2(s)
1− θ1 for s ≤ s
∗
p2(s
∗)
(1− θ1) for s ≥ s
∗
(3.15)
3. If s∗ ≤ s (a is high), f(s) = f ∗ for all s ∈ S where f ∗ ∈ [ p2(s∗)
(1−θ1) ,
p2(s¯)
(1−θ1) ].
In equilibrium, agents strictly prefer to trade repo over any combination of repo and
spot trades in cases 1 and 2. They are indifferent to using a combination of both in
case 3.
The equilibrium contract reflects the optimal use of the collateral value. As we
explained, agent 1 can indeed pledge at most p2(s)/(1−θ1) per unit of asset in state
s. This amount increases in s together with the collateral value p2(s). When the
collateral value is low, for s ≤ s∗, the borrowing constraint of agent 1 is binding
and the repurchase price f(s) is equal to this maximal amount. However, when the
collateral value is high, agent 1 does not want to borrow above the first best amount.
Hence, the repurchase price becomes flat for s ≥ s∗. We call this the hedging motive.
The proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix formalizes this argument ensuring that
agents do not want to trade another contract f˜ .
It is interesting to emphasize why agents prefer trading repo rather than spot.
Suppose indeed that agent 1 sells the asset spot in period 1 and buys it back at the
spot market price p2(s) in period 2. This is formally equivalent to a repo contract
f˜ with f˜(s) = p2(s). This alternative trade is dominated for two reasons. When
the collateral value is low, agent 1 can increase the amount he pledges from p2(s)
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to p2(s)/(1− θ1) with a repo. More importantly, when the collateral value is high,
the equilibrium repo limits the repayment to agent 2 to the first best level. In the
case where θ1 = 0 (no punishment), our results thus carry through but only the last
motive to trade a repo is present13.
The equilibrium repo in (3.15) has a state contingent repurchase price. When
θ1 = 0, it is equivalent to a repo contract with constant repurchase price fˆ and de-
fault. Let us indeed set fˆ = p2(s
∗) for all states s. When s ≥ s∗, agent 1 repays since
the collateral is worth more than the payment he has to make, that is p2(s) > p2(s
∗).
In low states however, he finds it optimal to default. The lender’s payment is then
equal to the collateral value p2(s). As a result, the effective repurchase price schedule
is exactly as in Proposition 1. When θ1 > 0, there is a deadweight cost of default.
Hence, contracts with constant repurchase prices come with a loss of generality. In-
deed, a contract with a high (constant) value of f generates costly default in low
states. A contract with a low (constant) value of f reduces default but also the
amount pledged in any state. When restricted to constant repurchase schedules,
the equilibrium contract is non-trivial and depends on the relative strength of the
borrowing and the hedging motive.
3.3.1 Haircuts, liquidity premium, and repo rates
In this section, we derive the equilibrium properties of the liquidity premium and
repo haircut. We compare the haircuts and liquidity premia of two assets with
different risk profile. We also investigate the role of counterparty risk, as measured
by θ. We define the liquidity premium L as the difference between the spot price of
the asset in period 1 and its holding value. We thus have
L = p1 − E[s]
The holding value E[s] follows naturally from the preferences of agent 1. The liquid-
ity premium is also the shadow price of the collateral constraint. Hence, whenever
the asset is scarce and agents are constrained, the asset bears a positive liquidity pre-
mium. Using the equilibrium characterization, we can relate the liquidity premium
13As we explain in the next Section however, θ1 > 0 is necessary to explain re-use.
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to the repo contract and the allocation:
L = E[f(s)(u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))]
The liquidity premium is positive if there exist (low) states where agents are con-
strained because they cannot increase borrowing. In those states, u′(c22(s)) >
v′(c12(s)) which implies L > 0.
The repo haircut is the difference between the spot market price and the repo
price. Indeed, it costs p1 to obtain 1 unit of the asset, which can be pledged as
collateral to borrow q. So to purchase 1 unit of the asset, an agent needs p1 − q
which is the downpayment or haircut14.
H ≡ p1 − q = E[(p2(s)− f(s))v′(c12(s))] (3.16)
where the second equality follows from the first order condition of agent 1 with
respect to spot and repo trades. Finally, the repo rate is
1 + r =
E[f(s)]
q
=
E[f(s)]
E[f(s)u′(c22(s))]
. (3.17)
When agents are constrained (case i) and ii) of Proposition 1), we have u′(c22(s)) >
u′(c22,∗) for s ∈ [s, s∗] so that 1 + r < 1 + r∗. Agent 2 would like to lend at the
frictionless interest rate 1+r∗. However, agent 1 cannot increase borrowing since he
runs out of collateral. The interest rate must then fall for agent 2 to be indifferent.
Interestingly, r < r∗ when the liquidity premium L is strictly positive. Remember
that a positive liquidity premium precisely indicates collateral scarcity. Net repo
rates r can thus be negative for assets with large liquidity premium. This is con-
sistent15 with market data as reported in ICMA (2013). We now derive the haircut
and liquidity premium for the equilibrium repo f .
14An alternative but equivalent definition is (p1 − q)/q.
15The ICMA (2013) reports that “The demand for some assets can become so strong that the
repo rate on that particular asset falls to zero or even goes negative. The repo market is the only
financial market in which a negative rate of return is not an anomaly.” (p.12) and in footnote 6
“negative repo rates have been a frequent occurrence and can be deeply negative.” Also, see Duffie
(1996), or Vayanos and Weill (2008).
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p¯(s)
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1−θ
s¯
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Figure 3.1: Repo haircuts
Corollary 1. The haircut and liquidity premium are:
L =
∫ s∗
s¯
s
1− θ1
u′
(
ω + ap2(s)
1−θ
)
v′
(
ω − ap2(s)
1−θ
) − 1
 dF (s)
H = − θ
1− θ
∫ s∗
s
sdF (s) +
∫ s¯
s∗
(
s− s
∗
1− θ
)
dF (s)
when s∗ ≥ s , where p2(s) is the period 2 spot market price defined in (3.14).
When agents can reach the first-best allocation in all states, that is s∗ ≤ s, the
liquidity premium is L = 0 and the haircut lies in the following range:
H ∈
[
E[s]− s
1− θ , E[s]−
s∗
1− θ
]
As Figure 3.1 shows, the borrowing and hedging motives have opposite effects
on the size of the haircut. In the states s < s∗ where agents are constrained, the
borrower uses the maximum pledgeable capacity p2(s)/(1 − θ1) per unit while the
asset price trades at p2(s). From expression (3.16), this contributes negatively to
the haircut. However, in states s ≥ s∗ , agent 1 does not wish to borrow more
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than c22,∗ − ω. Hence, he does not use the full collateral value of the asset. In
particular, the repayment f(s) is flat while the asset value p2(s) increases with s.
This contributes positively to the haircut. The overall sign of the haircut depends on
the weights on both regions in the distribution of s. This simple discussion suggests
that when θ1 = 0 , haircuts are always positive. Finally, observe that the haircut
is not pinned down when s∗ ≤ s since several (constant) repurchase prices f are
possible in equilibrium.
As we discussed, the liquidity premium captures the value of the asset as an
instrument to borrow over and above its holding value. This premium is zero when
agents are not constrained in any state, that is s∗ ≤ s as shown by the expression
above. When s∗ > s, the liquidity premium is an average of the pledging capacity
of the asset s/(1− θ1) multiplied by the wedge in marginal utilities
Counterparty risk
We now perform a comparative static exercise varying θ, a proxy for counterparty
quality. Indeed, a higher θ implies a higher punishment from defaulting and thus
a superior ability to honor debt. Although there is no default in equilibrium, the
equilibrium contract reflects default risk. Using the expression derived in Corollary
1, we obtain that haircuts increase with counterparty risk, or:
∂H
∂θ1
= − 1
(1− θ1)2
∫ s∗
s
sdF (s) ≤ 0
Indeed, as Figure 3.2 shows, a higher θ1 increases the amount a borrower can
raise per unit of the asset pledged. This naturally leads to a decrease in the haircut,
by increasing the size of the region where f(s) > p2(s) while leaving the other region
unchanged.
When it comes to the liquidity premium L, counterparty quality θ1 has an am-
biguous effect. First, remember that agent 1 can pledge at most ap2(s)/(1 − θ1)
in state s. Hence, an increase in θ raises the pledgeable amount16. Agent 1 can
16This argument abstracts from the negative equilibrium impact of θ on the spot market price
p2(s) which is pinned down by the relationship p2(s)v
′(ω − ap2(s)/(1 − θ)) − s = 0 for s ≤ s∗.
However, one can easily show that the net effect is positive, that is ∂[p2(s)/(1− θ)]∂θ > 0.
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Figure 3.2: Influence of θ, with θH > θL
thus borrow more in states s < s∗, which reduces the wedge u′(c22(s))/v
′(c12(s)) − 1
between marginal utilities. This effect, similar to an increase in the asset available
a, tends to reduce the liquidity premium. However, θ1 also increases the slope of
the repurchase price 1/(1− θ1) on those states where the agents are constrained. As
more income can be pledged when this is most valuable, the asset becomes a better
borrowing instrument, which raises its price. Observe that this second effect does
not arise when we vary the asset supply a. Thus, counterparty quality θ1 can have
a non-monotonic impact on the liquidity premium L.
Asset risk
We now want to compare haircuts and liquidity premium as a function of asset
riskiness. For this purpose, we introduce two assets with different risk profiles but
perfectly correlated payoffs17. We compute the liquidity premium of the safer asset
relative to the riskier, the haircuts that both assets carry, and the repo rates. As
17We can prove similar results, in the one asset case, by considering a mean preserving spread.
However, we would then compare quantities across equilibrium rather than within an equilibrium
as we do here.
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before, s ∼ F [s, s¯] but there are now two assets i = A,B with payoffs ρi(s):
ρi(s) = s+ αi(s− E[s]),
where αB > αA = 0. With αA = 0, asset A is our benchmark asset. Since αB > 0,
asset B has the same mean but a higher variance than asset A. Indeed V ar[ρα] =
(1 + α)V ar[s]. We choose to consider two assets with perfectly correlated payoff to
ignore the effect of risk sharing on the structure of the repo contract. Agent 1 is
endowed with a units of asset A and b units of asset B, while agent 2 does not hold
any of the assets. It is relatively straightforward to extend the equilibrium analysis
of the previous section to this new economy with two assets. The set of available
contracts consists of feasible repos using assets A and B. For each asset i = A,B,
the repo contract fi uses the maximum pledgeable capacity up to the state where
the first best level of consumption can be reached. We then prove the following
result.
Proposition 2. The safer asset A always has a higher liquidity premium and a
lower haircut than the riskier asset B.
The key intuition behind the result is the misallocation of collateral value in-
duced by a mean preserving spread. Asset A and B have the same expected payoff.
However, since ρB(s)− ρA(s) = αB(s−E[s]), the risky asset pays relatively more in
high states (upside risk) and less in low states (downside risk). Given that agents
are constrained for low values of s, this is precisely when collateral is valuable. Since
the safe asset A pays more in these states, it carries a larger liquidity premium. We
now turn to the haircut. In high states, the riskier asset B has a higher payoff which
means that more income can be pledged compared to asset A. However, agent 1
does not wish to borrow over the first best level. Hence agents do not exploit the
the higher collateral value of the risky asset in high states, implying a larger haircut.
Observe that without this hedging motive, asset risk would have no impact on the
haircut.
So far, repos are indistinguishable from collateralized loans. Indeed, with ν = 0,
the asset is immobile once pledged in a repo. The next two sections show that
allowing for re-use delivers new predictions. First, re-use increases the borrowing
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capacity of agent 1. Second, the possibility to re-use collateral may lead to endoge-
nous intermediation in equilibrium.
3.4 The multiplier effect of re-use
In this section, we analyze the impact of collateral re-use on equilibrium contracts
and allocations. This is a natural feature of a repo trade where the collateral is
sold to the lender who acquires ownership rights. Re-use has been very much under
scrutiny following the crisis (see Singh and Aitken, 2010) since a default on re-used
collateral may affect several agents along a credit chain. While we do not model the
consequence of such default cascades, we provide the foundations for this analysis
by highlighting the benefits of re-use. The lender, agent 2 is now able to re-use
collateral, that is ν2 > 0. We set ν1 = 0 for agent 1, the borrower to simplify the
exposition and discuss the role of this assumption after Proposition 3.
To understand the potential benefits, consider the equilibrium without re-use.
Agent 2 (the lender) holds collateral pledged by agent 1. Re-use frees up a fraction
ν2 of this collateral. Suppose agent 2 then sells  units where  is small to agent 1
at the equilibrium price p1. The marginal gain for agent 1 is null since buying the
asset is feasible without re-use. The marginal gain to agent 2 is
∂U2
∂
= p1 − E[p2(s)u′(c22(s))] = η21
where η21 is the shadow price of the asset for agent 2. Using the equilibrium
characterization, we obtain:
η21 =
θ1
1− θ1
∫ s∗
s
(
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
)
p2(s)dF (s)
Hence, this marginal gain is strictly positive when s∗ > s (agents are constrained)
and θ1 > 0. To understand this last condition, observe that agent 1 may now sell in a
repo the re-used asset he bought spot from agent 2. He can thus pledge p2(s)/(1−θ1)
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per unit. The net transfer however is
−p2(s) + p2(s)
1− θ1 =
θ1
1− θ1p2(s)
since he first bought the asset spot from agent 2. This transfer is positive and
increases agent 1’s borrowing only if θ1 > 0.
These steps can be repeated over multiple rounds. Agent 1 initially owns a unit
of the asset. In the first round, he can pledge ap2(s)/(1−θ1), just as in the no re-use
case. After this trade, agent 2 has ν2a units of re-usable asset. Given our argument
above, agent 1 can then pledge an additional θ1
1−θ1ν2ap2(s) in state s. After this
operation, agent 2 has (ν2)
2a units of re-usable asset. Iterating over these rounds
infinitely, the total pledgeable amount per unit of asset in state s obtains:
M12p2(s) : =
p2(s)
1− θ1 +
∞∑
i=1
(ν2)
i θ1
1− θ1p2(s)
=
1
1− ν2
[
1
1− θ1 − ν2
]
p2(s) (3.18)
where we call M12 the borrowing multiplier between agents 1 and 2. This expres-
sion is strictly increasing in ν2 as long as θ1 > 0. Again, the role of trustworthiness
θ for re-use appears clearly.
In this analysis, we guessed that agent 2, the lender, returns the collateral.
Indeed, our construction implicitly relied on a repo contract f12 with f12(s) =
p2(s)/(1 − θ). This satisfies the no-default constraint (3.4) of the lender, agent
2.
Let us now define s∗(ν2) as the minimal state above which agent 1 can pledge
enough income to finance the first best allocation, that is:
ω + aM12p2(s
∗(ν2)) = c22,∗.
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We can then introduce the candidate equilibrium repo contract f(ν2) where:
f(s, ν2) =

p2(s)
1− θ1 if s < s
∗(ν2)
s∗(ν2)
(1− θ1)v′(c12,∗)
+
ν2(s− s∗(ν2))
v′(c12,∗)
if s ≥ s∗(ν2)
(3.19)
The following Proposition establishes that agents trade this contract in an equi-
librium with re-use:
Proposition 3. Collateral Re-use.
Let ν2 ∈ (0, 1) be the fraction of collateral agent 2 can re-use. Collateral re-use
is strictly preferred whenever θ1 > 0 and the first best allocation is achieved for any
ν2 ≥ ν∗ defined as
ν∗ =
s∗(0)− s
s∗(0)− (1− θ)s.
The (essentially) unique equilibrium repo contract is f(ν) defined in (3.19).
As we discussed before, when θ1 > 0, re-use strictly increases the amount agent
1 can pledge to agent 2. This is valuable when agents are constrained and want to
expand borrowing in low states. From the expression of M12 in (3.18), it is clear
that for ν2 high enough, the first-best allocation can even be financed in the lowest
state s. One can obtain the expression for ν∗ by setting s∗(ν2) = s. The equilibrium
repo contract has f(s, ν2) = p2(s)/(1− θ1) in those states s ≤ s∗(ν2), where agents
are still constrained. There, agents use the maximum pledgeable amount. On
states s ≥ s∗(ν2), the repo schedule is not flat anymore when ν2 > 0. The second
component ν2(s−s∗(ν2)) corrects for the short position taken by agent 2 in the spot
market. Indeed, in every round of re-use, agent 2 sells a fraction ν2 of the collateral
he receives as a pledge from agent 1. He must then return this collateral in period
2 or equivalently cover his short position in the asset. Since he re-sells a fraction ν2
of every unit, it is not surprising that the second term is proportional to ν2.
It may seem that agent 1 would only be willing to engage in re-use if the haircut
is negative. Indeed, buying 1 unit of asset from agent 2 to pledge it back yields a net
gain of −p1 + pF = −H in period 1. This intuition proves correct when there is no
uncertainty, that is s = E[s] = 1 for all s. Then, since f = p2/(1− θ1) , expression
(3.16) shows that H ≤ 0 indeed. Intuitively, the borrower would benefit only if he
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increases consumption in period 1. When there is uncertainty, the above logic is
incomplete since agent 1 may also gain by transferring consumption across states.
If the haircut is positive, agent 1 benefits by decreasing his consumption in period
1 and in the low states of period 2 to increase it in the high states of period 2.
The liquidity premium L can exhibit non-monotonicity in the re-use factor ν2.
Indeed, while re-use relaxes the collateral constraint, it also increases the amount
pledgeable in states where agents are constrained. This last effect makes the as-
set more valuable and can increase the liquidity premium. These two effects are
reminiscent of the comparative statics with respect to the commitment power θ. Fi-
nally, our model predicts that re-use is helpful when collateral is most scarce (that
is s∗(0) > s) and there is evidence that this is indeed the case (see Fuhrer et al.,
2015).
Remark 1. The role of ν1
Since agent 2 is the natural lender, it seems that the re-use capacity of the bor-
rower ν1 should play no role. The proof in the appendix shows indeed that Proposition
3 holds not only when ν1 = 0 but that ν1 should not be too large either. We provide
an informal discussion for the role of ν1 here. Observe first that agent 2 is free to
re-use the asset as he wishes. He may either re-sell it spot or re-pledge it in a repo
to agent 1. In the discussion leading to Proposition 3, we implicitly guessed that he
prefers the first option. We now argue that this is indeed the case if:
−p2(s) +M12p2(s) ≥ −ν1(1− θ1)p2(s) + ν1M12p2(s)
The left hand side are the gains from re-selling the asset spot. The right hand side
are the gains from re-selling the asset in a repo where f21(s) = ν1(1 − θ1)p2(s).
Observe from (3.4) that this is the repo with the minimum repurchase price that
avoids agent 1 default as a lender. On each side of the inequality, the first term is
the period 2 transfer from agent 2 to agent 1. It enters with a minus sign because
agent 1 actually wants to borrow, which implies decreasing his consumption in period
2. The second term is the gain derived from agent 1 holding some asset. This is
equal to the quantity of asset he acquires from agent 2 times the borrowing multiplier
M12p2(s). We may now understand why agent 2 may want to use repo f21 rather
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than a spot sale. The benefit is the smaller transfer from agent 2 to agent 1 in period
2 while the cost is the segregation of (1− ν1) units by agent 1. Intuitively, when ν1
is large enough the benefit dominates. Elementary transformations of this inequality
yields the following condition.
ν1(1− ν2)
1− ν2ν1 (2− θ1) < 1 (3.20)
The left hand side is monotonic in ν1 , the fraction of pledged collateral agent 1
can re-use. The equilibrium characterization in Proposition 3 is thus valid not only
when ν1 = 0 but whenever (3.20) holds. When it does not hold, agent 2 re-sells in a
repo to agent 1. In equilibrium, this will also affect the contract sold by agent 1 to
agent 2. Although, the equilibrium contracts may change, the core intuition remains.
Collateral re-use allows agent 2 to sell the asset back to agent 1, whether spot or
repo, for him to increase the amount he borrows.
3.5 Collateral Re-use and Intermediation
In their guide to the repo market, Baklanova et al. (2015) state that “dealers operate
as intermediaries between those who lend cash collateralized by securities, and those
who seek funding”. To fix ideas, let us consider the following chain of trades. First,
a hedge fund who needs cash borrows from a dealer bank through a repo. The dealer
bank then taps in a money market fund (MMF) cash pool through another repo to
finance the transaction. Figure 3.3 illustrates this pattern of repo intermediation.
Since direct trading platforms such as Direct RepoTM in the US are available, it may
seem puzzling that a significant share of the repo market is intermediated. In this
section, we explain these chain of trades based on heterogeneity in trustworthiness
between the hedge fund and the dealer bank. A remarkable feature of this equilib-
rium is that intermediation arises endogenously although in our example, the hedge
fund would be free to trade with the MMF18.
18Our analysis thus extends Infante (2015) and Muley (2015) which assume intermediation ex-
ogenously. We do not account for the possible institutional differences between the two trades
involved. Indeed, repos between hedge funds and dealer banks are typically bilateral whereas
dealer banks and hedge funds often trade via a tri-party agent (in the US, these are JP Morgan
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Figure 3.3: Intermediation with Repo
We change the economy slightly for this purpose. For simplicity, we assume that
agent 1 has linear preferences, that is :
U1(c1, c2,c3) = c1 + δc2 + c3
This is a particular case of our general framework with v(x) = δx. We also
introduce a third type of agent named B, for Banker. Agent B has no asset initially.
He is endowed with ω in period 1 and 2 and has the following preferences:
UB(c1, c2, c3) = c1 + δBc2 + c3
where δ ≤ δB < u′(ω). Under this assumption, agent B also wants to borrow from
agent 2 but he has lower gains from trade than agent 1. We set θB > θ so that
the Bank has a higher trustworthiness than agent 1. The corresponding greater
borrowing capacity will explain why agent B can play a role as an intermediary. We
will say that there is intermediation when agent 1 chooses not to trade directly with
2 in a repo contract. The last section already discussed the role of the re-use factor
of the borrower ν1. For simplicity, we thus set ν1 = 0 here.
3.5.1 Intermediation via spot trades
We assume first that agents 1 and B have the preferences, δ = δB and only differ
in their trustworthiness with θ1 < θB. Although agents 1 and B have no gains from
and BNY Mellon) which acts as a collateral custodian. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(2010) for a discussion of Tri-Party repo. Still, our analysis provides a fundamental explanation
for this market segmentation.
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trade, we show that the latter plays an active role as an intermediary.
Proposition 4. Let δ = δB and θ1 < θB and suppose the asset is too scarce to reach
the first-best allocation. Then, in equilibrium, agent 1 sells his asset spot. Agent B
buys the asset and iterates on repo trades with agent 2.
The striking feature in Proposition 4 is that agent 1, does not trade a repo with
agent 2, the natural lender while he holds the asset. It means that there exists no
repo contract f˜12 that these agents wish to trade. Instead, in equilibrium, 1 sells the
asset to agent B for the latter to use as collateral with agent 2. Observe that once
he buys the asset from agent 1, agent B substitutes for agent 1 as a borrower with
agent 2. In particular, the equilibrium repo contract fB2 is the same
19 as (3.19),
replacing θ1 with θB.
Without agent B, agent 1 would borrow in a repo from agent 2 as before. How-
ever, agent B may pledge more income to agent 2 due to its higher trustworthiness
θB > θ. In a competitive equilibrium, agent B makes no profit as an intermediary.
Hence, his higher borrowing capacity with agent 2 is fully reflected in the spot price
he pays for the asset to agent 1. As a result, agent 1 now prefers to sell his asset
and delegates borrowing to a more trustworthy agent. When δ = δB, intermediation
takes place via a spot trade between agents 1 and B and not via a repo. Observe
indeed that there are no direct gains from trade between 1 and B. As a result,
agents 1 and B do not value the extra borrowing capacity from a repo when θ1 > 0.
To the contrary, trading repo is costly because a fraction 1− νB of the asset could
not be used by agent B to borrow from 2. This trade-off is no longer trivial when
δ <δB and a chain of repos may emerge as we show in the next subsection.
When the asset is not scarce, the first best allocation whereby u′(c22,∗) = δ is at-
tainable. In this case, other equilibrium trades are possible. In particular, agent B
could be inactive if agent 1 has enough asset to compensate for his low trustworthi-
ness θ1. An interesting implication of our result is thus that intermediation should
19As before, agents B and 2 do multiple rounds of repo thanks to re-use by agent 2. Whether
agent 2 re-sells spot rather than repo the collateral pledged by agent B depends on the following
condition:
νB(1− ν2)
1− ν2νB (2− θB) < 1
This expression is similar to (3.20) replacing ν1 by νB and θ1 by θB .
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be observed precisely when collateral is scarce. When δB = δ, the Bank essentially
acts as a proxy by “selling” his higher trustworthiness to the risky agent.
3.5.2 Chain of repos
We now let δ < δB and show that an equilibrium with a chain of repos exists. When
δ < δB, agents 1 and B have direct gains from trade. A repo sale can now be
valuable because it increases the transfer with respect to a spot sale when θ1 > 0
. Since a fraction (1 − νB) of the asset pledged is segregated, this may dominate a
spot sale only if δB − δ is large enough.
If agents trade in a chain of repo, agent B acts both as a lender with agent 1
and as a borrower vis a vis agent 2. This creates a competing use for the asset.
Indeed, when he holds one unit, agent B may either sell the asset back to agent 1
for him to increase borrowing or use it to borrow from agent 2. A key observation
is that in equilibrium, he will be marginally indifferent between these two options.
Suppose for instance that he strictly prefers to re-use to borrow from agent 2. This
means that some asset collateralizing trade between agent 1 and B is misallocated
and should rather support trade between B and 2. As a result, agents 1 and B
would rather trade spot as before. Intuitively, indifference is possible if the gains
from trade between agents 1 and B (proportional to δB − δ) are not too different
from those between agents B and 2 (proportional to u′(ω)− δB).
Finally, agent 1 must prefer trading in a repo with agent B rather than with
agent 2 while gains from trade are larger with 2. However, with heterogeneity in
re-use factors ν, one unit of pledged collateral can be redeployed at different rates
by each counterparty. Indeed, we have shown that the multiplier between borrower
i and lender j is:
Mij =
1
1− νj
[
1
1− θi − νj
]
i = B, 2 (3.21)
We conjecture that agent 1 will prefer to trade with B if the larger borrowing
multiplier compensates for the lower gains from trade. We may now state the exact
conditions under which a chain of repo can arise in equilibrium.
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Proposition 5. Intermediation equilibrium.
An intermediation equilibrium with a chain of repos f1B and fB2 exists iff
1
1− θB −
1
1− θ1 ≥ (1− νB)MB2 (3.22)
δ ≥ δB ≥ δ (3.23)
where the thresholds verify δ < δ < δ < u′(ω) and depend on all the parameter
values. Agents 1 and B trade using repo f1B given by
f1B(s) =
s
1− θ1 ∀s ∈ [s, s¯] (3.24)
Observe first that the repo contract f1B between agents 1 and B does not reflect
any hedging motive since both agents are risk neutral. Uncertainty does not play
any crucial role for the rest of the equilibrium characterization. To simplify the
interpretation of Proposition 5, we thus assume that s = 1 for the discussion. When
involved in a repo chain, agent B acquires re-usable collateral from agent 1. He
may either re-resell this collateral to agent 1 to increase borrowing or re-pledge
the collateral to agent 2. As we discussed, in equilibrium, he must be marginally
indifferent between both usages. The indifference condition can be written as follows:
MB2[u
′(c22)− δB] = (M1B − 1)(δB − δ) (3.25)
The left hand side is the gain from pledging collateral to agent 2. It is equal to
the gains from trade times the borrowing multiplier MB2 between the two agents.
The left hand side is the gain from re-selling the asset to agent 1. The term in factor
of the gains from trade is M1B − 1 since the asset must first be sold for agent 1 to
borrow, if it is initially held by agent B. Condition (3.23) should now be clearer.
If δB is too close to δ, the right hand side is necessarily smaller than the left hand
side. In this case, agent 1 and B would rather trade spot as in Proposition 4.
We must still understand why agent 1 should trade with agent B rather than
with agent 2 . He can indeed sell one unit of asset in repo f1B to either agent. We
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argue that the first option dominates the second if:
δB − δ
1− θ1 + νHMB2(u
′(c22)− δB) ≥
u′(c22)− δ
1− θ1 + ν2(MB2 − 1)(u
′(c22)− δB)
The left hand side (resp. right hand side) measures the gains from selling the
asset in a repo to agent B (resp. 2). The first component is the direct gain from
trade. This is obviously larger with agent 2 since u′(ω) > δB. However, with re-use,
there are also indirect gains (the second term) since the collateral can be redeployed.
If agent 1 sells to agent B, νH units can support borrowing with agent 2. If sold to
agent 2, ν2 units can be re-used. These re-use gains may be larger with B if νB > ν2.
The possibility to re-use collateral thus explains why seemingly dominated trades
(here between 1 and B) can take place20. Equilibrium condition (3.22) obtains
from straightforward manipulation of the inequality above. When we set ν2 = 0,
condition (3.22) nicely reads as a cost-benefit analysis of intermediation. Indeed, it
collapses to:
1− νB ≤ θB − θ1
1− θ1
The left hand side is the fraction of collateral immobilized when going through
agent B to trade. The right hand side is the (normalized) extra borrowing capacity
θB − θ1 of agent B.
To summarize, an agent may become a dealer if he is more trustworthy than
the natural borrower and more efficient at re-deploying collateral than the natural
lender. Our analysis thus shows that repo intermediation arises endogenously out of
fundamental heterogeneity between traders. Existing models of repo intermediation
typically take the chain of possible trades as exogenous. Our endogenous approach to
intermediation is helpful to rationalize several features of the repo market. First, we
can explain why intermediating repo is still popular despite the emergence of direct
trading platforms. Second, in exogenous intermediation models, dealers typically
20One can show that Condition (3.22) is equivalent to
M1B(δB − δ) ≥M12(u′(c22)− δ)
From the point of view of agent 1, borrowing from agent B dominates if the multiplier M1B is
larger than M12 although gains from trade are smaller (δB − δ ≤ u′(c22)− δ). Again this is possible
only if νB > ν2.
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gain and collect fees by charging higher haircuts to borrowers. In our model, the
haircut paid by the borrower to the bank may very well be smaller than the one
paid by the bank to the lender. Using data from the Australian repo market, Issa
and Jarnecic (2016) show that this is indeed the case in most transactions.
3.6 Conclusion
We analyzed a simple model of repurchase agreement with limited commitment and
price risk. Unlike a combination of sale and repurchase in the spot market, a repo
contract provides insurance against the asset price risk. We introduce counterparty
risk as heterogeneous cost from defaulting on the promised repurchase price. We
showed that the repo haircut is an increasing function of counterparty risk and a
decreasing function of the asset inherent risk. Safe assets naturally command a
higher liquidity premium than risky ones. Our model targets repos since we allow
agents to re-use collateral. We showed that re-use increases borrowing through a
multiplier effect. In addition, it can explain intermediation whereby trustworthy
agents borrow on behalf of riskier counterparties.
Our simple model delivers rich implications about the repo market but leaves
many venues for future research. We argued that counterparty risk is a fundamen-
tal determinant for the terms of trade in repo contracts. It would be interesting to
analyze the impact of clearing on repo market activity since clearing often implies
novation by a central counterparty. Novation bears some similarities with interme-
diation although terms of trades cannot be adjusted and risk may be concentrated
on a single agent. When it comes to re-use, besides the limit on the amount of
collateral that can be re-deployed, we assumed a frictionless process. Traders estab-
lish and settle positions smoothly although many rounds of re-use may be involved.
This may not be the case anymore in the presence of frictions in the spot market
for instance. Recent theoretical papers have shown that secured lending markets
can be fragile. Although we did not investigate this aspect in the present work, we
believe collateral re-use may add to this fragility.
130
Chapter 3. Repurchase Agreements
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Equilibrium analysis of spot trade only
We prove the following Proposition that characterize spot trade equilibria.
Proposition 6. When agents can only trade spot, there exists a threshold a¯spot such that
1. Low asset quantity: if a < a¯spot, then agent 1 sells his entire asset holdings at date 1. The
liquidity premium L is strictly positive.
2. High asset quantity:if a ≥ a¯spot, then agent 1 sells less than a at date 1. The liquidity
premium is L = 0.
Deriving the first order conditions, the following system of equations characterize the
equilibrium.
c13(s) = ω + as,
c12(s) = ω − p2(s)(a21 − a22(s)),
−p2(s)v′(c12(s)) = s+ ξ12(s), (3.26)
−p2(s)u′(c22(s)) = δs+ ξ22(s), (3.27)
−p1 + E
[
p2(s)v
′(c12(s))
]
+ ξ11 = 0,
−p1 + E
[
p2(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
+ ξ21 = 0,
ξ11ξ
2
1 = 0
where ξit is the Lagrange multiplier on the no-short sale constraint of agent i in period t. Given
that u′(ω) > v′(ω), one can easily check that ξ12(s) = 0 for all s. This is natural since agent 1 who
does not discount period 3 payoffs is the natural holder of the asset. By the same logic, we have that
ξ21 = 0. Agent 2 must buy a positive quantity of the asset since otherwise gains from trade are left
on the table. From equation 3.26, it is easy to realize that p2(s) is increasing in s. Moreover there
exists sˆ(a21) such that a
2
2(s) is equal to 0 for s ≤ sˆ(a21) and solves p2(s)u′(ω+p2(s)(a21−a22(s)) = δs
otherwise. Agent 2 carries positive holdings of the asset into period 3 in those high states s > sˆ(a21)
where re-selling everything would increase too much his period 2 consumption. Focusing now on
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period 1, we are left to pin down a21, the quantity agent 2 initially buys from agent 1.
−p1 + E
[
p2(s)v
′(c12(s))
]
+ ξ11 = 0,
−p1 + E
[
p2(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
= 0,
c12(s) = ω − p2(s)a21
c13(s) = 2ω + as
so
ξ11 = E
{
p2(s)
[
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
]}
(3.28)
To solve for the equilibrium price p2(s) and the quantity sold a
2
1, let us introduce the following
system:.
p2(s)v
′(ω − p2(s)a21) = s
G(a21) = E
{
p2(s)
[
u′(ω + p2(s)a21)− v′(ω − p2(s)a21)
]}
The first equation implicitly defines p2(s) as a function of s and a
2
1, using equation 3.26. The
Implicit Function Theorem shows that p2(s) depends negatively on a
2
1. The total derivative of G
with respect to a21 is equal to
G′(a21) =
∫ sˆ(a21)
s
[
∂p2(s)
∂a21
{
u′(ω + p2(s)a21) + a
2
1p2(s)u
′′(ω + p2(s)a21)
}
+ p2(s)
2u′′(ω + p2(s)a21)
]
dF (s)
This expression is strictly negative if the coefficient of relative risk aversion of u is less than 1.
Define then a¯spot as the unique solution to G(a
2
2) = 0. Two cases are then possible: i) a ≥ a¯spot
and ξ11 = 0 and a
2
1 = a¯spot or ii) a < a¯spot and ξ
1
1 > 0 that is a
2
1 = a.
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In the absence of re-use (ν = 0), the set of no-default repo contracts for agent i ∈ {1, 2} at a given
spot market price schedule p2 = {p2(s)}s∈S is:
Fi(p2) =
{
f ∈ C0[s, s¯] | 0 ≤ f(s) ≤ p2(s)
1− θi
}
We proceed in two steps. First we characterize the equilibrium repurchase contract f ∈ F1(p2)
for a given spot price schedule p2, using the fact that agents must not be willing to trade any other
feasible contract. Then we characterize spot market prices p2 compatible with the equilibrium.
First observe that Fi is stable under linear combinations with positive coefficient (convex cone).
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Hence a combination of contracts shorted by i can be replicated by a single contract. Let fij be
the unique repo contract in which agent i borrows bij ≥ 0 from agent j. We observe also that in
equilibrium, agent 2 needs not borrow, that is b21 = 0 and that spot trading is redundant, that is
a11 = a
1
2(s) = a for all s wlog. Indeed, agent 1 is the natural borrower since u
′(ω) > v′(ω) and the
payment schedule from a spot transaction p2 is included in the set of feasible repos F(p2). Hence,
we will only consider a repo contract where agent 1 is the borrower that we call f for simplicity.
The equilibrium conditions when agents trade repo f are:
−p1 + E[p2(s)v′(c12(s)] + γ11 = 0,
−pF + E
[
f(s)v′(c12(s)]
]
+ γ11 = 0.
−p1 + E
[
f(s)u′(c22(s))
]
+ γ21 = 0,
−pF + E
[
f(s)u′(c22(s))
]
= 0.
−p2(s)v′(c12(s))− s = 0,
ξ11ξ
2
1 = 0,
c12(s) = ω − f(s)b12,
c22(s) = ω + f(s)b
12
We used the fact that agent 1 will be the marginal holder of the asset into period 3. We can also
derive the marginal willingness to pay for any contract f˜ ∈ F12(p2) for both agents. In other
words, we derive the minimum (resp. maximum) price q˜112(f˜) and q˜
2
12(f˜) at which agent 1 (resp.
agent 2) is ready to sell (resp. to buy) an infinitesimal amount of contract F˜ .
q˜112(f˜) = E
[
f˜(s)v′(c12(s))
]
+ γ11
q˜212(f˜) = E
[
f˜(s)u′(c22(s))
]
For agents not to trade contract f˜ in equilibrium, the following inequality must hold:
q˜212(f˜) ≤ q˜112(f˜) (3.29)
Indeed, if this inequality holds, there is an equilibrium price q˜12(f˜) ∈ [q˜112(f˜), q˜212(f˜)] such that
agents’ optimal trade in f˜ is 0. We will use this inequality to show that the equilibrium f is the
contract characterized in Proposition 1. There are two cases.
i) γ11 = 0 : agent 1 is unconstrained.
Then agents 1 and 2’s (marginal) valuation for any contract f˜ ∈ F1(p2) must coincide, that
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is:
E
[
f˜(s)u′(c22(s))
]
= E
[
f˜(s)v′(c12(s))
]
(3.30)
where c22(s) = ω + f(s)b
12. Suppose there is an open interval (s1, s2) ∈ S such that for all
s ∈ (s1, s2), u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s)) = 0 and has a constant sign. Let us then consider the piece-wise
linear schedule f˜ such that f˜(s) = f˜(s1) = f˜(s2) = f˜(s¯) = 0 and f˜(s1/2+s2/2) = s1. The schedule
f˜ ∈ F1 would violate equality (3.30). It means that there cannot be an open interval on which
u′(c22(s)) − v′(c12(s)) 6= 0. Hence, by continuity, we must have for all s ∈ S, u′(c22(s)) = v′(c12(s)),
that is c22(s) = c
2
2,∗. This means that f is constant and in particular that agent 2 can finance c
2
2,∗
in the lowest state s :
c22,∗ = ω + f(s)b
12 ≤ ω + a p2(s)
1− θ1 = ω + a
s
v′(c12,∗)(1− θ1)
where we can replace p2(s) = s/v
′(c12,∗), using the spot market equilibrium condition in pe-
riod 2 and the fact that c12(s) = c
1
2,∗. This may hold, only if s
∗ ≤ s. In that case, although
the equilibrium allocation is unique, the contracts traded are not. The expression of c22(s) only
pins down21 the product b12f , and the repurchase price f may lie anywhere in the interval
[ s
∗
(1−θ1)v′(c12,∗) ,
s
(1−θ1)v′(c12,∗) ] .
ii) γ11 > 0 : agent 1 is constrained.
This means that b12 = a. Rewriting 3.29 using equilibrium conditions, we obtain:
E
[(
f(s)− f˜(s)
) (
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
)] ≥ 0 (3.31)
Let us now define a partition of S as follows
S+(p2) =
{
s ∈ S | ω + a p2(s)
1− θ1 ≥ c
2
2,∗
}
, S−(p2) =
{
s ∈ S | ω + a p2(s)
1− θ1 < c
2
2,∗
}
Intuitively, S+(p2) is the union of intervals (by continuity) where the first-best allocation is
attainable given p2 . We have S+(p2) ∪ S+(p2) = S also by continuity. We argue first that
f(s) = s∗/(1 − θ1) for s ∈ S+(p2) . If f lies below this constant, be definition of s∗ , we
have u′(c22(.)) − v′(c12(.)) > 0 . Any f˜ lying slightly above p¯ would violate (3.31). A similar
argument can be applied to show that f cannot lie above s∗/(1 − θ1) for s ∈ S+(p2) . Now,
we argue that f(s) = p2(s)/(1 − θ1) for s ∈ S−(p2) . Indeed, by definition, for all s ∈ S−(p2),
u′(c22(.))− v′(c12(.)) > 0 so that any schedule p˜ above p¯ is feasible and would again violate (3.31).
Hence, we have fully defined the equilibrium f as a function of p2.
We now characterize the fixed point defining equilibrium p2. Given equilibrium trades and the
21In addition, agent 2 could also buy the asset spot to sell it in a repo F2. In any case, having
agent 1 sell a units of contract p¯ = s∗/(1− θ) is an equilibrium since agents do not (strictly) want
to trade another contract.
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equilibrium contract traded, we have:p2(s)v
′
(
ω − ap2(s)1−θ1
)
= s s ∈ S−(p2)
p2(s)v
′(c12,∗) = s s ∈ S+(p2)
We have that c12(s) < c
1
2,∗ for s ∈ S−(p2). Suppose there exists s+ ∈ S+(p2). Since p2(s) >
p2(s
+) for s > s+, we have that [s+, s¯] ∈ S+(p2). In this case, S+(p2) is an interval containing the
larger elements of S. We are left to show that its minimal element is s∗ defined in (3.13). Clearly,
s∗ ∈ S+(p2). Consider now sˆ < s∗. By definition of s∗, we have that
ω + a
sˆ
v′(c12,∗)(1− θ1)
< c22,∗
In words, the first best allocation cannot be reached if the spot market price is equal to its
“fundamental value” that is p2(sˆ) = sˆ/v
′(c12,∗). This means that sˆ ∈ S−(p2) as otherwise, we
would have f(sˆ) = s∗/(1− θ1) and p2(sˆ) = sˆ/v′(c12,∗).
To conclude, the equilibrium contract f and spot market price p2 verify the following equations
If s < s∗,
p2(s)
(
v′ω − ap2(s)1−θ1
)
− s = 0
f(s) = p2(s)1−θ1
If s ≥ s∗,
p2(s) = sf(s) = s∗1−θ1
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Building on the case with one asset, we can characterize the equilibrium as follows. Define
s∗∗ as the minimal state where the first best allocation can be reached.
ω +
aρA(s
∗∗) + bρB(s∗∗)
(1− θ1)v′(c12,∗)
= c22,∗.
Then the repayment schedule for asset i is
fi(s) =

p2,i(s)
1− θ for s ≤ s
∗∗,
ρi(s
∗∗)
(1− θ)v′(c12,∗)
for s ≥ s∗∗.
where (p2,A(s), p2,B(s)) are the spot market prices of asset A and B respectively in period 2,
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state s. They are defined as follows for i = A,B:p2,i(s)v
′
(
ω +
ap2,A(s)+bp2,B(s)
(1−θ)
)
− ρi(s) = 0 s ≤ s∗∗
p2,i(s)v
′(c12,∗) = ρi(s) s > s
∗∗
for s < s**.
The liquidity premium for asset i = A,B is
Li =
∫ s∗∗
s
ρi(s)
1− θ
[
u′
(
c22(s)
)
v′(c12(s))
− 1
]
dF (s)
Hence,
·La,b = LA − LB
=
∫ s∗∗
s
s− ρα(s)
1− θ
[
u′
(
c22(s)
)
v′(c12(s))
− 1
]
dF (s)
= − α
1− θ
∫ s∗∗
s
(s− E[s])
[
u′
(
c22(s)
)
v′(c12(s))
− 1
]
dF (s)
> 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that the integral is negative over the integration range.
The haircut as a function of α is:
Hi(α) = p1,i − qi
= E
[
(p2,i(s)− fi(s))v′(c12(s))
]
= E[p2,i(s)v
′(c12(s))]−
∫ s∗
s
p2,i(s)
1− θ1 v
′(c12,s)dF (s)−
∫ s∗
s
p2,i(s
∗)
1− θ1 v
′(c12,∗)dF (s)
= E[s]−
∫ s∗∗
s
ρi(s)
1− θdF (s)−
∫ s¯
s∗∗
ρi(s
∗∗)
1− θ dF (s)
= E[s]−
∫ s∗∗
s
(1 + αi)s− αiµ
1− θ dF (s)−
∫ s¯
s∗∗
(1 + αi)s
∗∗ − αiµ
1− θ dF (s)
= E[s] +
αiµ
1− θ −
(1 + αi)
1− θ
[∫ s∗∗
s
sdF (s) +
∫ s¯
s∗∗
s∗∗dF (s)
]
The term in brackets is less than E[s] therefore, for all assets A and B such that αA < αB we
obtain
HA < HB
i.e. the safe asset always commands a lower haircut than the risky asset.
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3.7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The same arguments apply to establish that agent 2 does not borrow in a repo so that
we need to consider only one repo contract f(ν2) ∈ F12(p2). However, spot trades are non trivial
because agent 2 can now re-sell collateral pledged by agent 1. The equilibrium conditions write:
−p1 + E[sv′(c12(s))] + γ11 = 0,
−q12 + E
[
f(s, ν)v′(c12(s))
]
+ γ11 = 0.
−p1 + E
[
su′(c22(s))
]
+ γ21 = 0,
−q12 + E
[
f(s, ν)u′(c22(s))
]
+ ν2γ
2
1 = 0.
c12(s) = ω − f(s, ν)b12 + p2(s)(a11 − a)
c22(s) = ω + f(s, ν)b
12 + p2(s)a
2
1
We only look at the case where the collateral constraint binds as otherwise agents may reach
the first-best allocation and the analysis is straightforward. In this case:
a11 = b
12 (3.32)
a21 = −ν2`21 (3.33)
Using clearing in the spot market, we have a11 + a
2
1 = a. Market clearing for for repo requires
b12 = `21. Summing (3.32) and (3.33) we obtain
a11 = b
12 =
a
1− ν2
a21 = −νb12 = −
ν2
1− ν2 a
We can write agent 2 consumption as
c22(s) = ω +
a
1− ν2 (f(s, ν2)− ν2p2(s))
We can then adapt the proof of the no re-use case, observing that f(s, ν2) ≤ p2(s)/(1 − θ1) as
before and replacing f(s) by (f(s, ν2)−ν2p2(s))/(1−ν2). As a consequence, the repurchase schedule
finances the first-best consumption profile (c12,∗, c
2
2,∗) whenever possible and hits the borrowing limit
otherwise. We thus have:
p¯(s, ν) =

p2(s)
1−θ if s < s
∗(ν)
s∗(ν2)
(1−θ)v′(c12,∗) +
ν(s−s∗(ν2))
v′(c12,∗)
if s ≥ s∗(ν)
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where s∗(ν2) is implicitly defined as follows
ω +
as∗(ν2)
(1− ν2)v′(c12,∗)
[
1
1− θ − ν2
]
= c22,∗.
Since v → 1−(1−θ)v1−v is increasing in v, s∗(ν2) is decreasing in v2 and limν2→1 s∗(ν2) < 0.
Assuming now that ν1 > 0, we provide a formal argument for the claim in Remark 1. Agent
2 does not want to sell in a repo if for all f˜21 ∈ F21(p2), we have:
E[f˜21(s)u
′(c22(s))] + γ
2
1 ≥ E[f˜21(s)v′(c12(s))] + ν1γ11
Using the equilibrium characterization, we obtain the following inequality:
E
[
f˜21(s)
(
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
)] ≥ 1
1− ν2E
[
(ν1(f(s, ν2)− ν2p2(s))− f(s, ν2) + p2(s))
(
u′(c22(s))− v′(c12(s))
)]
Using the expression for f(s, ν2) we derived and f˜21 = ν1(1− θ1)p2(s) (the contract for which
the inequality above is the most difficult to satisfy), we obtain:
(1− θ1)ν1 ≥ (1− ν1ν2)(1− θ1)− (1− ν1)
(1− θ1)(1− ν2)
⇔ ν1(1− ν2)(1− θ1)2 ≥ ν1(1− ν2)− θ1(1− ν1ν2)
⇔ θ1(1− ν2ν1) ≥ ν1(1− ν2)θ1(2− θ1)
This is equivalent to condition (3.20).
3.7.5 Proof of Proposition 4 and 5
In this section, we prove the following result, that nests Proposition 7 and 8. Define first s∗(b, θi, ν)
for i = 1, B, as the solution in s∗ to:
u′
(
ω +
bs∗
1− ν
[
1
1− θi − ν
])
= δi,
and for i = 1, B, define the repo contract fi2(b) implicitly as a function of the amount borrowed b:
fi2(b, ν2, s) =

p2(s)
1−θi if s < s
∗(b, θi, ν2)
s∗(b,θi,ν)
δ(1−θi) +
ν2(s−s∗(b,θi,ν2))
δ if s ≥ s∗(b, θi, ν2)
(3.34)
As before, s∗(b, θi, ν2) is the threshold in s above which marginal rates of substitution between
a type i and 2 agents can be equalized, given, in particular, the amount of asset b available. Since
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agent 1 is the marginal holder of the asset into period 3, we know that p2(s) = s/δ.
Proposition. Let f1B be the repo contract given by :
f1B(s) =
p2(s)
1− θ1 ∀s ∈ [s, s¯] (3.35)
and bˆ the solution to:
∫ s∗(bˆ,θB ,ν2)
s
[
u′
(
ω +
bˆ
1− ν2
[
1
1− θB − ν2
])
− δB
]
p2(s)dF (s)
=
(δB − δ)θ1
(1− νB)(1− θ1)
(1− θB)(1− ν2)
1− (1− θB)ν2 E[p2(s)] (3.36)
The equilibrium features intermediation iff bˆ > 0. Three cases are then possible:
1. bˆ > a. Agent 1 sells the asset spot to B who borrows bB2∗ = a/(1 − ν2) from agent 2 using
repo fB2(a, ν2). [Proposition 4]
2. bˆ ∈ [νHa, a]. Agent 1 uses a combination of a spot and repo sale with f1B with B. Agent B
borrows bB2 = bˆ/(1− ν2) from agent 2 using repo fB2(bB2, ν2)
3. bˆ ∈ [0, νHa]. Agent 1 borrows from B using repo F1B and B borrows bB2 = bˆ/(1− ν2) from
agent 2 using repo fB2(b
B2, ν2). [Proposition 5]
In case 2 and 3, the following condition is necessary :
1
1− θB −
1
1− θ1 ≥ (1− νB)
1− ν2(1− θB)
(1− ν2)(1− θB)
In all three cases the amount b1B∗ borrowed by agent 1 from B is given by:
bLH∗ =
a− (1− ν2)bB2∗
1− νB (3.37)
Proof. Under our conjecture, agents 1 and B may trade in a repo f1B and agents B and 2 can trade
in a repo fL2. As usual, agents may also trade in the spot market. We then derive the conditions
and characterize the repo contracts fLH and fH2 for this conjecture to be an equilibrium.
Step 1: Agents problem and first order conditions
Observing that agent 1 will be the final holder of the asset, as before, we can write his opti-
mization problem as follows:
max
a11,b
1B
ω + p1(a− a11) + q1Bb1B + E
[
δ
(
ω + p2(s)a
1
1 − f1B(s)b1B
)
+ a.s
]
s.to a11 ≥ b1B (γ11)
b1B ≥ 0 (ξ1B)
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While the problem of agent H is:
max
aB1 ,l
B1,bB1
ω − p1aB1 − q1B`B1 + qB2bB2
+δBE
[
ω + p2(s)a
B
1 + f1B(s)`
B1 − fB2(s)bB2
]
s.to aB1 + νB`
B1 ≥ bB2 (γB1 )
`B1 ≥ 0 (ξB1)
bB2 ≥ 0 (ξB2)
Recall that aB1 is the spot market trade of agent B. The variable `
B1 is the amount agent B lends
to 1. Every unit of loans yields agent B a fraction νB of re-usable asset. These units can be re-sold
spot, which decreases aB1 , or re-pledged to agent 2, which increases b
B2. Finally, agent 2 solves
max
a21,l
2B
ω − p1a21 − qB2`2B + E
[
u
(
ω + sa21 + fB2(s)`
2B
)]
s.t. a21 +ν2`
2B ≥ 0 (γ21)
`2B ≥ 0 (ξ2B)
Let us now write down the first order conditions for our 3 agents:
−p1 + δE[p2(s)] + γ11 = 0 (3.38)
q1B − δE[f1Bs)]− γ11 + ξ1B = 0 (3.39)
−p1 + δBE[p2(s)] + γB1 = 0 (3.40)
−q1B + δBE[f1B(s)] + νBγB1 + ξB1 = 0 (3.41)
+qB2 − δBE [fB2(s)]− γB1 = 0 (3.42)
−p1 + E
[
p2(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
+ γ21 = 0 (3.43)
−qB2 + E
[
fB2(s)u
′(c22(s))
]
+ ν2γ
2
1 = 0 (3.44)
Market clearing implies that bij = `ji for each pair of agents (i, j). Hence, we only use the notation
b in the following. Observe that we introduced the positivity constraint on the amount borrowed
by 1 to B as these agents may not use a repo transaction but a spot trade exclusively. A quick
examination shows that all three collateral constraints bind, that is γ11 > 0 , γ
B
1 > 0 and γ
2
1 > 0.
This implies that:
a11 = b
1B
aB1 + νBb
1B = bB2
a21 + ν2b
B2 = 0
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while market clearing for the asset yields:
a11 + a
B
1 + a
2
1 = a
Using this last equations together with the collateral constraints above, we obtain equation (3.37),
that is
a = (1− νB)b1B + (1− ν2)bB2
Quick manipulations of equations (3.38) to (3.44) give the following expressions for the La-
grange multipliers associated to the collateral constraints:
γ21 =
1
(1− ν2)E
[
(fB2(s)− p2(s))
(
u′(c22(s))− δB
)]
γB1 =
1
(1− ν2)E
[
(fB2(s)− ν2p2(s))
(
u′(c22(s))− δB
)]
γ11 = γ
B
1 + (δB − δ)E[p2(s)]
Let b∗ be the amount of asset available for the repo between 1H and 2 so that bB2∗ = b
∗/(1− ν2)
c22(s) = ω + b
B2
∗ (fB2(s, b
∗, ν2)− ν2p2(s))
Step 2 : Equilibrium Repo contracts
i) Equilibrium repo contract f1B between 1 and B
With usual equilibrium selection argument, agents 1 and B are not willing to trade contract
f˜1B if and only if
δE[f˜1B(s)] + γ
1
1 ≥ δBE[f˜1B(s)] + νBγB1
If b1B > 0, from equations (3.39) and (3.41), we obtain
(δB − δ)E
[
f1B(s)− f˜1B(s)
]
≥ 0
which, if δB > δ1, may only hold if
f1B(s) =
p2(s)
1− θL , ∀s.
If b1B = 0 (i.e. agents 1 and B trade only spot) then we must have :
(δB − δ) θ1
1− θ1 E[p2(s)] ≤ (1− νB)γ
1
B
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ii) Equilibrium repo contract fB2 between B and 2.
For a given amount b∗ of asset available, agents B and 2 trade as in the previous section
replacing a by b∗. Using our previous results, the equilibrium repo contract is fB2(b∗, ν2) defined
in (3.34).
Step 3 : Determination of b∗
We now determine the endogenous amount b∗ available for the repo trade between 1H and 2
in order to describe the equilibrium completely. This determines in particular whether agents 1
and B trade spot.
i) b1B = 0.
Since agent 1 collateral constraint binds, it must be that a11 = 0 and a
B
1 =
a
1−ν2 . This implies
that b∗ = a and bB2 = a1−ν2 . Agent 2 consumption is
c22(s) =
ω +
ap2(s)
1−ν2
[
1
1−θB − ν2
]
if s < s∗(a, ν2, θB)
c22,∗ if s ≥ s∗(a, ν2, θB)
This is an equilibrium if ξ1B + ξB1 ≥ 0 . Using equations (3.39) and (3.41), the condition
writes
γ11 ≥ νBγB1 +
δB − δ
1− θ1 E[p2(s)]
which, using our derivations above, can be rewritten:
1− (1− θB)ν2
(1− θB)(1− ν2)
∫ s∗(a,θB ,ν2)
s
[
u′
(
c22(s)
)− δB] p2(s)dF (s) ≥ (δB − δ)θ1
(1− νB)(1− θ1)E[p2(s)]
Since the mapping
a→
∫ s∗(a,θB ,ν2)
s
[
u′
(
c22(a, s)
)− δB] p2(s)dF (s)
is decreasing in its argument, the condition above is equivalent to condition bˆ > a of case 1.
ii) b1B > 0
In this case, we obtain two expressions for γB1 which impose the following equality:
1− (1− θB)ν2
(1− θB)(1− ν2)
∫ s∗(a,θB ,ν2)
s
[
u′
(
c22(s)
)− δB] p2(s)dF (s) = (δB − δ)θ1
(1− νB)(1− θ1)E[p2(s)]
and pins down the amount b∗ ∈ [0, a] available for B to use in repo fB2. Suppose first that
142
Chapter 3. Repurchase Agreements
b∗ ∈ [νBa, a]. Then it must be that agent 1H buys a fraction of the asset from 1L. If they only
trade in a repo, the maximum amount of free collateral available to 1H is νBa. Suppose now that
b∗ ∈ [νBa, a], then using equation (3.37) and agent 1 collateral constraint, we obtain a11 = b1B > a.
Since agent 1L initially owns a10 = a , it means that he is a net buyer of the asset (throughB
re-selling in the repo). Hence, agent 1 and B only use repo f1B .
Step 4 : No profitable contract between 1 and 2
We need to check that intermediation is optimal, that is agents 1 and 2 do not want to trade
directly a contract f˜12. This requires
δE[f˜L2(s)] + γ
1
1 ≥ E[f˜12(s)u′(c22(s))] + ν2γ21
We can rewrite the condition as
(1− ν2)γ21 ≥ E
[(
f˜12(s)− p2(s)
) (
u′(c22(s))− δ
)]
Using the expression of γ21 , we obtain:
E
[
(fB2(s)− p2(s))
(
u′(c22(s))− δB
)] ≥ E [(f˜12(s)− p2(s)) (u′(c22(s))− δ)]
or,
E
[(
fB2(s)− f˜12(s)
) (
u′(c22(s))− δB
)] ≥ θ1(δB − δ)
1− θ1 E[p2(s)]
In the LHS, we use f˜12 = p2(s)/(1− θ1) to find the tightest bound:(
1
1− θH −
1
1− θL
)∫ s∗(b∗,,θ,ν2)
s
p2(s)
(
u′
(
c22(s)
)− δB) ≥ θL(δH − δL)
1− θL E[p2(s)]
(1− ν2)(1− θB)
1− (1− θB)ν2
[
1
1− θB −
1
1− θ1
]
γB1 ≥
θL(δH − δL)
1− θL E[p2(s)]
\
where the last line follows from the expression for γB1 derived above. We know from (3.38)
-(3.41) that the RHS lies below (1− νB)γB1 and that it is equal when b1B > 0. In this latter case,
we can rewrite the necessary condition above as(
1− 1− θB
1− θ1
)
1
1− ν2(1− θB) ≥
1− νB
1− ν2
which is sufficient condition (5). The condition will also be necessary whenever b1B > 0.
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